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**Population Protection in the 1990s:
Managing Risk in the New Security Environment**

Patrick Harrison Donley

**Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement
of the PhD in International Relations,
London School of Economics and Political Science
University of London**

2003

Abstract

Throughout the 1990s, Western states, either as part of a UN force, a multinational coalition under UN authority, or a coalition of states operating without UN approval, intervened militarily in intrastate conflicts, ostensibly to protect endangered non-combatants. In spite of their military superiority and vast resources, the Western interveners were largely unsuccessful at providing protection to the populations. This thesis seeks to explain why Western states intervened in humanitarian crises throughout the 1990s in a way that failed to protect populations.

Using the protection interventions in northern Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo as case studies, this thesis demonstrates that the interveners prioritised the protection of their self-interests over the protection of the endangered populations. As a result, and in spite of their humanitarian rhetoric, Western interveners protected populations only when doing so coincided with the pursuit of their self-interests.

Furthermore, this thesis argues that by utilising concepts from risk theory, it is possible to reconcile the willingness of Western states to intervene in humanitarian crises with their refusal to provide adequate protection to vulnerable civilian populations. Rather than viewing these inadequate protection interventions as anomalous occurrences that defy an overarching explanatory framework, it argues that they were the logical results of the West's post-Cold War "risk" perspective.

By applying key concepts derived largely from Ulrich Beck's sociological conception of a Risk Society to the population protection interventions of the 1990s, this thesis develops an explanatory framework for understanding the complex and seemingly counterproductive strategies employed by Western states.

The thesis concludes that Western states were acting as risk societies and approached the interventions of the 1990s as exercises in "risk management" in which the costs required to protect populations were deemed to be disproportionately high when compared to the risks posed to Western self-interests.

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DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1990s, Western states, acting within coalitions or as part of the United Nations, launched elaborate interventions into dangerous intrastate conflicts purportedly to protect endangered non-combatant populations. Though lives were saved as a result of these efforts and “success” was proclaimed by the interveners, over a million non-combatants were killed and millions more were displaced from their homes while under the “protection” of intervening forces. Moreover, many recipients of these protection efforts were still suffering abuse in refugee villages or internally displaced persons (IDP) camps years after the interventions ended. Mary Kaldor described these interventions as “disappointing” and “shameful” and declared that “it is hard to find a single example of humanitarian action during the 1990s that can be unequivocally declared a success”.¹ Similarly, Adam Roberts described the interventions as “flawed”, “shameful”, and “dishonest” and urged the West to cease its “bland statements, half-promises and betrayals”.² The fact that the wealthiest states with the most powerful militaries in the world, backed by large segments of the international community, were unable to provide effective protection to vulnerable civilians warrants further investigation. What is perhaps even more interesting is that despite the variances in their times and locations, these Western interventions shared a number of commonalities. In all the interventions, Western states emphasised humanitarian justifications and objectives for their actions, acted within a coalition or similar multinational arrangement, prioritised the safety of intervention forces over that of the endangered populace, and implemented minimalist

¹ Mary Kaldor, “A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention: The Role of Global Civil Society”, in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2001*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 110.

² Adam Roberts, *Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and impartiality in a policy vacuum*, Adelphi Paper 305, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 9 79, and 88.

strategies designed to contain or manage the humanitarian crises rather than end them altogether. Indeed, in many cases, the West took actions that seemed to thwart its stated protection objective.

Numerous authors, independent panels, and specially-appointed investigative commissions have repeatedly concluded that the West's failure to protect populations did not originate from a lack of capabilities or technical expertise. To be sure, Western military forces have learned "lessons" from their experiences and have attempted to incorporate them into workable doctrines for the future. Nevertheless, their failure to provide adequate protection is widely accepted by academics and practitioners alike to have resulted from a lack of will.³ Beyond this general observation, the analysts either differ substantially or else choose not to pursue the issue further. This thesis takes the West's "lack of will" as its starting point and endeavours to provide an explanatory framework by which the West's "will" regarding endangered populations, and the seemingly self-defeating actions it took on their behalf, can be understood. To accomplish this, the thesis seeks to answer one primary question: **Given its overwhelming military capabilities, why did the West intervene in humanitarian crises throughout the 1990s in a way that failed to protect populations?** This question can best be answered incrementally by resolving several secondary questions:

- a.) Was population protection the West's primary purpose for launching the interventions?
- b.) If not, what was the primary purpose?
- c.) How did the West go about pursuing this purpose?

³ For example, see A/54/549, 15 November 1991, "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica", para 490, page 108, and A/55/305—S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations", paras 52, 265, and 266, pages 9 and 44, and S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, 15 December 1999, Accessed 21 July 2003. <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement>, Conclusions 1 and 10.

Prior to discussing the specific manner in which this thesis goes about answering these questions, it is necessary to give a brief description of the post-Cold War security environment in which the interventions took place.

1.1 POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Western protection interventions in the 1990s occurred in an environment characterised by two contradictory pressures. On the one hand, Western states were pressured to intervene on behalf of endangered populations as a result of their increased ability, opportunity, awareness, and acceptance of the population protection mission. On the other hand, they were reluctant to undertake dangerous military missions for issues that did not clearly affect their more traditional notions of national interest. Factors such as casualty aversion, fickle public support, and the complexity of the protection mission all argued against an interventionist approach. Faced with these conflicting pressures, Western states seemed simultaneously to advocate and eschew the protection mission in the 1990s.

1.1.1 Pressures to Protect

Numerous factors existed throughout the 1990s which provided a basis for hope to endangered populations who sought external protection from intrastate belligerents. First, there existed an increased *ability* among Western states to intervene on behalf of populations as the Permanent Members of the Security Council were inclined to put aside ideological differences and co-operate, at least passively, to stop instances of egregious humanitarian abuse. Second, there was an increased *opportunity* for protection interventions as anti-population intrastate conflict abounded in the volatile and weapons-saturated post-Cold War environment. Third, the Western public's *awareness* of the

crises increased as the effect of globalisation and the growth of global civil society increased the information available. The media transmitted real-time footage of the plight of populations from formerly inaccessible regions of the world and humanitarian organisations became more adept at influencing public opinion. As public awareness of the crises grew, Western publics generally became more willing to respond to humanitarian needs and to pressure Western decision-makers to act on the victims' behalf. Finally, as a result of the relaxed survival threat and the increased public demand for humanitarian action, Western leaders conveyed an increased *acceptance* of protection interventions. They responded with strong humanitarian rhetoric and forceful condemnation of population abuse. Some Western states even expanded their concept of security to include the individual human being. The Security Council's frequent ruling that serious humanitarian crises constituted threats to international peace and security further reinforced acceptance of the protection mission. This interpretation legitimised enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, in so doing, challenged the prevailing understanding of state sovereignty with respect to a state's treatment of its own population.

Ability. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s⁴ had a profound effect on the West's ability to protect endangered populations. Not only did it usher in a period of extreme optimism within the international community, but it also left the West in an indisputably predominant position. Freed from the superpower stalemate that had blocked effective action for the previous forty-five years, the international community was optimistic that

⁴ Though the date of the Cold War's end is disputable, many scholars recognise two key dates as marking its termination. The first was Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the General Assembly on 7 December 1988 announcing the restructuring of the Soviet military and the drastic cuts to its military presence in Eastern Europe. The second was the Malta Summit between Gorbachev and US President George Bush in December 1989 in which both leaders recognised the lessening of tensions between the two countries.

the Security Council would finally be able to carry out its intended purpose of safeguarding international peace and security. As the superpowers withdrew their support from various Cold-War conflicts around the globe and exerted pressure on their former clients to end the fighting, many combatants found themselves physically, technically, or financially unable to continue fighting and looked to the UN for help in bringing about a durable peace. Optimistic of success, the UN Security Council authorised a number of new peacekeeping missions of a substantially different magnitude from those of the Cold War era. Rather than merely interposing peacekeeping forces to support an already agreed-upon cease-fire as it had done in the past, the Security Council mandated these new operations to perform a variety of tasks including electoral support, repatriation of refugees, provision of humanitarian assistance, and disarmament.⁵

Optimism was further increased as a result of the Chapter VII action taken against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91. In response to Iraq's aggression, the Security Council Member States co-operated enough to pass relevant Security Council resolutions and fight together in an international coalition to reverse the Iraqi occupation. In 1991, US President George Bush confidently proclaimed that a New World Order had begun. In 1992, the Security Council had its first meeting composed entirely of heads of state. British Prime Minister John Major, who chaired the meeting, captured the Security Council's spirit of optimism with these words:

The world now has the best chance for peace, security and development since the founding of the United Nations. I hope, like the founders of the United Nations themselves, that we can today renew the resolve enshrined in the Charter—the resolve to combine our efforts to accomplish the aims of the Charter in the interests of all the people we are privileged to represent.⁶

⁵ See Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey's/IISS, 1993), 12-25.

⁶ S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992, 7.

Fresh from its success in the 1991 Gulf War and the multidimensional operations of the late 1980s, the Security Council commissioned the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to report on how the UN could be made more effective in its "capacity ... for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping".⁷ The resultant report, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, was a ground-breaking document founded squarely on post-Cold War optimism. Among other things, Boutros-Ghali proposed a new mission, coined "Peace Enforcement", in which UN troops would take "coercive action" to enforce cease-fires.⁸ Such a mission was particularly novel for the UN because it suggested deploying troops to intrastate conflicts in which the peacekeeping norm of consent was weak or lacking altogether. Boutros-Ghali's proposition was significant for Western states, particularly those who held permanent seats on the Security Council, because it offered them a way to address difficult humanitarian missions without necessitating large deployments of their own forces. Acting through the Security Council, they could reap the benefits of responding to difficult conflicts without shouldering all of the costs and responsibilities. More importantly, if the intervention went awry, they could hold the UN responsible. The large number of UN missions which followed Boutros-Ghali's report attested to the West's approval. For example, in 1992, 10,000 UN forces were deployed in support of 8 traditional peacekeeping and observation missions. By 1993, the numbers had risen to 80,000 personnel across 18 separate operations that covered a wide range of multivariate missions.⁹

⁷ S/23500, 31 January 1992.

⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992. Boutros-Ghali expounded on the definition of peace enforcement in his article, "Empowering the UN," *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter 1992-1993), 93.

⁹ John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, 2nd ed., (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 2000), 146.

Western states were also more able to protect populations in the post-Cold War period because of the permissive environment in which they operated. They could embark on protection interventions without the fear of inciting the Soviet Union into a larger, more dangerous conflict. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Russia in economic turmoil, the West was economically and militarily predominant. There was no challenger that possessed anything comparable to the West's range of capabilities. Consequently, the West wielded a great deal of influence in the international community and was able to pursue its humanitarian agenda with very few external constraints. The West's ability to launch protection interventions was further enhanced by the fact that most states did not want to be seen as supporters of openly abusive regimes. Therefore, even when states were uncomfortable with the West's humanitarian agenda, they were rarely willing to oppose it openly in cases of egregious population abuse.

Opportunity. The instability and upheaval of the post-Cold War period meant that intrastate conflicts proliferated. Moreover, as non-combatant populations were often intentionally targeted by combatants in these conflicts, the West's opportunity to intervene on the populations' behalf increased accordingly. In 1994, the UN Development Programme reckoned that 79 of the 82 conflicts that occurred between 1989 and 1992 were intrastate in nature.¹⁰ In a similar finding, Cherif Bassiouni reported that, of the 100 conflicts in the 1990s, only 10 were interstate in nature.¹¹ The point of these statistics is not to assert that post-Cold War intrastate conflicts vastly increased in number or even that the manner in which they were fought was markedly different from earlier conflicts; both of these assertions can, and have been, hotly disputed. The point is that

¹⁰ UNDP, UN Development Report, 1994. Quoted in John Harriss, "Introduction: a time of troubles—problems of international humanitarian assistance in the 1990s," in *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, John Harriss, ed., (London: Pinter, 1995), 1.

the intrastate conflicts, within the context of the post-Cold War security environment, took on new dynamics which increased the West's opportunity to protect populations.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and other formerly communist states, many newly recognised states experienced internal turmoil as various factions struggled for political control. As superpower support was withdrawn and state control weakened, disaffected groups and ethnicities, motivated by successful independence movements across the globe, the international isolation of their governments, or simply the injustice of their own circumstances, forcefully challenged their state authorities. In many cases, the recognised governments of these new states sought external military assistance from the international community. In other cases, states that had once been strategically important in the zero-sum game of bi-polar confrontation were now viewed by their former patrons as remote, costly, and strategically unimportant. Consequently, favoured leaders and regimes that had maintained power through their patrons' financial and military sponsorship were now left to fend for themselves. Faced with these circumstances, many states fell into economic ruin and near (or actual) collapse. Whether the interventions occurred as a result of a request from the legitimate government or in the absence of a viable state structure, in many cases, the West was able to intervene on the populations' behalf without posing a direct challenge to the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

Without the Cold War threat to stay the hand of would-be Western humanitarians or to provide decision-makers with an excuse for inaction, Western states were forced to consider intervention in humanitarian crises more seriously than before. For the Western

¹¹ Cherif Bassiouni, "Organized Crime and New Wars", in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.), *Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume I, New Wars*, (London: Pinter, 1997), 35.

states that had long championed human rights but had excused themselves from action because of the possibility of sparking a superpower confrontation, these humanitarian crises tested the credibility of their humanitarian commitment. In the fairly co-operative international environment of the 1990s, Western inaction in the face of serious humanitarian atrocities required convincing justifications from Western decision-makers.

The nature of the intrastate fighting further increased the West's opportunity to intervene on behalf of endangered populations. Since intrastate wars were often fought along ethnic or religious lines, people were often targeted because of their identity rather than their politics or combatant status. In these wars, "otherness" was the enemy. In an effort to "purify" or "cleanse" a piece of territory for self-rule, belligerents frequently launched terror campaigns against non-combatant populations. These campaigns resulted in genocidal purges and intentional mass expulsions of populations, either across borders or into other areas within their own borders. One study estimated that civilians made up ninety percent of all casualties in civil wars during this period.¹² The US Committee for Refugees claimed that "the number of people forced from their homes by violence and repression stood at more than 35 million at the end of 1999, compared to 29 million uprooted people in 1990".¹³ According to Mary Kaldor, in the 1990s, civilians went from being the unintentional victims of the conflicts to being the objective. She describes the terror tactics used against populations as follows:

Conspicuous atrocity, systematic rape, hostage-taking, forced starvation and siege, destruction of religious and historic monuments, the use of shells and rockets against civilian targets, the use of land-mines to make large areas uninhabitable, are all deliberate components of military strategy. The aim is to sow fear and

¹² Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 6.

¹³ "Review of a Dismal Decade: 1990s Ended with a larger Population Uprooted," *Press Release*, US Committee for Refugees, Washington, DC: USCR, 13 June 2000, 1. Quoted in Carola Weil, "The Protection-Neutrality Dilemma in Humanitarian Emergencies: Why the Need for Military Intervention?", *International Migration Review*, Volume 35, Number 1, (Spring 2001), 79.

discord, to instill unbearable memories of what was once home, to desecrate whatever has social meaning.¹⁴

Not only were civilians endangered by an opposing identity group, they were often intentionally kept vulnerable by their own leadership. Since ethnic cleansing translated into a victory of sorts for the opponent, the leaders of targeted groups often sought to keep their populations in place, regardless of the danger. Moreover, civilian atrocities, regrettable though they were, often served as a catalyst for international involvement and were, therefore, quite useful. In this way, populations became both the targets of the conflicts and the "trip wires" for international military assistance. In some conflicts, rival combatants even co-operated with one another to avoid direct battle, and chose to confine their "campaigns" to rival populations.¹⁵

The well-armed and loosely organised nature of combatants in these conflicts made a negotiated end to the atrocities, short of military intervention, difficult to achieve. The availability of weaponry in the aftermath of the Cold War made the combatants particularly resistant to international attempts at mediation. Armed with modern weapons, these challengers were able to fight against their state-supported adversaries or international forces on a more even (and in some cases superior) footing. Though these groups were better armed than Cold War rebels had been, they were not necessarily better organised. Typical of many intrastate conflicts, post-Cold War belligerents were frequently composed of "loosely knit groups of regulars, irregulars, and locally based warlords under little or no central authority".¹⁶ Moreover, fragmented state structures,

¹⁴ Mary Kaldor, "Introduction", in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.), *Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume I. New Wars*, Volume I, (London: Pinter, 1997), 16.

¹⁵ Mary Kaldor, "Introduction", Mary Kaldor (ed.), *Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume III, Global Insecurity*, (London: Pinter, 2000), 5-6. See also Adam Roberts, *Humanitarian Action in War*, 10-11, and Danish Institute of International Affairs, *Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects*, (Copenhagen, Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 32.

¹⁶ Danish Institute of International Affairs, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 32.

economic ruin, general dissatisfaction and desperation, combined with high weapons availability, meant that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants was often blurred. Though various groups may have been united in their desire to overthrow the existing system, they often disagreed over their vision of the post-conflict situation. In these cases, there was very little co-operation among the various bands of fighters. Even in cases where there was some semblance of central authority over the rebel movement, control over the disparate groups was often so weak that elements of the force were virtually independent of each other. These characteristics of post-Cold War intrastate conflict made it very difficult for peace negotiators to reach compromise agreements that would be honoured throughout the land, thus increasing the need and the opportunity for Western states to intervene on behalf of endangered populations.

Awareness. In addition to increased ability and opportunity for Western intervention, Western publics were more aware of the humanitarian crises, which led to their increased willingness to support action on behalf of endangered populations. One of the principle reasons for this greater awareness was the growth of what some have called the global civil society.¹⁷ While there are many definitions for this term, it is basically “the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities, and economies”.¹⁸ The interplay between the media, humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks, and commissions increased pressure on state governments to intervene on behalf of endangered populations primarily by raising

¹⁷ See Christopher Coker, *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*, Adelphi Paper 345, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 28-32.

¹⁸ Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor, “Introducing Global Civil Society”, in Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2001*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 17.

public awareness.¹⁹ The end of the Cold War meant that the media gained access to formerly restricted parts of the world. Moreover, the use of satellite technology enabled news stories to be transmitted to publics around the world as events took place. Twenty-four-hour news stations and Internet news sites sprang up and proved hugely popular with the public, especially in times of crisis. Around-the-clock news coverage of the 1991 Gulf War whet the public appetite for instant news and allowed viewers to watch the story unfold. One study estimated that 600 million viewers watched reports of the Gulf War every day.²⁰

Television images were particularly influential when it came to humanitarian emergencies. Images had the ability to move audiences to empathise with the victims of anti-population warfare in a way that printed media did not. Arousing viewers' empathy as opposed to their sympathy meant that they were moved to identify with the victims and were essentially transformed into vicarious participants. According to Christopher Coker, television images of victims "show us ourselves, at the same time denying us an alibi for indifference".²¹ The media's impact on shaping public perceptions and driving government policy has been widely debated and addressed, but there is, nevertheless, widespread agreement that the media is a powerful force in increasing public awareness and unease when it comes to humanitarian emergencies.²² A former US Secretary of State made the following comment regarding the effect of the media on policy-making:

We have yet to understand how profoundly the impact of CNN has changed things. The public hears of an event now in real time, before the State Department

¹⁹ Kaldor, "A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention", 110.

²⁰ Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 13.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 38.

²² For more on the effects of the media on foreign policy, see Fred H. Cate, "Through a Glass Darkly" [DRAFT], Harvard University's Asia Center, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/fs_cate2.htm. Accessed 17 July 2003. Also Nik Gowing, "Real-time TV Coverage from War: Does it Make or Break Government Policy?", in James Gow, Richard Paterson and Alison Preston (eds.), *Bosnia By Television*, (London: British Film Institute, 1996), 87. (81-91), Larry Minear, Colin Scott, Thomas G. Weiss, *The News Media, Civil War, & Humanitarian Action*, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1996).

has had time to think about it. Consequently, we find ourselves reacting before we've had time to think. This is now the way we determine foreign policy—it's driven more by the daily events reported on TV than it used to be.²³

Media accessibility was not the only factor that increased public awareness of humanitarian catastrophes. According to Coker, over 40,000 non-profit international NGOs currently exist, disbursing more money than the UN (excluding the World Bank and the IMF).²⁴ Armed with media images and an empathetic audience, humanitarian NGOs were increasingly enabled to affect Western policy. Moreover, the media often relied on spokespersons from humanitarian NGOs to interpret the images they showed. The more public empathy an NGO was able to generate, the more funds it was able to raise and, hence, the more pressure it was able to exert on decision-makers. As humanitarian NGOs grew in number, so did their competition for scarce resources. This need for funds further increased the motivation for NGOs to find and publicise newsworthy catastrophes. Only by doing so could they generate the necessary resources to survive.²⁵

Media influence and NGO growth increased the Western public's awareness of intrastate barbarity. Once aware, viewers were often moved to action on behalf of the endangered populations. Free from any obvious threats to their own survival and confronted with the daily barrage of civilian atrocities, they often demanded that something be done on behalf of the victims. As a result of information availability, "the informed citizen is [now] debating how, when and where to use force..."²⁶ Democratic governments had little choice but to take public sentiment into consideration during the 1990s. Bruno Delhay,

²³ Quoted in Dennis C. Jett. *Why Peacekeeping Fails*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999) 29.

²⁴ Coker, *Globalisation*, 29.

²⁵ For example, see "Sins of the Secular Missionaries", *The Economist*, 29 Jan 2000 on Global Policy Forum website, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/globdem/credib/2001/sins0329.htm> . Accessed 17 July 2003.

²⁶ Coker, *Globalisation*, 30.

head of France's Africa Unit in the president's office in 1992, expressed with uncharacteristic bluntness for a government official the effect that public pressure had on the French government's decision to join the aid effort in Somalia: "You see, it is soon going to be Christmas and it would be unthinkable to have the French public eat its Christmas dinner while seeing on TV all those starving kids. It would be politically disastrous".²⁷

Acceptance. As awareness of endangered non-combatants increased among Western audiences, Western decision-makers demonstrated a growing acceptance of the legitimacy of population protection interventions. In response to public pressure, and in some cases leading the outcry, leaders of international organisations as well as Western democratic officials grew ever more likely to make strong statements of support for population protection missions. For example, Kofi Annan spoke of a

...growing recognition that our first duty in any conflict is to protect the innocent civilians – who have no part in the fighting, who have nothing to gain from its persistence, and who have no choice but to rely on the international community to help them in their most desperate hour of need. To answer their call is our most important obligation under the Charter....²⁸

Similarly, when US President Bill Clinton announced the end of the war in Kosovo, he claimed that as a result of NATO's effort to protect the endangered Kosovars, the "demands of an outraged and united international community have been met".²⁹ In 1998, President Jacques Chirac stated his belief that humanitarian concerns overrode the norm of state sovereignty:

²⁷ Statement made to Gerard Prunier, 12 Dec 1992. Quoted in Prunier, "The Experience of European armies in Operation Restore Hope", in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 135.

²⁸ Kofi Annan, Press Release SG/SM/7364 SC/6848, 19 April 2000, "Secretary-General, Addressing Security Council on Protection of Civilians in Conflict, Reviews Past Progress, Recommends Future Approaches". <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000419.sgsm7364.doc.html>. Accessed 17 July 2003.

... the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required it, then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in order to assist those that are in danger.³⁰

In their apparent acceptance of the protection mission, Western leaders expanded and challenged the norm of state sovereignty. British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in his "international community" speech in Chicago that

[w]hen oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighbouring countries, then they can properly be described as 'threats to international peace and security'. When regimes are based on minority rule they lose legitimacy....³¹

Some states even shifted their conception of security from being state-based to individual-based. This concept, known as "human security", was first used in the UN Human Development Reports of 1994 and 1998. Canada, seeking a new post-Cold War security paradigm, proposed the concept within the UN General Assembly in 1996 and gave it additional prominence when holding the presidency of the Security Council in 2000.³² Though not a replacement for national security, the concept gave endangered populations reason for hope. Paul Heinbecker, Assistant Deputy Minister in Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, described human security this way:

The concept establishes a new standard for judging the success of international security policies: the ability to protect people, not just safeguard states. It may even require protecting people from their states. It considers both military and non-military threats to safety and well-being; and it points to human rights; democracy; and human development as key building blocks of security.³³

²⁹ William Jefferson Clinton, Text of speech on 10 June 1999, Cited in "Clinton Announces the End of the War in Kosovo", <http://www.australianpolitics.com/usa/clinton/speeches/990610kosovo.shtml>. Accessed 17 July 2003.

³⁰ Quoted in Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 44-5.

³¹ Prime Minister Tony Blair, "Speech by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, Thursday 22 April 1999. Accessed 17 July 2003. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316>.

³² See "Canada's Human Security Website", Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Accessed 17 July 2003. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignnp/humansecurity/HumansecurityBooklet-e.asp>

³³ Paul Heinbecker, "Human Security", <http://www.peacemagazine.org/9907/humsecur.htm>. Accessed 2002.

Twelve states were part of the human security network in 2002.

As the 1990s progressed and protection interventions were repeatedly launched or advocated, the norm of state sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention in internal affairs evolved considerably. Although there were no formal changes made to the UN Charter and many states continued to advocate the pre-eminence of state sovereignty, the Security Council began interpreting its purview more expansively than it had during the Cold War. In 1993, Louis Fréchette, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, observed that the

the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs of states no longer reign supreme in the UN. Indeed the pressure felt in the UN is for more intervention, not less and the debate of the future may revolve less around the question of whether the UN has the *right* to intervene than whether it has a *duty* to do so.³⁴

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, writing as Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1992, declared that "the centuries old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands".³⁵ Humanitarian concerns, once deemed to be the sole jurisdiction of the sovereign state and, therefore, off-limits to outsiders prior to 1991, were increasingly judged by the Security Council to be threats to peace and security. By re-defining what constituted such threats, the Security Council was able to legally justify interventions on humanitarian grounds. Such a shift was labelled by Nicholas Wheeler as "the key normative change in the 1990s".³⁶

Although there is still resistance to formally codifying a humanitarian exception to the non-intervention rule, UN Member States, and particularly the permanent members, are

³⁴ Louis Fréchette, Quoted in Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations?", *The Washington Quarterly* (17), no. 1, (Winter, 1994), 124.

³⁵ Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", 98-99.

unlikely to go on record defending a state's "right" to commit egregious humanitarian atrocities on the grounds of state sovereignty. Unlike the Cold War objections to humanitarian intervention for any reason, the post-Cold War debate in the 1990s centred on the determination of when a particular action moved from legitimate state control to state-sponsored abuse. Several times in the 1990s, the non-intervention norm was stretched even further when regional security organisations launched interventions without prior Security Council approval. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) launched its military force, ECOMOG, into Liberia in 1990, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) initiated airstrikes against Kosovo in 1999, both without Security Council approval. In spite of their unilateral actions, ECOWAS was eventually commended by the Security Council for its work and given post-intervention approval, and NATO's intervention was tacitly approved by the overwhelming defeat of a draft resolution introduced in the UN that called its actions illegal.

It would seem that the combination of greater ability, opportunity, awareness, and acceptance of protection interventions would have led to a host of successful protection efforts. Unfortunately for the endangered populations, these factors were countered by a host of others which weakened any serious resolve to protect them.

1.1.2 Pressures to Abstain from Intervention

Although Western states were often advocates of population protection, they were, nevertheless, constrained from intervening themselves because of their traditional notions of what constituted a threat to their national interests. As horrific and shocking as these

³⁶ Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 289.

population crises were, they rarely presented an unambiguous threat to Western interests. Instead, the crises typically produced discomfort, unease, or anxiety. The television images of suffering humanity *might* make the Western public feel ashamed or morally uneasy; the prospect of large numbers of refugees *might* put a strain on Western economies or endangered regional stability; and the well-publicised atrocities *might* challenge the West's credibility and reputation in the post-Cold World environment. While all of these potential effects struck chords of legitimate concern within the West, they rarely had the ability to move Western decision-makers or their publics to expend the lives and resources necessary to protect foreign populations adequately. In the absence of significant, unambiguous threats to national interests, Western states hesitated to intervene in a robust manner. Casualty aversion, fickle public support, and the complexity of the protection missions caused Western decision-makers to avoid robust interventions on behalf of endangered foreigners.

Casualty Aversion. Although Western publics often demanded action on behalf of endangered populations and influential leaders responded with positive humanitarian rhetoric, decision-makers, strongly influenced by past experience, were doubtful that the public would be willing to suffer friendly casualties in order to save the lives of distant strangers, especially if that sacrifice was made in the absence of a threat to traditional security interests. Providing assistance to hurting people and delivering food to starving children was one thing; doing so in a hostile environment where rescuers could be forced to jeopardise their own safety was quite another.

Casualty aversion did not originate in the post-Cold War era. It was certainly evident in the American experience in Vietnam when thousands of American servicemen and

women were killed or wounded for what many Americans believed were insufficient national interests. US casualty aversion was also evident in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 when the US expeditiously withdrew its Marines after 241 of them were killed by a suicidal car bomber. Though casualty aversion was not a new phenomenon, its effect on Western states in the post-Cold War environment intensified for a number of reasons.

First of all, humanitarian crises did not pose any direct or indirect threats to the survival of Western states. Hence, it was difficult for Western publics to justify paying the "ultimate price" for what they saw as tertiary interests. Protection interventions were viewed by the public as wars of choice, not survival. As such, the public was moved to action, but the action was to assist, not to sacrifice.³⁷ As previously mentioned, the viewing public could be moved to demand action on behalf of non-combatant victims, but they could not necessarily be moved to the point of personal suffering (or the suffering of their military representatives). Colin McInnes compared the public to sports spectators and concluded that, though they look on with pity,

they do not expect to suffer unduly themselves. Nor do they expect substantial numbers of their representatives on the field of battle to suffer either. The West does not wish to participate in the suffering but to spectate while its representatives act as a force for good in the world.³⁸

Throughout the 1990's, Western states and individual citizens sent enormous quantities of money, resources, food, and medicine out of genuine concern and goodwill toward suffering populations. Nevertheless, many considered the lives of their armed forces to be reserved for those operations that challenged clearly-defined and significant national interests.

³⁷ Colin McInnes, *Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) 93.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Second, technology made it possible to conduct limited interventions with minimal risk to intervening forces. Unlike in the past, new weapons were available that incorporated “smart” and “stealth” technology. Munitions could be launched miles away from the hostilities and guided with tremendous accuracy to the target. With such advanced technological capabilities, the shooter was able to accomplish his or her mission and remain largely out of danger. The cruise missile became the weapon of choice for the US. In fact, use of these weapons became so prevalent in the 1990s that critics accused US leaders of engaging in “cruise missile diplomacy”.

Third, the success of advanced technology and risk-reduction tactics created an expectation among the public that armed protection interventions could and would be conducted virtually casualty-free, especially when the intervention was, in a sense, optional. This expectation caused public support for military action to be tied (or perceived by decision-makers to be tied) to near-zero casualty rates. Therefore, when decision-makers considered if and how a protection mission should be conducted, they had to take into account the risk to friendly forces posed by the opposition, as well as the risk to their public support should they fail to assess and manage the risks effectively.

Weak Public Commitment. Because the Western public was often moved by media images, sound bites, and desperate tales from humanitarian organisations, its commitment to the endangered population was often based on a shallow understanding of the conflict. Consequently, its support for the intervention frequently waned as soon as the media shifted its focus or the intervention proved more difficult to resolve than was first supposed. In some cases, the same people who demanded intervention on one day were screaming for a withdrawal on the next. In an effort to take this shifting public support

into account, Western decision-makers demonstrated a propensity to dilute the protection mandate, either by formal decree or by their interpretation of the mandate, in order to maintain a degree of flexibility over the mission. They crafted the mandate in a way that left the objective ambiguous and which enabled them to terminate the mission and declare success almost regardless of the protection results.

Weak public commitment also led to a high degree of selectivity regarding which populations Western states would protect. Endangered populations in some crises were protected by the relatively quick, almost pre-emptive actions of interveners, while other vulnerable populations had to wait for the necessary momentum to build. In some cases, this momentum never did build, and the populations were left completely unprotected. The threshold for intervention during this period was difficult to define because it did not correlate with the number of civilians being killed or the complexity of the intrastate conflict in which the tragedy was occurring. In Rwanda, Western states virtually stood by and watched for over a month while close to a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu civilians were massacred. In the case of Sudan, where it is estimated that over 2 million people have been killed and 4 million internally displaced in a 17-year civil war, Western states have never seriously considered intervening on their behalf.³⁹ In contrast, NATO forces intervened in Kosovo even though the number of civilian fatalities was comparatively low.

Mission Complexity. The difficult nature of the protection mission also discouraged Western states from intervening on behalf of populations unless their national interests were at stake. The very characteristics of intrastate conflict that provided an increased

³⁹ See U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Seventeen Years of Crisis in Sudan", *Refugee Reports*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2001), http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/17years_rr01_4.htm. Accessed 17 July 2003.

opportunity for protection missions also served to dissuade Western decision-makers from committing their forces. Because control of the populations was often the goal of the combatants, any force sent to protect populations would likely find itself opposed by the warring sides. Moreover, as the combatants were often composed of irregular forces who blended in with the civilian populace, or who engaged in combat only on some occasions, it was difficult for the interveners to distinguish whom to protect.

Another factor that made the mission so complex was the fact that irregular forces were often impervious to the Western military's technological dominance. Usually, they were loosely organised, operated very cheaply, and had little in the way of a rigid command structure. These factors made it very difficult for Western forces to target them effectively and, perhaps more importantly from the Western perspective, safely.

Finally, the combatants in post-Cold War intrastate conflicts showed themselves to be much more willing to suffer and inflict casualties than Western states. In contrast to the West's preoccupation with limiting casualties, both friendly and enemy, these combatants intentionally utilised methods that were chosen for their barbarity and shock value.

All of these factors meant that would-be Western protectors would have to deploy a very large, heavily equipped, and highly trained force. Additionally, they would have to prepare for long and dangerous missions that would be difficult to sell to a Western public who expected quick results and limited casualties. For these reasons, Western states were particularly reticent to engage in protection missions when national interests were not at stake, regardless of the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe.

As a result of these counteracting pressures, Western decision-makers faced extremely complex choices regarding the appropriate actions to take in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s. In spite of the West's unambiguous humanitarian rhetoric, endangered populations rarely received unambiguous protection. In some cases where protection interventions took place, the populations may have been placed in more danger than if they had been left to fend for themselves.

1.2 CONTENTION

This thesis argues that, by utilising concepts from risk theory, it is possible to reconcile the willingness of Western states to intervene in humanitarian crises with their refusal to provide adequate protection to vulnerable civilian populations. Rather than viewing these inadequate protection interventions as anomalous occurrences that defy an overarching explanatory framework, it argues that they were the logical results of the West's post-Cold War "risk" perspective. It contends that Western states intervened in humanitarian crises, whether as part of a UN force, a multinational coalition under UN authority, or a coalition of states operating without UN approval, primarily to protect their own self-interests, and not to provide protection to endangered populations.

What makes these self-interested interventions different from those which occurred during the Cold War is that the humanitarian crises to which they were responding and the security environment in which they were acting were characterised by a high degree of uncertainty that made it difficult for Western interveners to determine what actions would promote their self-interests and what actions would harm them. Faced with this uncertainty and the anxiety which it produced, Western states acted as "risk societies".

They utilised protection interventions as a means of managing the risk to themselves generated by the humanitarian crises. In other words, they sought to protect populations only as long as doing so managed more risk than it generated.

1.3 ORGANISATION

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two focuses on the methodology of the work, including basic definitions, literature reviews, and theoretical concepts applicable to the thesis. Chapters Three through Six provide an in-depth examination of protection interventions in northern Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo respectively. The purpose of these case studies is to answer the first two secondary questions set out in the beginning of this chapter. By contrasting the West's official justifications and objections for the interventions with the methods and means it utilised to carry them out, the case studies show that the West was not primarily seeking to protect endangered non-combatants, regardless of the tone of its pre-mission rhetoric or post-mission analyses. Instead, the West primarily sought to safeguard its own self-interests. While these self-interests stayed fairly constant in the post-Cold War security environment, the potential hazards to them were often highly ambiguous and difficult to identify. Consequently, their uncertainty over the hazards was reflected in the apparently inconsistent strategies with which they approached the humanitarian crises. By exposing this inconsistency, the case studies reveal the need for an explanatory framework that accounts for the West's actions.

Each case study is divided into four sections. The first section examines the background of the humanitarian crisis leading up to the West's decision to intervene. Section two analyses the Western states' official and unofficial motives, as well as their official

objectives. This section takes into account verbal and written statements, as well as implied or unspoken ones, in an effort to develop an accurate picture of what the intervention was primarily designed to accomplish. Next, in order to shed light on which objectives were prioritised in practice and to expose the complexities and inconsistencies that permeated this prioritisation process, the third section focuses on how the intervention was actually conducted. Factors such as the types and numbers of troops and equipment that were used, the general strategies that were employed, and the rules of engagement that governed the operation are discussed in this section. The final section examines the results of the intervention in light of the interveners' stated objectives. Its purpose is to demonstrate that, while the methods used by the interveners accomplished questionable results in terms of population protection, they achieved many positive results in terms of Western self-interest.

While it is unreasonable to expect a decision as serious as foreign military intervention to be motivated by a single factor or conducted with a solitary objective in mind, it is reasonable to draw conclusions as to the interveners' priority objectives based on the methods they used and the results they achieved. If Western states were primarily motivated to protect populations, as was repeatedly claimed throughout the interventions, their actions should have been consistent with that end, regardless of any other objectives they sought to accomplish.

The four protection interventions addressed in this thesis were chosen for several reasons. First, they were the most obvious examples of population protection efforts (in designation if not in practice). In each of the first three cases, the interveners utilised specially designated humanitarian protection areas which, implicitly or explicitly, created

an expectation of physical protection within the endangered population, as well as among the interveners' domestic publics.

In the Kosovo case (Chapter 6), NATO did not designate a specific 'in-country' area for the protection of endangered non-combatants; however, it continually justified its intervention as a necessary measure to protect the endangered Kosovar population from the Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces. NATO's action in Kosovo was so connected with the idea of population protection that it was colloquially billed as a "humanitarian war".⁴⁰ Rather than being a weakness in the argument of this thesis, the absence of safe zones in Kosovo actually strengthens the conclusions and broadens the applicability of the study. The lack of safe zones in Kosovo reveals that the problem with population protection in the 1990s was bigger than a flawed method or an inadequate technique.

Analysing NATO's operation in Kosovo is also useful because it occurred at the end of the 1990s, after the initial heyday of UN optimism had given way to cautious scepticism. Finally, occurring as it did at the end of the decade, the Kosovo intervention dispels the notion that protection interventions failed simply because interveners were unfamiliar with the post-Cold War environment or inexperienced with the protection mission.

The selection of these four interventions is advantageous for a number of other reasons as well. The fact that they took place in geographically diverse areas broadens the applicability of the conclusions. Additionally, each of the four protection interventions were conducted by different groupings of Western interveners. In northern Iraq, the

⁴⁰ Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn 1999, 102. (102-23)

effort to protect the Kurds from Iraqi attacks was enforced by a thirteen-state coalition acting without specific authorisation from the UN Security Council but with its tacit acceptance. In Bosnia, the safe areas were initially protected by UN peacekeepers under a UN chain of command. Later, this UN force was augmented by a UN-authorized NATO air contingent. In Rwanda, the UN Security Council authorised a French-led multinational coalition to undertake an interim protection mission on its behalf until a UN peacekeeping force could be assembled to replace it. In Kosovo, the intervention was conducted by the NATO alliance without specific UN approval, though the UN was involved in the settlement and post-war administration. In short, the different actors and decision-making structures represented in the four case studies provide a complete picture of Western population protection in the 1990s.

While Chapters Three through Six conclude that the primary objective of the interveners was the pursuit of their self-interests and not the protection of endangered populations, Chapter Seven answers the third and final secondary question of the thesis by arguing that Western states, faced with the uncertainty that characterised the post-Cold War security environment, approached the humanitarian crises of the 1990s from a risk perspective and pursued their self-interests as risk societies. Their primary objective was the management of their own risks at the lowest possible expense. To support this argument, the chapter re-addresses the four interventions in light of risk theory. It demonstrates that Western states, in each of the interventions, displayed five key characteristics of risk societies, and implemented strategies that were consistent with risk management techniques.

Chapter Eight concludes the work. In addition to summarising the key points of the thesis and clearly answering the primary question, this chapter discusses a number of

observations and implications for Western risk societies, the international community, and endangered populations. Finally, it makes several recommendations for potential "protectors" in the future and highlights some key principles and warnings for the representatives of endangered non-combatant populations who might be seeking or receiving outside protection.

Included as an appendix to this work is a short case study on the 1999 Australian-led intervention in East Timor. This brief examination of International Force East Timor, or INTERFET as it was called, is intended to answer those critics who might view its apparent success as invalidating the conclusions reached in this work. It is thus written to show how the intervention in East Timor further demonstrates the suitability and applicability of utilising risk concepts as explanatory tools for Western actions in the 1990s.

CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to lay the conceptual foundation for the rest of the thesis. It is divided into five primary sections, each designed to help demonstrate the explanatory potential of applying concepts from risk theory to the Western protection interventions of the 1990s. The first section defines several key terms as they are used in this thesis. Section two presents a brief survey of some of the literature on humanitarian intervention, paying special attention to recent works that emphasise aspects of population protection. The third section, which makes up the bulk of the chapter, focuses on different aspects of risk. In order to demonstrate that risk has a central place in the contemporary political lexicon, this section first gives examples of how politicians have increasingly used risk terminology to describe the post-Cold War security environment. Next, it gives a brief background into the sociological theory of risk and lists five key risk concepts, drawn from a variety of sources, which characterise societies dominated by a risk mentality. The fourth section draws parallels between these characteristics and those that defined the security environment of the 1990s. Finally, in order to show how risk concepts are increasingly being applied within the fields of International Relations and International Security, the fifth section reviews several recent works that utilise risk theory to describe various aspects of the post-Cold War period.

2.1 DEFINITIONS

Many of the key terms used in this thesis have a wide range of definitions and connotations associated with them. In an effort to avoid the misunderstandings which often result from such ambiguity, this section defines some of these terms as they are used throughout the thesis. An effort has been made to simplify the definitions as much as possible with the realisation that further clarification will often be necessary within the context of the work.

2.1.1 Humanitarian Intervention

As mentioned in Chapter One, the focus of this thesis is on Western military interventions that were ostensibly undertaken to protect endangered populations in the 1990s. Most of the literature that deals with this subject uses the broad term *humanitarian intervention* to classify these operations, though there is little agreement as to what this term actually means. It has been applied to a wide range of humanitarian activities, from diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian assistance measures to full-scale combat operations. Humanitarian intervention has also been used to signify both consensual and non-consensual activities, with little agreement as to whose consent is required. Finally, some commentators qualify a humanitarian intervention as one motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns while others ignore the motive altogether and focus exclusively on the results. In an effort to avoid the confusion that could result from using this term, and to limit the scope of the thesis more explicitly, this thesis uses the term *population protection interventions* (or simply *protection interventions*) to refer to non-consensual, third-party military operations conducted for the stated purpose of protecting endangered

populations. In an effort to clarify this definition further, some related terms are addressed in greater detail below.

2.1.2 Population

A *population* refers to a group of non-combatants living within the borders of their home country whose physical security is directly endangered by armed conflict. Though the nature of many contemporary conflicts blurs the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, this thesis defines a non-combatant (or civilian) as any person who chooses not to take up armed struggle, regardless of age, sex, or fitness for military duty. Population is restricted to non-combatants because those who engage in armed conflict forfeit the right to any special degree of protection other than that stipulated for combatants under international humanitarian law. Population is further limited to people within their own country because once endangered people cross a border, they are viewed as refugees and are afforded special rights and protections as such. Additionally, refugees usually do not pose the same dilemma to the international community in terms of sovereign jurisdiction and accessibility as those confined within their own borders. In some cases, a population consists of people living within their own communities; in others, it is composed of internally displaced people (IDPs) who have been forced to flee their homes, but who have not crossed an international border. It is the vulnerability and inaccessibility of these IDPs that makes protection interventions on their behalf so necessary. Finally, the population addressed here encompasses only those people who are in need of protection as a result of armed conflict. This need could arise either from direct military attack, intentional endangerment for political purposes, or indirect manipulation through the withholding of basic necessities.

2.1.3 Protection

Protection is a widely disputed term within the humanitarian community. Adam Roberts distinguishes between two types of protection.¹ The first is a legal entitlement which signifies protection under the law, such as non-combatant immunity under the Geneva Conventions. The second is “physical protection from attack”. Others would add a third category to encompass a full range of activities, such as protection from hunger, disease, poverty, or oppression. While there are certainly different levels of protection, this thesis is chiefly concerned with efforts to provide physical protection from attack. It is arguably this interpretation of the term which shapes the expectations of most endangered people. While the standard connotation of protection goes beyond the mere provision of food and healthcare, it stops short of all-encompassing security. While physical protection from attack is the standard that will be used to judge the success of the four interventions examined in this thesis, it is important to note that various interveners defined the term differently (or left the definition intentionally ambiguous) throughout the 1990s. Consequently, some interveners may dispute this standard and claim that protection, in the sense of “physical protection from attack”, was never promised and, therefore, not their responsibility to provide. However, this thesis argues that by using terms such as “Safe Areas”, “Safe Havens”, “Humanitarian Zones”, “humanitarian space”, and “safe corridors”, the interveners created an expectation of physical protection among the endangered populations as well as among their own domestic publics.

¹ Adam Roberts, “The Exceptional Role of Humanitarian Issues in International Politics Since 1989”, 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, “Networking the Security Community in the Information Age”, 19-21 October 1998, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/securityforum/Online_Publications/WS5/WS_5C/Roberts.htm. Accessed 17 July 2003.

2.1.4 Consent

The meaning of *consent*, as it applies to this thesis, includes both the permission and the corresponding permissive action for an intervention to take place. Verbal acquiescence alone does not constitute consent. In the intrastate conflicts of the 1990s, combatants frequently gave their assurances of consent and then, once the interveners were on site, acted in a non-consensual manner or tried to manipulate their degree of consent in a way that benefited themselves. Moreover, the term is not used in the juridical sense of the word, which restricts the ability to grant and withhold consent to governments of sovereign states. The legal distinction simply is not useful for this thesis, given that the conflicts addressed here were intrastate in nature and always had at least one non-state combatant. Although few of the combatants were sovereign entities, and though their consent may have been insignificant in regards to international law, their toleration of the intervening force was often a matter of life and death to those who were engaged in the mission.

2.1.5 The West

Though protection interventions involved a host of states from various geographical areas and economic strata, this thesis is primarily concerned with the group of states often referred to as the *West*. The precise composition of the West is difficult to define because it is not strictly based on objective criteria such as geographical position or economic wealth. The definition is further complicated by the fact that the constituent states are not as unified as the collective term connotes. In an effort to give some structure to the term, however, this thesis utilises Colin McInnes' rather ambiguous definition which suggests that, while the "core" of the West includes the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, its composition can be more broadly defined as the "established liberal

democracies”.² According to McInnes, “the less well-established a liberal democracy is, the less that state may be considered to be part of the West”.³ In spite of the differences that exist among the states in the West, the use of the term is helpful because it allows broader generalities to be drawn and conveys the general expression, feeling, or opinion of this group of relatively like-minded states. While the term is difficult to define precisely, its use is broadly employed and accepted by academics and practitioners.

The West is an appropriate focus for the subject of protection interventions because, as Spyros Economides observed recently, “It is the Western world, with as its mainstay the Atlantic alliance, which is the flag-bearer, framer, and enforcer of the so-called ‘international community’”.⁴ Western states were especially influential in the majority of the interventions in the 1990s. Though not every so-called protection intervention involved the deployment of Western troops, the West’s influence, sanction, encouragement, and resources were generally critical to the effort. As for UN missions, Western states wielded three of the five vetoes on the Security Council, any one of which could have prevented the missions from occurring. Moreover, as Russia and China frequently abstained from the voting so as not to condone any action that would signal their support for a diminution of state sovereignty, Western states were frequently the primary drivers behind the scope, pace, and conduct of the operations. Additionally, Western states were responsible for providing the majority of the resources that made executing the missions possible. In non-UN missions, Western states frequently led the “coalitions of the willing”. Overall, had the West not pushed, or at least acquiesced in the population protection mission, very few protection interventions would have occurred.

² Colin McInnes, *Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict*, (Boulder, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002), 3.

³ Ibid.

2.1.6 Risk

Finally, the term *risk* deserves considerable attention. Because risk is discussed more fully in section four of this chapter, its treatment here is somewhat brief. Though the term risk has been in existence for years, its meaning has taken on new significance over time. Deborah Lupton devotes an entire chapter of her book, *Risk*, to the evolution of the term's meaning.⁵ Rather than go into the word's etymology or list a number of its definitions from a variety of sources, this thesis simply defines risk as the possible occurrence of a negative outcome or hazard. Two points from this definition are worth emphasising. First, risk is associated with an undesirable consequence, a potential harm, or an ill effect. Second, risk is based on uncertainty. The degree or intensity of a risk is determined by combining the perceived magnitude of the undesirable consequence with the probability of its occurrence. Thus, the more likely an event is to occur and the more damaging its potential effect, the greater the risk is said to be. The problem with such a determination is that risk, dealing as it does in uncertainties, makes the measurement of probability and magnitude extremely difficult and leaves the result open to dispute.

Risk Versus Threat. In the academic discourse, much has been made about the difference between *risk* and *threat*. For the sake of clarity, this thesis maintains a distinction between the two terms, even though politicians and practitioners often use them interchangeably. Some writers differentiate the terms according to the degree of the hazard they represent. For example, issues that jeopardise the survival of the state are

⁴ Spyros Economides, "Western Security: What Security? Whose Security?", Unpublished article in author's possession.

⁵ See Deborah Lupton, *Risk*, (London: Routledge, 1999) and Lennart Sjoberg, "Risk perceptions: taking on societal salience", in Johan Erikson (ed), *Threat politics: new perspectives on security, risk and crisis management*, (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), 21-2, Carlos C. Jaeger, Ortwin Renn, Eugene A. Rosa, and Thomas Webler, *Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action*, (London: Earthscan Publications,

threats, while those that merely affect its quality of life are risks. Others find in the terms a useful way of distinguishing the hazards associated with the Cold War (threats) from those of the post-Cold War (risks). For this thesis, the key distinction between the two terms is the level of certainty that accompanies the associated ill-effect. Hazards associated with risks are highly uncertain, the results of speculation. Hazards associated with threats are based on more precise information. For example, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal presented a threat to the West because Western leaders knew a great deal about the capability of the nuclear warheads. They also knew that the warheads were aimed at them. This perceived knowledge of the Soviet Union's intent and capability formed the basis of the Mutual Assured Destruction deterrent strategy. In contrast, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability prior to the US-led war in 2003 was a subject of wide debate among Western states, leading some to view it as a threat and others as a risk.⁶

As the above distinction implies, risks and threats are not exclusive of one another but exist simultaneously at either end of a continuum. Potential hazards are loosely categorised as one or the other depending on the degree of uncertainty that accompanies them. In this way, risks can become threats as uncertainty decreases and vice versa. Though risks and threats can be present simultaneously, the West's security environment in the 1990s was characterised more by risks than by threats. Rather than facing certain, impending perils, the West faced a host of uncertain, potential hazards that required constant monitoring and reassessment. The horrific effects of intrastate wars on non-combatant populations presented only one risk among a host of others. Moreover, the

Ltd, 2001), 17, Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999), 135, and John Adams, *Risk*, (London: UCL Press Limited, 1995), 69 for some of the different meanings of risk.

⁶ Yee-Kuang Heng, "Policing Iraq : A 'risk-management exercise' in international security?", unpublished paper.

risks did not jeopardise the state's survival, but its quality of life. These comparatively low risk, non-survival hazards created an environment in which Western states were in a position to choose which hazards they would confront and which they would ignore.

The final distinction discussed here relates to the different ways in which decision-makers respond to threats versus risks. The more knowledge a person has about a particular hazard, the more effectively that person can develop a specific strategy to confront it. Because threats are based on a greater degree of certainty than risks, decision-makers generally react to the specific hazard by developing a focused strategy with which to counter it. Risks, however, are based on highly uncertain hazards that defy such focused reactions. Instead of reacting based on what is already known, decision-makers must anticipate the unknown in an attempt to select the means most likely to prevent its occurrence. This proactive response to risks is discussed more fully in section four.

2.2 POPULATION PROTECTION LITERATURE SURVEY

In response to the frequent military interventions in humanitarian crises which occurred throughout the 1990s, academics and practitioners addressed the subject of population protection from a variety of different perspectives. Many writers viewed the protection interventions as signalling a major shift in international relations. Some saw them as the beginning of the end for Westphalian sovereignty and rejoiced at the future prospect of the state being replaced by the individual as the primary unit of analysis. Others tempered their optimism and proclaimed that the interventions merely indicated the beginnings of a shift toward a more solidarist conception of international society. Not everyone was pleased with the possibility of such a shift. Some viewed the interventions

with alarm, warning that a norm of humanitarian intervention could lead to the disintegration of international order. Others rejected the idea that the interventions signalled a major shift in state behaviour. Instead, they relied on explanations of state self-interest or contextual exceptionalism to account for the increased number of interventions.

The following brief literature survey examines some of these works, emphasising those that focus on the issue of non-combatant protection. Although there are a host of examples that could have been reviewed, this survey relies on a small representative sample to speak for the many whose writings followed similar lines of reasoning.

2.2.1 Solidarism

Because the protection interventions of the 1990s are viewed by many to represent a shift or weakening in the traditional notion of state sovereignty, a large percentage of the literature on the subject is written from a solidarist perspective. Solidarists generally feel that states can, or at least should, co-operate to enforce humanitarian norms in cases of severe humanitarian catastrophes, even if that means overriding the traditional norm of state sovereignty.

Sovereignty with Responsibility. One of the most common solidarist themes argues that state sovereignty should be redefined to incorporate a state's responsibility to its citizens.⁷

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is one of the most recent bodies to promote this position. The goal of the commission, which

⁷ For instance, Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), Fernando R. Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality*, (Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1988), and

concluded its report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* in December 2001, was to determine a minimum standard of acceptable state protection which the international community could agree upon and enforce in future crises.⁸

The basic premise of the report is that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, and that this responsibility is “sufficiently accepted in practice to be regarded as a de facto emerging norm...”⁹ Sovereignty, according to co-chairs Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, implies a dual responsibility: “externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state”.¹⁰ When the state is unable or chooses not to uphold its responsibility (or perhaps is itself guilty of endangering the population), “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”. In other words, the state forfeits its sovereign immunity to intervention and the obligation to protect the population falls to the community of states.

Adherents to this approach do not attempt to explain why Western states intervened in the manner they did in the 1990s except to infer that the absence of international consensus on a state’s responsibilities led to the West’s hesitant response. Instead, their focus is on improving future international responses through the formulation of minimal principles for acceptable state conduct. As with other efforts to “legalise” or justify intervention to protect populations, the ICISS report is largely based on particular legal interpretations

Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (London: Allen Lane, 1978).

⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, <http://www.dfa.it-maacci.gc.ca/iciiss-ciise/report-en.asp>. Accessed 7 July 2003. All quotes in conjunction with this section can be found in the synopsis of the report unless otherwise noted.

⁹ Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6, Nov/Dec 2002, 102.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 102.

and conversations with decision-makers regarding hypothetical circumstances. The problem with such an approach is that rhetorical agreement on such hypotheticals rarely translates into agreement and commitment in actual crises. This weakness is freely acknowledged by Evans and Sahnoun.¹¹

Saving Strangers. Nicholas Wheeler's book entitled *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, is particularly relevant to this thesis because it provides a comprehensive analysis of numerous Cold War and post-Cold War protection interventions.¹² In addition to agreeing with the "sovereignty with responsibility" position mentioned previously, Wheeler argues that humanitarian intervention has become "*a legitimate exception to the rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force*" in the post-Cold War era.¹³

Key to his argument is the dual nature of legitimacy. He makes the argument that a state's need for legitimacy both restricts and liberates its behaviour in international society.¹⁴ Thus, when a state justifies its actions as humanitarian, regardless of its self-interested motives, it is constrained to act in ways which can be defended as humanitarian, or else be judged by the court of world opinion. By comparing Cold War cases of humanitarian intervention with post-Cold War cases, Wheeler argues that "a new norm of UN-authorized humanitarian intervention developed in the 1990s."¹⁵ He notes that though grave human rights abuses were alleviated by Cold War interventions in Uganda, East Pakistan, and Cambodia, none of the interveners appealed to humanitarian

¹¹ Ibid., 110.

¹² He uses the term humanitarian intervention, but he is primarily concerned with the protection of "strangers". Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

¹³ Ibid., 2.

¹⁴ Ibid., 8.

norms to justify their actions because, at the time, humanitarianism was not considered a legitimate justification for intervention. In spite of their positive humanitarian results, the international community condemned the Cold War interventions as violations of state sovereignty. In contrast, Wheeler concludes from his analyses of northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia/Kosovo that post-Cold War interventions were usually justified on humanitarian grounds and were formally or tacitly authorised by the international community. He considers the shift in Western public thinking that led to the Security Council's incorporation of humanitarian protection under Chapter VII of the Charter to be the most significant normative change of the 1990s.¹⁶

Joining a number of other academics on the subject, Wheeler puts forth his own criteria for judging whether or not an intervention qualifies as "humanitarian". These include the presence of a supreme humanitarian emergency, the use of force as a last resort, proportionality of means, and a high probability of a humanitarian result.¹⁷ All of these criteria are highly subjective and, as such, leave ample room for outside states to justify self-interested action or inaction. Ironically, Wheeler concludes that most post-Cold War interventions to "save strangers" were far from successful and did not pass his humanitarian test. He acknowledges that the majority of interventions were conducted by casualty-averse, mission-selective interveners whose inadequate methods reflected their pursuit of self-interests.¹⁸ In his conclusion, Wheeler admits what most solidarists are forced to admit at the end of the day:

How to persuade state leaders that they have a moral responsibility to 'pay the human' costs of intervention in cases of genocide, mass murder, and ethnic cleansing is the challenge for a solidarist theory of international society. The fact

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 289.

¹⁷ Ibid., 34-37.

¹⁸ Ibid., 301.

is that no Western government has intervened to defend human rights in the 1990s unless it has been very confident that the risks of casualties were almost zero.¹⁹

His explanation for the inconsistencies between his solidarist conclusion and the self-interested behaviour of states in the 1990s is that state practice has not yet caught up to the newly accepted solidarist norm of humanitarian intervention.²⁰ In other words, international society is in a transition phase in which solidarist behaviour lags behind solidarist thought. It is this inconsistency between Wheeler's solidarist explanation and the actual behaviour of states in the 1990s which suggests that solidarism is not the most helpful tool for understanding why the West intervened in the manner it did.

2.2.2 Pluralism

In his book, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*, Robert Jackson counters the solidarist contention and concludes that international society is still primarily driven by pluralist concerns.²¹ As an advocate of pluralism, Jackson defends the prioritisation of international order and state sovereignty over international justice and humanitarian intervention on the grounds that order is a necessary precondition for justice. Because of this belief, Jackson expresses concern over the claims that state sovereignty has been weakened by the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a new norm in international society. He particularly disagrees with any attempt to make humanitarian intervention a requirement or obligation.²² Any attempt to "require" an international response, according to Jackson, would not only be unenforceable and stringently opposed by a host of states, but it would also jeopardise the current

¹⁹ Ibid., 300.

²⁰ Ibid., 308.

²¹ Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in World of States*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

²² *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 90, Quoted in Ibid., 212.

international system which was designed to limit the possibility of war among the great powers.

He recognises the ethical dilemma aroused by his emphasis on order, yet he declares that unless protection interventions are conducted with the consent of the sovereign government, they constitute far more danger to humanity by jeopardising international order. According to Jackson,

the stability of international society, especially the unity of the great powers, is more important, indeed far more important, than minority rights and humanitarian protections in Yugoslavia or an other [sic] country—if we have to choose between those two sets of values.²³

As evidence for his position, Jackson analyses four of the post-Cold War humanitarian interventions examined by Wheeler (Somalia is excluded from Wheeler's analysis). Although his analysis of the cases is not as detailed as Wheeler's, his conclusions are as firmly drawn. His primary purpose for analysing the case studies is to evaluate the claims and consequences of an emerging solidarist shift in international society. He sums up his analysis with the following statement: "Pluralist ethics of state sovereignty were clearly evident in all these cases".²⁴ The Kosovo case was more worrying for Jackson than the others. NATO's non-consensual and unauthorised intervention against Yugoslavia was a violation of pluralist norms that unwisely jeopardised international order (though he consoles himself with the fact that NATO's "regional stability" motive was a pluralist justification). Rather than seeing Kosovo as evidence of a solidarist shift for all of international society, he views it more as Europe's reversion to past "standards of civilisation" behaviour within its sphere of influence. By "attempting to impose

²³ Ibid., 291.

²⁴ Ibid., 288.

'civilized' policies by force", he reasons, NATO could be accused of implementing a secular and modern version of *respublica Christiana* within Europe.²⁵

Jackson recognises the existence of humanitarian motives, particularly in the West, but considers them to be of secondary importance to pluralist considerations in state practice. In his analysis of the case studies, he finds that "all the cases disclosed a humanitarian concern on the part of international society, but military risk and particularly the danger of casualties to intervention soldiers were the crucial consideration".²⁶ In other words, the gap between states' humanitarian rhetoric and their willingness to suffer casualties for humanitarian values disproved the solidarist claim.

In his vigorous defence of pluralism, Jackson does not give adequate consideration to the nature of the post-Cold War security environment with regard to humanitarian intervention. He does not consider that, in an international environment characterised by the "hyper-dominance" of Western power and the absence of survival threats to Western states, the threat to international order resulting from intervention appears to be far less of a probability to Western decision-makers than the negative effects resulting from humanitarian crises. The weakness of Jackson's pluralist explanation for the humanitarian intervention in the 1990s is exposed in his explanation of the Kosovo intervention. As Jackson is forced to admit, NATO violated the sovereignty of a functioning state without the authorisation of the UN Security Council, and in direct opposition to the wishes of two permanent members of the Security Council. Though Jackson explains these actions as a reversion to the past rather than a shift to a solidarist

²⁵ Ibid., 290.

²⁶ Ibid., 289.

future, he is unable to dismiss NATO's actions as something other than a defiance of the ordering principles he so resolutely defends.

2.2.3 Realism

Realist approaches to the protection interventions of the 1990s generally fall into one of two primary categories. The first views protection interventions as acceptable as long as they do not harm the state's self-interests. Realists of this school do not deny the legitimacy of moral concern in foreign policy or the duty of assisting those in need if they can be assisted at an acceptable cost.²⁷ While they are not "principally opposed to principle", they recognise that moral interests alone are frequently insufficient to sustain the long-term, dangerous commitments that protection interventions often require.²⁸ Therefore, like the pluralists, they prioritise order over justice and emphasise prudence when making decisions about intervention. They claim that a state has no right to endanger the lives of its citizens for strictly humanitarian purposes.²⁹ Henry Kissinger stated in his book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, that the difficulty with recent humanitarian interventions and the push to carve out an exception to the non-intervention rule is that moral interests and values can actually relegate more traditional strategic interests to a secondary position.³⁰ The preoccupation with non-strategic concerns at the expense of strategic self-interests is precisely what former US Secretary of Defense William Perry and Ashton Carter cautioned against in their book, *Preventive Defense*. They were concerned about the US preoccupation with the conflicts in Bosnia and Africa at the expense of North Korea, Weimar Russia, and China. They were eager to encourage

²⁷ David C. Hendrickson, "In Defense of Realism: A Commentary on Just and Unjust Wars", *Ethics and International Affairs*, 1997, vol. 11, 43.

²⁸ Ibid., 35.

²⁹ Ibid., 46.

³⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 271-2.

policy-makers to prioritise the prevention of those issues that could eventually develop into survival threats over the lesser conflicts that were dominating the international environment at the time.³¹

The second school of realist thought argues that protection interventions only occur, or should only occur, when they are within the interest of the intervener. In other words, moral considerations and concern for endangered populations should have no place in the calculation of a state's self-interest.³² While not advocating a realist position with regard to intervention, S. Neil MacFarlane, in his analysis of population protection interventions in the 1990s, reaches a conclusion with which many realists would agree. In his Adelphi Paper entitled *Intervention in Contemporary World Politics*, MacFarlane concludes that intervention in the immediate post-Cold War period was primarily motivated by state interest, though his definition of state interest is more encompassing than those of classic realists.³³ "Where such interest is not perceived to be present," he summarises, "intervention tends not to occur, whatever the prevailing humanitarian situation".³⁴

Critics of Western actions such as Noam Chomsky, John Pilger, and Ted Galen Carpenter base their criticisms on their perceptions of the West's extreme self-interested approach. While certainly not realists themselves, they argue that the humanitarian justifications put forth in the 1990s were merely legitimising excuses for the West's self-interested quest for power. Sceptics such as these point to the West's selectivity in intervening only in

³¹ Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 11-14.

³² See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 2nd ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 9, George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 48, and Nicholas J. Spykeman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), 18.

³³ S. Neil MacFarlane, *Intervention in Contemporary World Politics*, Adelphi Paper 350, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002).

those situations that further their self-interests and ignoring those that do not. They also emphasise that when the West does intervene, it frequently does so in a manner that maximises its publicity rather than its effectiveness at protecting populations. Furthermore, as evidence of the West's "hypocritical humanitarianism", ³⁵ critics point to the priority attached to the safety of Western interveners over the lives of the endangered populations they are sent to protect, and the abandonment of populations through early withdrawal. These apparently self-interested motives and double standards cause Mary Kaldor to categorise the Western protection efforts as "spectacle wars".³⁶ Noam Chomsky sums up the Western interventions of the 1990s as "the powerful states [doing] as they wish unless constrained from within guided by interests of power and profit".³⁷

In the context of this thesis, the advantage of the first realist position over the solidarist or pluralist positions is its unabashed pursuit of self-interest. When the solidarists and pluralists are scrambling to make sense of the West's inconsistent ways, the realists' primary concern with self-interest provides an explanation that can be consistently applied to all the interventions. To say, however, that the West's pursuit of self-interest answers all of the questions raised by the interventions of the 1990s is overly simplistic, incomplete, and "profoundly unilluminating".³⁸

³⁴ Ibid., 10. See also pages 61-67.

³⁵ This term comes from Doug Bandow, "NATO's Hypocritical Humanitarianism" in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War*.

³⁶ Mary Kaldor, "Introduction", in Mary Kaldor (ed.), *Global Insecurity: Restructuring the Global Military Sector*, vol. III, (London: Pinter, 2000), 21.

³⁷ Noam Chomsky, *A New Generation Draws The Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the West*, (London: Verso, 2000), 141.

³⁸ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 45.

2.2.4 Humanitarianism AND Self Interest

Adam Roberts would probably object to being categorised in any of the three aforementioned schools of thought. His writings are more pragmatic than theoretical and so urge a blending of the traditions. In his Adelphi Paper entitled *Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection, and partiality in a policy vacuum*, he admits that "there is absolutely no possibility of securing general agreement among states about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention".³⁹ Nevertheless, he principally agrees with the legitimacy of protecting populations by force if necessary. He contends that the

leading Western powers, which are the ones that have been principally involved in humanitarian action, have a particular obligation to develop coherent and defensible policies regarding humanitarian crises, which will not disappear just because responding to them has created difficulties.⁴⁰

Using examples from key interventions, Roberts makes a number of valuable observations regarding protection efforts in the 1990s. First, he recognises that though protection is "a key aspect" of humanitarian operations, the difficulty of providing it cheaply has led to its being "handled repeatedly in a short-term and half-hearted manner, often with elements of dishonesty and buck-passing".⁴¹ These minimalist efforts, according to Roberts, have serious consequences for the population and the intervener alike. Second, he points out that Western states are far more likely to intervene when they perceive their risks to be low, regardless of the ongoing humanitarian crisis.⁴² Third, he acknowledges that Western efforts to protect populations are frequently substitutionary efforts, or "lowest common denominator" agreements to avoid riskier activities.⁴³ In spite of the ineffectiveness of past interventions, he foresees the West's reliance on air-power

³⁹ Adam Roberts, *Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and impartiality in policy vacuum*, Adelphi Paper 305, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 30.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 9, See also Adam Roberts' "Exceptional Role.

⁴¹ Roberts, *Humanitarian Action*, 9 and 86.

⁴² Ibid., 86.

⁴³ Ibid. 80 and 15.

and its aversion to ground troops as “tendencies unlikely to change suddenly”.⁴⁴ Finally, he contends that when interventions do occur, they are much more likely to succeed when the intervening force is motivated by traditional self-interests in addition to humanitarian concern.⁴⁵

While Roberts’ observations are astute and his analysis helpful, he is unable to bridge the gap between “what is” and “what ought to be”. He points out the weaknesses of past interventions and makes recommendations to improve future protection missions, but he gives no indication that the tensions which led to the West’s policy choices in the 1990s have been resolved sufficiently enough to facilitate the implementation of his recommendations.

2.2.5 Humanitarianism AS Self Interest

Several other writers have attempted to blend the above three traditions by suggesting that humanitarian concerns have, in themselves, become national self-interests. Joseph Nye, in a *Foreign Affairs* article entitled “Redefining the National Interest”, points out that the national interest is

broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values such as human rights and democracy if the public feels that those values are so important to its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them.⁴⁶

Consequently, Nye encourages US leaders (and by implication Western leaders) to broaden their definition of national interest to include any issue that jeopardises international order and to be willing to pay the necessary price to pursue it.⁴⁷ He argues that in democracies, there is no distinction between a morality-based foreign policy and

⁴⁴ Ibid., 86.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 86-7.

⁴⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Redefining the National Interest”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, July/August 1999, 23.

an interest-based foreign policy. "Moral values", he says, are "simply intangible interests".⁴⁸ As such, he recognises that stopping serious humanitarian abuse has a place in the Western national interest and should be carefully considered. That said, he then emphasises the importance of prudence in the pursuit of human rights. A human rights policy is merely "an important *part* of a foreign policy" and, as such, often requires difficult choices to be made.⁴⁹ The last part of his article is filled with strong pluralist caveats. Though he acknowledges that humanitarian crises are legitimate interests, Nye cautions against intervening militarily unless humanitarian concerns are "reinforced by the existence of other strong national interests".⁵⁰

While Nye makes an interesting case for viewing population crises differently in the future, his approach is not intended to describe previous cases. He limits his aim to influencing policy-makers faced with future difficulties regarding national or Western self-interest. Furthermore, Nye's pluralist qualifier limiting the use of force at the end of the article exposes one of the key problems with the "humanitarianism as self-interest" explanation. It has been difficult for proponents of this stance to demonstrate convincingly that endangered civilians in distant lands pose a significant enough threat to the West's self-interests to move Western societies to support casualty-producing military operations. As Nicholas Wheeler remarked with regard to Stephen A. Garret's attempt to conjoin humanitarian concern with national self-interest in *Doing Good and Doing Well*, "The reader waits in vain for a robust defence of the contention that the US had a compelling security interest in intervening in Rwanda".⁵¹

⁴⁷ Ibid., 27-8.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 31.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 32.

⁵¹ Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: emergent norm, moral duty or the coming anarchy?", Review article in *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1, 123.

Summary

While all of the above approaches are useful for evaluating aspects of population protection interventions, none of them provide an adequate analytical framework that can be convincingly applied to all the protection operations that occurred in the 1990s as well as to those that did not occur in spite of the humanitarian need. Although they recognise the tension that existed between the West's humanitarian impulses and its more traditionally defined self-interests, they do not provide a framework for understanding how that tension played itself out in the post-Cold War security environment. This thesis, in its attempt to provide such a framework, does not completely discount the emerging solidarist impulse, especially the relatively benign version put forth by Wheeler, or the pluralist emphasis on the West's general abidance with the international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. It agrees with S. Neil MacFarlane's observation that "solidarist and pluralist perspectives coexisted uneasily in this realm"⁵². Nevertheless, it principally views the pursuit of self-interest as the driving motivation behind the West's interventionist practices in the 1990s. The shortcoming with this extremely diluted and qualified realist explanation is that it does not explain the complexities that went into the West's identification of the potential hazards to their self-interests or the formulation of effective strategies to safeguard those interests in the post-Cold War security environment. Rather than simply accept MacFarlane's conclusion that there was no "overarching strategic logic" behind Western interests,⁵³ this thesis seeks to develop an applicable framework for understanding these past interventions with all their complexities, and for shedding light on future Western interventions. In order to establish the foundation on which the framework will be built, the thesis now turns to risk theory.

⁵² MacFarlane, 66.

⁵³ Ibid., 66-7.

2.3 RISK

This section is divided into two parts. In the first, it demonstrates the relevance of exploring risk theory as a possible framework for analysis in the post-Cold War security environment. It does this by showing how “the language of risk” has made its way into the post-Cold War security discourse and become a regular theme among many contemporary Western policymakers.

The second part provides a theoretical overview of the basic principles of risk theory as they have been discussed and popularised by the sociologist Ulrich Beck. This section discusses the five common identifiers of a risk society that will later be adapted and used as an explanatory framework for the population protection interventions of the 1990s.

2.3.1 Risk in the Security Discourse

In the 1990s, governments, security organisations, IGOs, and NGOs, particularly in the West, began using the language of risk to describe the uncertain nature of the post-Cold War security environment. NATO’s 1991 “Security Concept” described its “new security environment” as a composition of largely unnamed “security challenges and risks”.⁵⁴ Its revised 1999 “Security Concept” listed terrorism, sabotage, organised crime, and massive refugee flows as part of “a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict”.⁵⁵ Similarly, the UK’s 1998 Strategic

⁵⁴ NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” 1991, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>. Accessed 14 July 2003.

⁵⁵ NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, Press Release, Paragraphs 20 and 24, April 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. Accessed 14 July 2003.

Defence Review (SDR) referred to security “risks and challenges” rather than threats.⁵⁶ These risks included regional instability, massive humanitarian suffering, dangerous regimes, illicit drugs, and organised crime. According to the SDR, the “challenge ... [was] to move from stability based on fear to stability based on the active management of these risks, seeking to prevent conflicts rather than suppress them”.⁵⁷ The language of risk has also been used in the United States. In 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review, which lays out future plans for the US military, listed “Managing Risks” as one of its “Strategic Tenets” and devoted an entire chapter to the subject.⁵⁸ Clearly, the language of risk has become accepted terminology within Western security policy. The rest of the thesis looks beyond the language of risk to the underlying concepts of risk theory in an effort to develop an effective framework for analysing the protection interventions of the 1990s.

2.3.2 Risk Theory

In one sense, risk is nothing new. Businesses, insurance companies, and gambling establishments have always succeeded or failed according to their ability to analyse and confront risk. So, too, life-threatening risks have always been present, whether in the form of disease, natural disasters, warfare, or some other potentially dangerous hazard. Contemporary risk, however, is categorically unique in its nature and scope. People living in advanced industrial societies are faced with man-made risks that spring from “advances” in technology. These risks are different from previous risks because they are limitless in time and space and are of a non-actuarial nature. Moreover, as the long-term

⁵⁶ UK Ministry of Defence, *1998 Strategic Defence Review*, Chapter 1, “A Strategic Approach to Defence”, <http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/priorities.htm>. Accessed 14 July 2003.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 Sept 2001, 13, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>. Accessed 14 July 2003. Specifically see Chapter VII, “Managing Risks”, 57-65.

effects of technology are understood and scientific advancements reveal previously unknown dangers, people are increasingly aware of the potential perils that confront them. While the expanding nature of risk has captivated scholars from various fields, the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, has articulated the phenomenon, which he labels "risk society", in a way that has resounded with the public and profoundly affected various social sciences. His German publication, *Risikogesellschaft*, was published in 1986 and sold over 60,000 copies in its first five years.⁵⁹ It was then translated into English and published under the title of *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* in 1992.

Beck applies his "risk society" label only to those communities that are in the late stages of industrialisation (also known as "late" or "advanced" modernity). While he concedes that science and technology have resulted in improvements to people's lives, he argues that scientific attempts to control the future have also produced environmental risks that threaten global survival.⁶⁰ Global warming, radioactive fall-out, genetically-modified foods, and various life-threatening diseases are examples of technology-induced or "manufactured" hazards which have the potential of permanently altering the global environment. According to Beck, there is no escaping contemporary risk. Even unborn generations and people living in pre-industrial societies are affected by hazards resulting from technology. Not only are the risks unlimited by time and place, but they are also "not accountable according to the rules of causality", which means that it is also impossible to insure against them.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Scott Lash and Brian Wynne, "Introduction", in Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Mark Ritter, (trans.), (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 1.

⁶⁰ Beck, *Risk Society*, 21.

⁶¹ Ulrich Beck, "Risk Society and the Provident State", Martin Chalmers, (trans.), Scott Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski, and Brian Wynne, (eds.), *Risk Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Modernity*, (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 31.

The proliferation and awareness of contemporary risks among populations in late industrial societies ultimately leads to the emergence of a risk society. Beck defines this emergence as a "phase of development of modern society in which the social, political, ecological and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control and protective institutions of industrial society".⁶² In other words, a risk society emerges when people recognise that their attempts to increase their security through technological advances actually produce more dangers from which there is no escape. Their Enlightenment-based optimism in their ability to control the future evaporates, and they are left feeling powerless, sceptical, and vulnerable. Having lost faith in their ability to control the future, they grow increasingly preoccupied and wary of lurking dangers that have yet to be discovered. As Beck states, "... in the risk society the unknown and unintended consequences come to be a dominant force in history and society".⁶³

In addition to the insecurity that comes from technological uncertainty, many sociologists agree that "late modern" people are characterised by a host of transformations that add to their sense of isolation. The influence of feminism, changing gender roles, alternate "family" structures, and non-traditional employment options are some of the factors which have exacerbated a "growing sense of disorientation in face [sic] of the fact that nothing is immutable, there are no permanent alliances and no eternal verities; more than ever before the future appears to be riven with uncertainty".⁶⁴ As a result of this uncertainty, people within these societies are more anxious about their role in the future and more doubtful about their ability to control that future than ever before. As Ian

⁶² Ibid., 27.

⁶³ Beck, *Risk Society*, 22.

⁶⁴ Lennart Sjöberg, "Risk perceptions", 29.

Wilkinson put it, "It is now a matter of sociological common sense to identify ourselves as living through a period of acute insecurity and high anxiety."⁶⁵

In short, risk societies can be recognised by the way in which they identify potential hazards, the strategies and methods they adopt to deal with those hazards, and the consequences they suffer as a result of their risk-based approach. Each of these characteristics is dealt with more extensively below and is further broken down into five key identifiers of risk societies.

Risk Identification.

Uncertainty and the Role of Experts. In a technologically complex environment characterised by uncertainty and littered with potential hazards, people desire to know exactly what risks they face. Indefinite hazards generate feelings of anxiety and vulnerability since people are unable to prepare physically or mentally for catastrophes which they cannot comprehend. Thus, assessing contemporary risk requires technical expertise. It is for this reason that so-called "experts" have a paradoxical role to play in the risk society. In the words of Christopher Coker,

We are made aware of risks from non-cognitive sources such as expert reports, commissions set up by governments, or even newspaper articles. We do not see the risks we run, we read about them. We are becoming dependent on external knowledge. In the process we are losing part of our cognitive sovereignty: we can no longer judge for ourselves the risks we run. In the language of the hour, we feel increasingly disempowered.⁶⁶

Disempowered people are forced to rely on others for risk information. Because of their innate scepticism, people living within late modernity no longer believe in an exclusive source of "formulaic truth" such as a priest, chief, or divinely-enlightened ruler. Instead, they rely on specialists, or experts, who supposedly have the technical understanding to

⁶⁵ Iain Wilkinson, *Anxiety in a Risk Society*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 42.

accurately declare what constitutes risk and what does not.⁶⁷ The problem is that experts rarely agree. Because expertise is based on competence, and not on “formulaic truth”, experts attempt to distinguish their competence by challenging the findings of their rivals. The “risk society”, according to Beck, “is tendentially a *self-critical society*” where “[e]xperts are relativised or dethroned by counterexperts”.⁶⁸ In this sense, expertise is fuelled by doubt.⁶⁹ The paradox is that, while experts rely on scepticism to distinguish their conclusions from others, they make claims that are intended to be universally applicable.⁷⁰ This combination of universal claims and perpetual doubt results in continuous and widespread disagreement among competing experts which, in turn, adds to the uncertainty of disempowered people. The result is that, in advanced modernity, there is no final authority—no objective, knowable truth. Instead, there is only a range of contested expert opinion that generates very little confidence among the populace.

In spite of this conflicting expertise and low public confidence, individuals must eventually choose which expert to believe and then act on that choice. As groups of like-minded individuals gather together, a dominant risk conception emerges within a culture. In this sense, risk is culturally constructed. “Ultimately,” writes Beck, “*it is cultural perception and definition that constitute risk*. ‘Risk’ and the ‘(public) definition of risk’ are one and the same”.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 54.

⁶⁷ Anthony Giddens, “Living in a Post-Traditional Society”, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), 84. Also Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity, Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 195.

⁶⁸ Beck, “Risk Society and the Provident State”, 33.

⁶⁹ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity*, 195.

⁷⁰ Giddens, “Post-Traditional Society”, 86.

⁷¹ Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 135. See also Beck, *Risk Society*, 23.

Since individuals ultimately determine what constitutes risk in an environment of limitless possibilities, politics are increasingly shaped from the bottom up by sub-political forces.⁷² Entities such as NGOs, special interest groups, and political action committees wield influence and mobilise public support for their agendas by influencing the public's perception of risk. They accomplish this by employing experts who agree with their assessment of the current crisis. Similarly, governments in these societies, in an effort to maintain public support as well as their own legitimacy, are forced either to act on the public's risk perceptions or attempt to influence them with their own presentation of expert testimony.

The media also plays a considerable role in shaping the public's risk perception. By bringing together "science, politics, and popular consumer culture", the media "renders the invisibility of risk ... visible."⁷³ The media makes it practically impossible to avoid the risk debate. As the media has become particularly adept at packaging these stories in fifteen-second sound bites, the public is made aware of a host of risk-potentials in a very short period of time.⁷⁴ Media packaging, combined with the public's increased uncertainty, results in a public that is likely to change its risk perception as soon as the media moves to a new issue. The public's short attention span makes it very difficult for governments to maintain support for long-term objectives.

All of these factors have profound implications for the consumer of risk expertise. "Trust based purely on the assumption of technical competence," writes Anthony Giddens, "is

⁷² Beck, *World Risk Society*, 39.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁷⁴ For an excellent discussion on the media's effect on the public, see Fred H. Cate, "Through a Glass Darkly" [DRAFT], Harvard University's Asia Center, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/fs_cate2.htm.

revisable...; it can in principle be withdrawn at a moment's notice."⁷⁵ If it can be withdrawn, it can just as easily be "re-invested" in another expert. When there are limitless options available, there is no limit to the equivocation possible among those who have to choose—especially when their choices exact a price. Because consumers of expertise are free to choose from a variety of risk interpretations, "painful" choices can easily be discarded for less costly alternatives. In the end, public commitment, based on sceptical expertise and a host of alternative options, is far less resolute than commitment based upon the unquestionable pronouncement of "formulaic truth" from an exclusive group of elites.

Focus on Future Hazards. Because the hazards associated with risks exist in the future, risk strategies are necessarily future-focused and anticipatory in nature. "[T]he centre of risk consciousness" writes Coker,

lies not in the present but in the future. In the process, the past loses the power to determine the present. Instead, we are always looking forward. We are always speculating about something that is fictive, non-existent, even invented, but none the less very real.⁷⁶

Oftentimes, intense efforts are made to counter potentialities that may never occur. The emphasis of risk societies has shifted away from the distribution of present "goods" to the prevention of the distribution of future "bads". In other words, the nature of the potential hazard is considered so serious that addressing it cannot be postponed while additional information is collected. In accordance with the "Precautionary Principle" or *Versorgensprinzip* as it was called by the West German government in 1976, avoiding

⁷⁵ Giddens, "Post-Traditional Society", 89. See also Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity, Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, 141.

⁷⁶ Coker, *Humane Warfare*, 55.

risk requires taking precautionary action, even when there is "lack of full scientific certainty" that a hazard exists.⁷⁷

While this proactive approach gives the appearance of lessening future dangers, the risks themselves remain uncertain and, therefore, the strategies and corresponding preventive actions are not guaranteed to produce effective solutions. As a result, in spite of the precautionary, proactive actions that are taken to avoid risks, people within risk societies continue to feel vulnerable. It is this sense of vulnerability, coupled with the public's increased risk awareness, that exacerbates their insecurity and anxiety. As Beck writes,

Risks only suggest what should *not* be done, not what *should* be done. To the extent that risks become the all-embracing background for perceiving the world, the alarm they provoke creates an atmosphere of powerlessness and paralysis. Doing nothing and demanding too much both transform the world into a series of indomitable risks. This could be called the *risk trap*....⁷⁸

The strategy by which decision-makers attempt to extricate their societies from this risk trap, or at least to minimise its effect, is the focus of the following section.

Confronting Risk.

Risk Management. In an effort to avoid doing nothing and demanding too much, decision-makers attempt to manage their risks. While specific risk management techniques vary among different fields of activity, there is a great deal of agreement as to what risk management is intended to accomplish.⁷⁹ Most definitions take for granted the fact that risks can rarely be eliminated—at least not without incurring greater risks. They

⁷⁷ Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones, "Anticipation in risk management: a stitch in time?" in Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones (eds.), *Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management*, (London: UCL Press, 1996), 10.

⁷⁸ Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society*, 141.

⁷⁹ For various definitions of risk management, see Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones, "Introduction", in Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones (eds.), *Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management*, (London: UCL Press, 1996), 7. Carlos C. Jaeger, Ortwin Renn, Eugene A. Rosa, and Thomas Webler, *Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action*, (London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd, 2001), 18.

also imply that at some point, a particular risk, while not eliminated, can be controlled, limited, or reduced to a tolerable level. Beck contends that risks can never be completely removed—at best they can be minimised.⁸⁰ This being the case, the process of risk management can be described as minimalist in its scope and preventive in its approach. Its ultimate goal is to lower the likelihood of a future hazard to a tolerable level through the expenditure of the least amount of resources possible.⁸¹

Because risks change as the information about the hazards change, risk management is not a static exercise. Cultural risk perceptions constantly shift due to the uncertain nature of risk and an ever-expanding revelation of new risks. Thus, a diligent risk manager constantly reassesses the potential harm associated with a particular scenario in light of new risks. By constantly reassessing the risks, the effective risk manager strives to address the potential hazards by dedicating resources in proportion to the risks he or she faces. The greater the risk is perceived to be, the higher the priority that is assigned to confronting it, and the greater the number of resources committed to its management. In many ways, risk managers adopt a system of triage. They evaluate the risk, prioritise it, and assign the appropriate type and quantity of resources to handle it. As risk perceptions change, so do the risk priorities and management strategies. While there are a variety of managerial methods, some of the common techniques are risk surveillance, risk containment, and risk distribution.

Because risk is based on uncertainty, the more information the manager has about the risk potential, the better he or she is able to select an effective strategy for dealing with it. In

⁸⁰ Ulrich Beck, *Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 76-7.

⁸¹ Hood and Jones, "Introduction", in Hood and Jones (eds.), *Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management*, (London: UCL Press, 1996) 7.

comparison to more active and costly managerial strategies, surveillance is relatively low-cost and allows for a great deal of flexibility in resource commitment.

When risks cannot be avoided through surveillance, efforts are often made to contain them to a particular location. If risks can be contained, they can be controlled or avoided to some degree because a key element of uncertainty has been removed. By limiting the focus of concern, a risk manager is able to concentrate his or her efforts and resources more efficiently.

In addition to surveillance and containment, a third common method of managing risk is distribution. Risk managers attempt to reduce their vulnerability to a particular risk by "sharing" it with others who also benefit from its management. Indeed, risk distribution is the whole basis behind the insurance industry. Rather than being solely responsible for the management of a particular risk, effective risk managers induce, require, or persuade other beneficiaries to accept a portion of the responsibility and the vulnerability in return for a portion of the benefit. Thus, if the anticipated harm occurs, the negative effects are dispersed. Beck refers to people who share similar risk perceptions as "communities of risk" and argues that members of risk communities have a responsibility to share the burden of risk management.⁸² Since risks are often global in scope, risk communities tend to be global in their membership. The presence of international risk communities greatly expands the area over which risk can be distributed. Moreover, globalisation produces structures that make risk distribution much easier. "Globalisation from above", which Beck defines as international treaties and institutions, and "globalisation from below", such as NGOs and multinational corporations, promote a greater potential for

⁸² Beck, *World Risk Society*, 16.

international buy-in to a host of risks.⁸³ A good risk manager strives to use these additional "stakeholders", either to help overcome the risk, or to deflect the criticism and apportion the blame should the potential harm actually occur.

Consequences of a Risk Approach.

Generation of New Risks. Because risk strategies are formulated on imprecise information regarding uncertain hazards, the actions taken to prevent a hazard can actually generate "side-effect" risks that are at least as serious as those the manager was seeking to alleviate in the first place. As Mikkel Rasmussen has recently observed, "There is ... no end to risks. For every attempt to remove a risk, new risks [side effects] will proliferate".⁸⁴ This development is similar to what Beck calls the "boomerang effect".⁸⁵ Just as a boomerang returns to its thrower, "side-effect" risks circle back and threaten the safety of those who sought to manage them. Since risk elimination is usually impossible, the continued presence of a risk, even a so-called "managed" risk, can lead to follow-on risks of a completely different type.

The uncertainty that characterises every aspect of risk means that a great deal of managerial effort goes into coping with these side-effect risks and trying to undo the preventive actions that created them. While managers attempt to use logical risk management techniques, in the end, their efforts often more closely resemble trial and error. Because the side-effect risks can be more damaging than the risks that spawned them, risk communities can grow increasingly apprehensive about implementing management strategies.

⁸³ Ibid., 37.

⁸⁴ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2001, Vol. 30, No. 2, 292.

Alteration of Established Rules. Faced with a barrage of risks and vulnerabilities, Beck argues that managers are forced to consider methods that challenge the existing rule structure. Old ways of handling risk are increasingly challenged with new, untested ones. Because different actors simultaneously operate under different sets of rules, these systemic challenges have a dramatic effect on the overall rule structure that governs acceptable behaviour.⁸⁶ Some actors hold fast to the old rules, some mix the old with the new, and some abandon the old altogether. In short, efforts to manage risk often decrease systemic stability and increase the potential for conflict until new rule structures are formed.

2.4 RISK APPLICATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE

Although the language of Western decision-makers indicates that risk and risk management have been guiding principles in Western governments for the last decade, risk concepts have only recently been applied to the study of International Relations and International Security.⁸⁷ The next section briefly summarises some of these works, placing special emphasis on the manner in which the authors applied risk concepts to their particular subjects.

2.4.1 Reflexive Security

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, in his article entitled "Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society", utilises Beck's concept of risk as an analytical tool to

⁸⁵ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Mark Ritter (trans.), (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 23, 37.

⁸⁶ Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics*, 35-7.

demonstrate that “risk is becoming the operative concept of Western security”.⁸⁸ He contends that by “constructing a new reflexive conception of security”, NATO has reinvented itself and “provided a Western forum for reinventing security”.⁸⁹ Specifically, Rasmussen demonstrates NATO’s reflexive orientation by applying Beck’s risk concepts of “management”, “the presence of the future”, and the “boomerang effect” to NATO’s actions since 1991.

2.4.2 Humane Warfare

Christopher Coker also applies risk concepts to various security issues in two recent works. In his book entitled *Humane Warfare*, Coker postulates that the risk-filled, post-modern environment has caused Western publics to re-conceptualise warfare and the manner in which it fights.⁹⁰ According to Coker, risk aversion springs from the public’s anxiety of living with risk, its abandonment of metaphysical beliefs, the re-centring of the individual (as opposed to the state) in politics, and doubt as to the purity of motives and government justifications.⁹¹ Consequently, Western governments fight to preserve the lives of their own citizens as well as those of the “enemy” by attempting “to humanise war, to rob it of those features such as cruelty, hatred and courage”.⁹²

Coker highlights a number of risk management characteristics from recent “humane” wars. First of all, he stresses that management does not mean eradication. Demanding unconditional surrender from an enemy is no longer the objective. Because of the known and unknown risks that come with such a pursuit, the West generally seeks to contain the

⁸⁷ Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.

⁸⁸ Rasmussen, 285.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 298.

⁹⁰ Coker, *Humane Warfare*, 2-3.

⁹¹ Ibid., 42-3

insecurity—to “quarantine the nihilistic regions of the world, to seal them off or at least attempt to”.⁹³ Secondly, he notes that Western risk management efforts are future-focused. Western governments apply the precautionary principle to warfare and make the prevention of future “bads” their primary objective.⁹⁴ He contends that war as a risk management effort “is fought not to remove regimes from power, or defeat their armies in a decisive battle, but to reduce the opportunities for bad behaviour, to prevent them posing an even greater risk in the future”.⁹⁵ Thirdly, Coker argues that risk management strategies emphasise the limitation of casualties. An increasingly anxious and individualised public does not support casualty-producing efforts for very long. Hence, the military is forced to employ ever more precise, non-lethal, and “safe” methods for both friendly and hostile forces.⁹⁶

2.4.3 Globalisation and Insecurity

In his Adelphi Paper, *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*, Coker argues that globalisation has generated insecurities for NATO that must be managed.⁹⁷ Referring to NATO as a risk community, he makes the case that the new globalised security agenda is composed of issues such as weapons of mass destruction, the environment, inequality, migration, organised crime, and HIV/AIDS—issues that are too uncertain and too vast to be dealt with as traditional security threats.⁹⁸ In order to counter these uncertain hazards, Coker says that they must be managed or “policed”. NATO manages its insecurity through two primary means:

⁹² Ibid., 5.

⁹³ Ibid., 130.

⁹⁴ Christopher Coker, “The Risk Community and International Security,” paper presented at Goodenough-Chevening Conference on Risk, Goodenough College, London, 12 April 2002.

⁹⁵ Coker, *Humane Warfare*, 56.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 78.

⁹⁷ Christopher Coker, *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*, Adelphi Paper 345, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002).

surveillance, which allows for preventive or pre-emptive action, and “dramatic campaigns” to confront the hazard such as the “war on terror” or the “war on drugs”.⁹⁹ When NATO determines that military force must be used, its goal is the “containment, confinement, or dissuasion” of the risk, and airpower is NATO’s instrument of choice to accomplish it.¹⁰⁰

2.4.4. Risk and Terrorism

Yee-Kuang Heng, in his article entitled “Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism”, views the “war on terror” as a risk management exercise.¹⁰¹ In fact, he contends that the use of the word “war” is a misnomer and argues that “risk management exercise” should be substituted in its place. Heng identifies three characteristics of risk management and contrasts them with traditional characteristics of war. He then demonstrates how they are applicable to the US military efforts in Afghanistan. First, he claims that the war on terror is focused on preventing future harm by “minimis[ing] or reduc[ing] the factors which lead to the risks occurring”.¹⁰² Rather than dealing with an immediate threat, the war on terror is driven by a potential terrorist event in the future. Second, the war on terror is not meant to completely eradicate the possibility of terrorism, but to “minimize or reduce the factors which lead to risks occurring”. The very nature of terrorism makes its eradication impossible. Finally, Heng demonstrates that the war on terror is “based more on trying to prevent something ‘bad’... than on attaining something ‘good’”.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Ibid., 60.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 62.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 63-4.

¹⁰¹ Yee-Kuang Heng, “Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?”, *Security Dialogue*, Volume 33, No. 2, June 2002, 227-242.

¹⁰² Ibid., 232.

Summary

Although none of these articles specifically address the issue of population protection, their utilisation and adaptation of risk principles to explain the dynamics of the post-Cold War security environment reveal a growing academic acceptance of risk's applicability to subjects of International Security. Moreover, the authors' similar adaptations and interpretations of Beck's risk principles within this field add legitimacy to the adaptations and applications made in Chapter 7 of this thesis.

2.5 POST-COLD WAR PARALLELS

Parallels between Beck's risk society and the West's post-Cold War security environment make risk theory a useful framework for analysing population protection interventions. Rather than attempt to apply Beck's conception of a risk society directly to the protection interventions of the 1990s, this thesis simply borrows concepts from the risk literature and adapts them to the post-Cold War protection environment for use as an explanatory tool. The following section briefly identifies some of these parallels in order to set the stage for the analyses that follow.

The security environment of the 1990s differed significantly from the security environment of the Cold War period. During the Cold War, the hazards were more clearly defined. In the zero-sum struggle between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the continued existence of one camp presented a threat to the survival of the other. While secondary issues and less-certain security hazards such as humanitarian emergencies,

¹⁰³ Ibid., 232.

terrorism, and environmental destruction existed, they were subordinate to, and often subsumed within, the bigger Cold War confrontation.

When the Cold War ended, the overarching threat to the West's survival decreased drastically, leaving a "threat vacuum" in its place where less known and less severe perils proliferated. Consequently, the security environment of the 1990s, like the environment in which Beck's risk society emerged, was characterised by a host of uncertain hazards. Issues such as the environment, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian crises, endangered populations, and economic downturns posed potential risks, not to the West's survivability, but to amorphous factors such as credibility, stability, legitimacy, and influence. The ill-defined nature of the hazards, combined with the conflicting expertise regarding the degree of risk they posed to society, generated feelings of anxiety and vulnerability among the public. Moreover, without the Cold War survival threat to obscure these sub-survival sources of risk, Western governments were increasingly susceptible to public pressure to "do something" to address them. The risk framework developed in this thesis is presented as a tool for understanding the behaviour of these "post-survival" Western states as they dealt with the uncertain humanitarian crises of the 1990s.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the definitions, context, and theoretical basis for an analysis of the Western protection interventions of the 1990s. By reviewing several recent works relating to the subject of population protection, it demonstrated the need for an analytical framework with greater explanatory potential. It then discussed the five key characteristics of a risk society, drawn principally from the sociological writings of Ulrich

Beck. In Chapter 7, these characteristics will be used to analyse Western actions in the four instances of population protection addressed in this thesis. The applicability of using risk concepts to explain issues of international security was further demonstrated by reviewing several articles which utilised risk theory to explain various aspects of the West's post-Cold War behaviour, and by drawing specific parallels between Beck's risk society and the West's security environment in the 1990s.

In order to make the case that the West's so-called protection interventions can best be analysed and understood as efforts to manage risk using risk principles, the thesis must first demonstrate that the Western interveners were not chiefly seeking to accomplish their stated humanitarian objectives. Hence, the purpose of the case studies which follow is to show that the West was more concerned with preventing the negative effects of the humanitarian crises on their self-interests than with protecting the lives of the endangered non-combatants. In the course of supporting this claim, the case studies will also demonstrate that the uncertainties surrounding the humanitarian crises made it very difficult for Western states to determine what actions would safeguard their self-interests and what actions would harm them. In fact, the strategies that the West designed and implemented within this highly complex environment often seemed to run counter to its stated intentions. The case studies will thus fulfil the secondary purpose of exposing the need for an explanatory framework through which the West's seemingly inconsistent and counter-productive actions in the interventions of the 1990s can be understood. This framework, which is based upon the principles of risk theory and validated by numerous examples from the case studies, is the subject of Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 3 NORTHERN IRAQ

INTRODUCTION

The coalition effort to protect the Kurds in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War was hailed by many as a precedent for humanitarian intervention against abusive state governments. Between April and July 1991, a Western-led coalition of thirteen states sent military forces into Iraq, declared a 'safe haven' in Northern Iraq from which Iraqi forces were excluded, set up internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, facilitated the distribution of humanitarian assistance, and resettled the population—all without the consent of the Iraqi government or explicit authorisation from the UN Security Council. Because the effort took place on Iraqi soil without Iraqi consent, it marked a dramatic shift from past efforts to deal with displaced people (DPs).

While the coalition justified its action solely on humanitarian grounds, this chapter reveals that it was also pursuing self-interested objectives, the achievement of which often took priority over the provision of security to endangered Kurds. Undoubtedly, when the interveners withdrew from Iraq, they left behind a Kurdish people whose welfare had been dramatically improved. Nevertheless, the methods utilised by the interveners, as ambiguous as they often seemed, demonstrated that the West was more concerned with managing the future effects of the population crisis on itself than it was with providing protection to the Kurds. This self-centred concern resulted in an intervention that was characterised by minimalist, self-protective actions designed primarily to assuage an outraged populace, maintain alliance unity, and preserve the perception of the Gulf War victory. In light of these objectives, this chapter concludes

that the Kurds were protected only as long as Kurdish protection furthered the West's self-interests.

3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTION

In early March 1991, between the time of the Gulf War coalition's unilateral cease-fire and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687 of 3 April 1991 (the UN cease-fire agreement), rebel forces within Iraq, encouraged by the words of US President George Bush (Sr.) and UK Prime Minister John Major, rose up against Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. The primary rebel movements originated with the Shi'a Muslims in southern Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq. Although the rebel forces made impressive gains for a short time, the Iraqi military dominated the confrontation once it began its counterattack in earnest. As Iraqi forces moved from one village to the next using helicopters and mortars to attack escaping non-combatants, coalition aircraft circled passively overhead waiting for Western decision-makers and military commanders to decide whether or not to act on the rebels' behalf.¹ By 3 April, the Shi'ite and Kurdish rebellions had effectively been crushed and over a million Kurds and Shi'ites, fearful of the retribution that was to follow, fled the advancing Iraqi forces.² The Shi'ites primarily went to Iran and Saudi Arabia while the Kurds either went to Iran or tried to cross the border in Turkey.

¹ See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 454-57.

² Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) John M. Shalikashvili, US Army, Commander Operation Provide Comfort, Statement to the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Defence Policy Panel, Washington DC, 4 September 1991, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/lsn7appl.htm>. Accessed 8 July 2003.

Throughout this period, the UN Security Council was trying to craft a cease-fire agreement that would officially end the hostilities between the coalition forces and Iraq. France, acting on Austria's suggestion, had sought to incorporate a clause into the agreement which demanded that Iraq cease its repression of its population.³ Fearing a Chinese veto based on the grounds that the action violated Iraq's internal affairs, the US and the UK did not support France's initiative. Consequently, SCR 687 maintained the Chapter VII "all necessary means" capacity of previous resolutions, but it did not address Iraq's treatment of its own population.⁴

Deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq and the displacement of Iraqi civilians, France and Turkey requested a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the crisis.⁵ On 5 April, the Security Council adopted SCR 688 which had been submitted by France and Belgium and co-sponsored by the UK and the US. Iran and Turkey, in separate letters to the Council and in their pre-vote remarks on the resolution, emphasised the trans-border effects that the displacement of Iraqi Kurds was having on their countries.⁶

Although most states expressed concern for the civilian populace, they also had reservations about interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In fact, had the draft resolution sought to authorise force, China would almost certainly have vetoed it. Consequently, SCR 688 was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and was only

³ Ian Johnstone, *Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action*, (New York: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy, 1994), 19.

⁴ S/RES/687, 3 April 1991.

⁵ S/22435, 3 April 1991, "Letter dated 2 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/22442, 4 April 1991, Letter from the Charge D'Affairs A.I. of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council.

⁶ Letter from Turkey, S/22435, 3 April 1991. Letters from Iran, S/22436, 3 April 1991 and S/22447 4 April 1991. See also S/PV.2982, 5 April 1991.

approved at all by a very narrow margin, with Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe voting against, and China and India abstaining. All five of these member states justified their votes primarily on the grounds that intervention would constitute internal interference in the affairs of a sovereign state.⁷

Much has been written as to whether or not SCR 688 authorised enforcement actions against Iraq. Key to this debate is the fact that 688 was not adopted under Chapter VII and did not “recall” the previous Chapter VII resolutions. Its language, however, was the language of enforcement. In it, the Council “*condemn[ed]* the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, “*demand[ed]* that Iraq ... immediately end this repression ..., and “*insist[ed]* that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations”.⁸

The US signalled its broad interpretation of the mandate immediately upon passage of the resolution. After the vote, the American Permanent Representative to the UN announced that the US would begin air-dropping essential provisions to the Kurds along the Iraqi-Turkish border.⁹ This effort, which commenced deliveries on 7 April 1991, was designated Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and soon expanded into a thirteen-state coalition effort to create a non-consensual “safe haven” within Iraq’s borders.¹⁰ The motivations and objectives for this operation are explored in the next section.

⁷ S/PV. 2982, 5 April 1991.

⁸ S/RES/688 (1991) 5 April 1991, Operative Paragraphs (OP) 1, 2, and 3.

⁹ S/PV. 2982, 5 April 1991.

3.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES

The leaders of Operation Provide Comfort were adamant in their claim that their single motive for the intervention in Iraq was a humanitarian concern for the endangered Kurds. Similarly, their official objectives were entirely humanitarian in nature, focusing on bringing the Kurds down from the mountains and eventually restoring them to their homes in a secure environment. Yet, in spite of the coalition's claims, there also existed a number of unofficial motives such as the high probability of success, the maintenance of alliance unity, the preservation of domestic support, and the credibility of Western states which affected the decisions and the strategies of the coalition, often to the detriment of the endangered Kurds.

3.2.1 Official Motive

The coalition, which was composed almost entirely of Western states, justified its intervention solely on humanitarian grounds. The humanitarian justification was easy to support as the plight of the displaced Kurds was virtually undisputed. Along the snow-covered, mountainous borders, the IDPs formed numerous encampments. Journalists and humanitarian organisations estimated the death toll at over 1,000 per day, most of whom were women, children, or aged.¹¹

Prior to the operation's commencement, individual state leaders and representatives repeatedly emphasised their humanitarian motive in order to justify their actions. When President Bush announced the air-drop operation on 5 April, he stated, "I want to

¹⁰ Also designated Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort reflecting the multinational composition of the effort. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/provide_comfort.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.

emphasize that this effort is prompted only by humanitarian concerns".¹² US Secretary of State James A. Baker III described the Kurdish plight as "experiences of cruelty and human anguish that defy description" and urged that "they must be free from the threats, persecution and harassment that they have been subjected to by the brutal regime in Baghdad".¹³ Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated that "it is not a question of standing on legal niceties ... The people need help and they need it now".¹⁴ White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater commented that the "refugee tragedy must be alleviated".¹⁵

Likewise, once the intervention was underway, humanitarian concerns were again cited as the sole reason for creating a safe haven for the Kurds within Iraq. On 16 April, Bush publicly announced that because the nature of the region in which the displaced Kurds were grouped made it impossible to deliver aid effectively, the US, France, Turkey, and the UK would be setting up secure camps inside Iraq. Bush stressed, "I want to underscore that all we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns".¹⁶ When questioned about these actions in regard to Iraq's sovereignty, he replied, "Some might argue that this is an intervention into the internal affairs of Iraq, but I think the humanitarian concern, the refugee concern is so overwhelming that there will be a lot of understanding about this".¹⁷

¹¹ Lawrence Freedman and David Boren, " 'Safe havens' for the Kurds in post-war Iraq", in Nigel S. Rodley (ed.), *To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defense of Human Rights*, (London: Brassey's, 1992), 48 and Shalikhvili, "Congressional Testimony".

¹² George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Aid to Iraqi Refugees", 5 April 1991, <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91040500.html>. Accessed 8 July 2003.

¹³ Quoted in Freedman and Boren, 52.

¹⁴ Quoted in Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 149.

¹⁵ Ibid., 53.

¹⁶ George H.W. Bush, "Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference", April 16, 1991. <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91041608.html>. Accessed 8 July 2003.

3.2.2 Unofficial Motives

High Probability of Success. The post-Gulf War condition of the Iraqi opponent, the geographic isolation of the endangered Kurdish population, and the acquiescence of the international community combined to make Western states confident that they could intervene successfully on behalf of the Kurds at an acceptably low cost to themselves. An intervention under these conditions seemed likely to produce benefits to the West in terms of strengthened alliance unity, increased domestic support, and enhanced international credibility with little chance of encountering the hazards associated with a failed operation. Consequently, the high probability of success was foundational to all the other Western motives and influenced not only the West's decision to intervene but also the manner in which it chose to do so.

The Antagonist. Saddam Hussein and the nature of his regime in Iraq formed an important dynamic that influenced the development of the safe haven plan and its execution. Unlike many of the post-Cold War intrastate conflicts to follow, the situation in Iraq presented an easily recognisable victim and perpetrator. The Kurds were not being attacked by an elusive guerrilla faction or an unrecognisable militia force that operated without an obvious power base. Instead, the perpetrator was the Iraqi regime. Its forces wore clearly identifiable military uniforms, and its leadership could be targeted directly with international pressure and military threats. Even more important than being conspicuous, the Iraqi military was a conventional army that based its tactics on Soviet doctrine and supplied its forces with outdated Soviet equipment. These factors, in

¹⁷ Freedman and Boren, 55.

conjunction with the open desert landscape in which they fought, made the Iraqi forces especially vulnerable to coalition technology and aerial dominance.

Second, the capability of the Iraqi army was well known. As a result of the Gulf War, Western states had very little doubt as to the coalition's military superiority. They had overwhelmed the Iraqi army with air attacks and vastly superior equipment. After the one-hundred-hour ground offensive, the Iraqi military had fled in full retreat. The Iraqis were technologically inferior, and both they and those planning the intervention knew it.

Thirdly, a factor that cannot be over emphasised was the huge number of coalition troops and equipment still in the region from the Gulf War. With these resources already in place, decision-makers did not have to consider or justify the deployment costs (both political and monetary) which would otherwise have to be expended. Instead, they had the immediate capability to respond with overwhelming force.

Additionally, Western decision-makers did not have to spend time building a case against Saddam Hussein in order to secure public support. As a result of Saddam Hussein's actions against Kuwait and his defiance of the international community, he was already considered a "villain" throughout the West and much of the world. There was, therefore, little talk about the need to remain neutral or impartial, or to seek the consent of the Iraqi regime. Even though some Member States on the Security Council were unwilling to authorise force against Iraq for its treatment of the Kurds, they were also unwilling "to be exposed publicly as opposing a rescue mission that was saving lives and they were shamed into silence".¹⁸

¹⁸ Wheeler, *Strangers*, 154.

Geographic Separation. The geographic separation of the Kurds also increased the likelihood of a successful protection intervention. The Iraqi Kurds numbered approximately three million, but they were largely confined to the north of Iraq, often called Iraqi Kurdistan.¹⁹ For years the Iraqi Kurds had fought for autonomous rule within Iraq, and had, at various times, been granted different levels of autonomy. Unlike the perpetrators in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Kosovo, Iraqi forces were not driving the Kurds out with the sole intention of occupying or “cleansing” the land, nor was there a large percentage of Iraqi Arabs living in the area prior to the Iraqi counterattack in 1991. In other words, Iraq’s post-rebellion treatment of the Kurds was not a case of Arab neighbours fighting Kurdish neighbours, but rather the Iraqi military fighting an ethnically and geographically distinct people. This fact was important for the coalition because it simplified the process of demarcating a large section of northern Iraq and designating it as a safe haven.

International Approval. Contrary to the statements of many coalition leaders, neither Security Council Resolution 687 nor 688 authorised the use of force on behalf of the Kurds. The Security Council had already rejected the French suggestion to include a proviso in SCR 687 demanding the humane treatment of the Kurds. Moreover, the Council’s explicit acknowledgement of Iraq’s “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence” as well as its referral to Article 2(7) of the Charter were included in SCR 688 to mollify Member States that were hesitant to approve a resolution for fear that it would set a precedent for future interventions. Nevertheless, the Council declared that the refugee flow across Iraq’s borders threatened international peace and security,

¹⁹Freedman and Boren, 44.

demanded an end to Iraqi repression of the Kurds, and insisted on Iraq's allowance of humanitarian assistance. These decrees provided the Western coalition with a pretext for international legitimacy on which it frequently defended its action. As Nicholas Wheeler argued, Resolution 688 was ambiguous enough to provide the interveners with sufficient legitimisation to get involved more deeply, while still allowing the opponents of the intervention to register their disapproval.²⁰

Alliance Unity. Of critical importance to the West's decision to intervene was Turkey's demand for assistance. The Turkish government had many reasons for closing its border to the fleeing Kurds and calling on the international community to assist the Kurdish DPs on Iraqi soil. Like other states with large Kurdish populations, Turkey was anxious about the Kurds within and around its borders. For security reasons, it had consistently refused to countenance any strategy that called for the creation of a separate Kurdish state. Not only had Turkey been fighting the Kurdish terrorist group known as the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) for many years, but, in hopes of moving toward membership in the European Community, the government had recently relaxed many anti-Kurdish laws for which it was enduring heavy criticism from its political opposition.²¹ Allowing the influx of so many Kurds would have increased the government's vulnerability to these opposition attacks.

In addition to its security concerns, Turkey was unwilling to allow the Kurds refuge within its territory because of the lack of international support it had received in the past. Turkey's handling of the Kurdish refugee exodus in 1988 following the Iraqi chemical

²⁰ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 166-8.

²¹ Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After*, (London: John Murray, 1997), 265-6. Also see Sheri Laizer, *Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War*, (London: Zed Books, Ltd, 1996), 26, and Freedman and Boren, 49.

attacks had been met with very little international assistance and heavy criticism.²² Moreover, many Kurdish refugees were still living in camps within Turkey.²³

Turkey's position on the matter was quite influential within the West because of Turkey's importance as a NATO ally. Turkey had proven its value throughout the Cold War and then again in the 1991 Gulf War. Located on the Europe-Asia divide, the Turkish air base in Inçirlik was an important NATO forward staging base for Middle East operations and for protecting NATO's southern flank. Moreover, the coalition knew that the use of Turkish bases would be critical in the task of verifying Iraq's compliance with the cease-fire requirements set out in SCR 687. Thus, when Turkish President Turgut Özal called for "better land under UN control and to put those people in the Iraqi territory and take care of them",²⁴ the West was forced to take the demand seriously.

Domestic Support. Key Western states were motivated to act on behalf of the Kurds because of demands from their domestic publics. The media played a critical role in informing and shaping the Western public's opinion of the humanitarian crisis. Because the humanitarian tragedy happened so soon after the cease-fire agreement, the Persian Gulf region was inundated with reporters from around the world competing for a new story. The humanitarian catastrophe was the perfect opportunity. Unlike in southern Iraq where the reporters had difficulty gaining access, or in Iran where reporters had no access, reporters in Turkey had much more freedom to cover the unfolding humanitarian

²² Laizer, *Martyrs*, 26.

²³ John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds*, (London: Viking, 1992), 28.

²⁴ Donald MacIntyre, "Major gambles for high stakes in the mountains of Kurdistan: The Prime Minister's call for a safe 'enclave' for the Kurds may have lasting repercussions", *The Independent*, 14 April 1991 page 10.

crisis.²⁵ This accessibility was one of the primary reasons why the plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq received so much attention and the refugees in the south received so little.²⁶

The media was fully mobilised by the time the Iraqi forces began suppressing the Kurdish and Shi'ite rebellions.²⁷ The story was predictable. The sinister Saddam Hussein, mistakenly left in power by the victorious coalition, was brutally crushing the very rebellions that Western leaders had incited—and the Western leaders were now washing their hands of the tragedy. The media was there with cameras rolling as the Kurds fled to the mountains along the border with Turkey. They filmed harrowing pictures of unsheltered Kurds hanging onto the sides of snow-covered mountains. Moreover, the media was there when Turkish armed guards refused entry to the would-be refugees.

Reporters not only displayed the graphic images, but they provided detailed commentary as well. They were quick to assign blame to those Western leaders who had encouraged the rebellions and then looked the other way when they failed. Martin Shaw, author of an article written five years after the Kurdish refugee crisis on the media's efforts and subsequent effects in post-Gulf War Iraq, entitled the piece, "TV's finest hour". According to him,

The BBC and ITN developed a sustained campaign over weeks for the Kurdish refugees. Each day brought new film, new images—broad-lens canvasses of refugee columns, camps and scrambles for food, together with close-ups of a suffering child, a pregnant mother, a helpless old person. But what made the campaign effective was not just the images. There was a relentless commentary pinning responsibility for the victims' plight on Bush and Major.²⁸

²⁵ Nik Gowing, "The media dimension I: TV and the Kurds," *The World Today*, June 1991, 111.

²⁶ Poor Iranian-American relations and lingering memories of Iran's seizure of the American embassy were also major reasons for the neglect. Bulloch and Morris, 28-29.

²⁷ Martin Shaw, "TV's finest hour," *New Statesman and Society*, 19 April 1996, vol. 9, Issue 3, 22-23.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

The story was one of betrayal and tragedy thrust in the midst of post-war euphoria. The media not only had a story, but it also had a voracious consumer in a public that had been feeding on hours of "live" war footage each day. The effect such images and commentary had on the international public cannot be overstated. In the words of Nik Gowing, "Politicians no longer set the agenda. Television images dictated the agenda for them".²⁹ The coverage put Bush and Major on the defensive. In the early stages, both men denied any responsibility for the rebellions and, therefore, any obligation to get further involved.³⁰ As public opinion mounted against them, they changed their minds and intervened deeply in the conflict, leaving many to conclude that the media had shamed them into action. In a 1994 interview, Major admitted that he was moved to action on behalf of the Kurds largely as a result of the media images.³¹

The political considerations of American, British, UK, and French decision-makers also played a major role in determining the size and scope of the intervention. The US, having contributed the largest number of troops and equipment to the Gulf War, as well as being responsible for its leadership, largely considered the victory its own. American casualties had been low and United Nations' objectives had been met quickly. President Bush was determined to withdraw the troops as soon as practicable.³² Americans were proud of their dominant victory, and American politicians and military leaders wanted nothing to spoil the "success" of the effort. The continuance of Saddam Hussein's reign within Iraq was one of the most controversial aspects of the Gulf War "victory" and, as such, had the potential to jeopardise its success. Thus, when the Iraqi military began attacking Kurdish non-combatants in compliance with Saddam Hussein's orders, US decision-makers, and

²⁹ Gowing, "The media dimension," 111.

³⁰ See Bush, "Remarks on Assistance", 16 April 1991.

³¹ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 165, Footnote 130.

³² Ibid.

the West more generally, were pressured to “do something” to salvage the Gulf War victory and shift the focus from the decision to leave Saddam in power.

The upcoming 1992 US presidential election further increased the influence of public demand on the decision to intervene. For the Bush team, garnering and maintaining every ounce of political advantage from the Gulf victory was key to holding off a challenge from the democrats. The Bush administration was faced with a dilemma. In contrast to their desire for action on behalf of the Kurds, Bush perceived that the American public wanted US troops home quickly.³³ Having lived with the debilitating legacy of Vietnam and the dismal civil-military divide that characterised much of the post-Vietnam period, the American public, the military, and the government were determined to limit their objectives and minimise their risks.³⁴ Up to this point, the Gulf War had been a success and the Bush administration did not want to chance tarnishing that success unnecessarily. These factors constrained American objectives, and thereby limited the objectives of the allied coalition. For the US to participate in any intervention, the plan had to address the humanitarian plight of the Kurds without establishing a Kurdish homeland, and had to do so in the shortest possible amount of time.

John Major, who was the first to propose the safe haven concept, also had political motives that went beyond mere humanitarian concern for the Kurds. The British government was under pressure by its media-informed public to intervene on behalf of the Kurds. As already mentioned, the media was quick to assign blame for the Shi'ite and

³³ George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College, Montgomery, AL”, 13 April 1991, <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91041300.html>. Accessed 18 July 2003. Also see Bush, “Remarks on Assistance”, 16 April 1991.

³⁴ President Bush often cited the avoidance of a Vietnam-like quagmire as justification for not intervening in the Kurds behalf. “All along, I have said that the United States is not going to intervene militarily in

Kurdish uprisings to Major and Bush. Domestic pressure was reinforced by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's pro-Kurd stance. According to Minear, Scott, and Weiss, "sources close to the decisionmaking process" revealed that Major "feared criticism from his predecessor ... who had taken it upon herself to meet with Kurdish refugee leaders..."³⁵ Being the first prime minister after eleven and a half years of Thatcher's leadership, Major probably also had a desire to develop a policy that would set him apart from her shadow.³⁶ Consequently, he devised his plan for safe havens (originally called "enclaves") very quickly and largely independent of his foreign policy team.³⁷

The French government also had a political motive for assisting the Kurds. The French public had been informed of the Iraqi Kurds' situation prior to the Gulf War. Danielle Mitterrand, the French Prime Minister's wife, had long been campaigning on behalf of the Kurds. As a result of her efforts in the late 1980s, the Kurds' humanitarian plight had received domestic and international interest. She lobbied world leaders and American Congressmen with some success when the Iraqis began their actions against the Kurds in 1991.³⁸ The French requests to include the Kurdish plight in Resolution 687 and to authorise a Chapter VII response in Resolution 688 were ultimately rejected, but Major's safe haven idea had the same protective effect and seemed to appease Mrs. Mitterrand and the French public she had worked so hard to influence.

Credibility. The maintenance of international credibility and reputation also motivated the West to act. Throughout the Cold War, the West had billed itself as the champion of

Iraq's internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire." Bush, "Remarks on Assistance", 16 April 1991.

³⁵ Larry Minear, Colin Scott, Thomas G. Weiss, *The News Media, Civil War, & Humanitarian Action*, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1996), 51.

³⁶ Bulloch and Morris, 34-5.

human rights against oppressive dictatorial regimes. Now, in the post-Cold War environment, it appeared that the West had very little excuse not to intervene to stop such grave abuses, especially when Western leaders were accused of complicity in the tragedy. Only a couple of weeks before the decision to intervene in Iraq, President Bush had reiterated his vision of a New World Order. Quoting Winston Churchill, Bush spoke of a world order where

‘the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong....’ A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.³⁹

Iraq’s treatment of the Kurds threatened to shatter this new order before it was allowed to form and to expose the promises of the West as empty rhetoric.

The European Community’s quest for credibility also influenced the coalition’s decision to intervene. The Luxembourg Summit of 8 April 1991 was instigated by France to discuss Europe’s lacklustre performance in the Gulf War.⁴⁰ When John Major arrived with his hastily-developed plan (a plan that had not been discussed with the Americans), Europeans saw a chance to seize the initiative in an area where the US was perceived to be moving too slowly. Major’s plan not only presented an opportunity for Europe to regain some international credibility, but it also provided a chance to highlight Major’s decision not to pre-brief the Americans—something that was rarely done under the Thatcher regime. In the now oft-quoted statement from a European official regarding the

³⁷ Ibid. According to Nik Gowing, Major outlined the plan on the back of an envelope on the way to the Luxembourg Summit. Gowing, “The Media Dimension”, 111.

³⁸ Bulloch and Morris, 13.

³⁹ George H.W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict”, 6 March 1991.” <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91030600.html>. Accessed 8 July 2003.

⁴⁰ Freedman and Boren, 52-53.

Luxembourg Summit, "The Kurds saved the summit so we must save the Kurds".⁴¹ As a result of the summit, the EC came out in full support of the safe haven plan.

3.2.3 Official Objective

Despite the wide variety of motives for launching the intervention, the West's official objective was to provide humanitarian relief. According to OPC's coalition commander, US Army Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) John Shalikashvili, the official mission statement of the intervention was as follows:

Combined task force Provide Comfort conducts multinational humanitarian operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organisations can assume overall supervision.⁴²

Interestingly, the mission statement did not specify the Kurds in northern Iraq as the chief beneficiaries but referred to displaced Iraqi *civilians* in general. It was also unclear about what was to be done about the Kurdish *peshmerga* combatants that were intermingled with the civilian populace. Missing altogether from the statement were provisions for disarmament and the division of Kurdish combatants and non-combatants. According to USAF General James McCarthy, the Deputy Commander of US European Command at the time of the operation, the coalition "just assumed they [the *peshmergas*] were refugees as well".⁴³ The mission statement also noted the intention to turn the operation over to international relief agencies and private organisations by specifying that the coalition partners were to continue conducting humanitarian operations *until* the relief agencies could "assume overall supervision". There was no mention of what criteria would be used to evaluate the relief agencies' readiness to assume control. Did readiness mean mere presence, or did it mean the ability to provide a comparable degree of relief and

⁴¹ Ibid., 53.

⁴² Shalikashvili, "Congressional Testimony".

protection? Either way, the mission statement made it clear that Operation Provide Comfort was never envisioned to be a long-term intervention. Instead, it was designed to be an interim measure until international agencies could assume the responsibility.

The temporary nature of the operation was further reinforced by the West's three-part objective. According to Shalikashvili, OPC's humanitarian objective consisted of three phases; each phase with its own humanitarian aims:

Immediate: Stop the dying and suffering; stabilize the population.

Mid-term: Resettle population at temporary sites; establish sustainable, secure environment.

Long-term: Return population to their homes.⁴⁴

Although these aims were ostensibly motivated solely by humanitarian concerns for the IDPs, the swift attainment of them would also quell media-induced domestic pressure, salvage the West's Gulf War victory, preserve alliance credibility, restore regional stability, and prevent a long, controversial deployment of Western troops. At no time prior to the operation did the Western coalition promise to resolve the Kurds' political situation or guarantee their long-term security. Restoring the Kurds to their homes was the longest-term objective the West was willing to set. In fact, Western states, driven primarily by the US desire to withdraw quickly, intentionally limited the mission to those objectives that could be accomplished quickly and safely. As will be shown in succeeding sections, this desire to terminate the operation quickly overrode the West's concern for the Kurds' protection.

In spite of this self-interested limitation, the official objective assigned a comprehensive definition to the term "relief" as it was used in OPC's mission statement. "Relief",

⁴³ USAF General (ret.) James P. McCarthy, Deputy CINCEUR, 1989-1992, Interview with author interview, 2 October 2001.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

according to the operation's stated aims, was not simply the provision of a blanket and a can of beans. The "relief" that was to be supplied by the coalition involved the provision of humanitarian aid to alleviate the physical effects of the Kurdish displacement caused by the Iraqi attacks. Food, shelter, and medicine fell into this category. But "relief" also meant the provision of physical security. In order to induce the Kurds to leave their mountain hiding places, the coalition had to create an environment in which the DPs were safe from physical attack.

3.3 MEANS AND METHODS

The troops and equipment dedicated to OPC were certainly sufficient for the stated objective. Moreover the strategy itself was one that seemed to ensure success. However, the restrictions applied to their employment coupled with the nature and timing of their termination raises questions as to the coalition's priority aims.

3.3.1 Troops and Equipment

As humanitarian operations go, Operation Provide Comfort was massive. Because of its non-consensual nature, the coalition prepared for the possibility of encountering hostile Iraqi military forces by deploying a huge force into the area. Over 8,000 troops composed of special forces, military police, infantry, engineers, helicopter crews, and medical personnel deployed into Iraq with a host of others remaining within Turkey. Two aircraft wings composed of a full range of fighter, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft provided security and air support. Moreover, a US carrier task force was deployed off the coast of Turkey for additional support. In all, over 29,000 troops from 13 countries

deployed in support of OPC.⁴⁵ Military troops were not the only contribution to the coalition effort. Over a hundred unaffiliated civilians participated in the operation along with a UNHCR contingent composed of 88 workers. Thirty nations provided materiel support, and over fifty NGOs and private organisations assisted in the provision and delivery of humanitarian aid and expertise.

3.3.2 Strategy

The manner in which coalition forces sought to accomplish their goals in Iraq evolved over time. Initially, the plan was simply to provide assistance to the IDPs through the use of air-drops and no-fly zones. When that plan proved unworkable, the coalition implemented the safe haven concept of operations. Finally, after the IDPs had returned to their homes and coalition forces had departed Iraq, the coalition transitioned to a rapid reaction force in Turkey.

Air-Drops. After SCR 688 insisted that Iraq allow “immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq,” Operation Provide Comfort began on 6 April 1991 and focused extensively on the refugees along the Iraqi-Turkish border.⁴⁶ Initially, the US announced that it would begin providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds by air-dropping essential supplies to them in the mountains. According to General McCarthy, the US Air Force had not even determined if air-drops were possible when President Bush announced on television that the operation was underway.⁴⁷ The relief effort was joined the next day by the British

⁴⁵ All figures taken from Lt Gen Shalikashvili’s “Congressional Testimony”.

⁴⁶ Ten other nations also participated.

⁴⁷ McCarthy interview.

and French. Because of the difficult terrain, the lack of established drop zones, and poor weather, the air-drops were extremely inefficient and dangerous.⁴⁸

No-Fly Zone (NFZ). On 10 April 1991, the coalition imposed a no-fly zone on Iraq which prevented Iraq from flying fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft north of the 36th parallel.⁴⁹ With it came an instruction to “the Iraqi government not to send military forces north of the 36th parallel”.⁵⁰ Although the coalition justified the NFZ as a means to protect the displaced Kurds, General McCarthy, who helped formulate this strategy, said it was primarily designed to protect the coalition forces and humanitarian aid workers who were inside Iraq helping with the relief effort.⁵¹ Hence, the Kurds were only secondary beneficiaries of the coalition’s NFZ protection. In fact, when the coalition forces withdrew from Iraq in July 1991, McCarthy tried on several occasions to terminate the NFZs because he felt they posed an unnecessary risk to coalition pilots and equipment. The US State Department argued for its continuance as it “was useful for controlling Saddam”.⁵² Instead of terminating the zone, it became the principal activity of Operation Provide Comfort II, which began on 24 July 1991, and later Operation Northern Watch, which was in effect from 1 Jan 1997 to 1 May 2003.

Safe Haven. When the air-drop strategy failed to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the coalition turned to Major’s safe haven proposal. According to McCarthy, the politicians were so desperate to demonstrate to their publics that they were acting on behalf of the

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ United States European Command, <http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Operations/onw/Chronology.htm&2>, Accessed, 8 July 2003.

⁵⁰ Freedman and Boren, 53.

⁵¹ McCarthy interview.

⁵² Ibid.

Kurds that they implemented the plan 36 hours after it was conceived.⁵³ From the beginning, Western leaders tried to minimise their responsibility for the zone. John Major sought to utilise the United Nations to carry out the operation, but UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar balked at such a request in the absence of either another Security Council resolution or Iraqi consent, neither of which was a remote possibility.⁵⁴ The coalition leaders, therefore, agreed to carry out the operation initially on the strained justification of SCRs 687 and 688, but continued to seek ways of transferring the operation to the UN at the earliest opportunity. The US, in particular, was anxious to relinquish the operation and get its troops home quickly. The initial plan had been to complete the transfer of IDPs to their homes by the middle of June.⁵⁵ To American officials, this time frame became the unofficial target for complete withdrawal.

To speed the transition, the coalition constantly emphasised methods that could be easily transferred to a replacement organisation. The safe haven plan originally called for the demarcation of a large piece of Iraqi territory in which there would be six "zones of protection" or temporary camps that could accommodate 60,000 people each. Because many IDPs proceeded directly from the mountains to their homes, only two camps ended up being completely established. In an effort to create a camp system that could be easily transferred to humanitarian organisations or left to the Kurds, coalition planners designed the camps on a Kurdish community model based on the input of Kurds.⁵⁶ Second, Kurdish leaders were allowed to govern the camps so that they would remain operational after the coalition military structure departed. General McCarthy related that the primary

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ As to the possibility of the coalition operating under UN cover, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar said, "If this is to be a military presence under aegis of the UN, consent would have to be obtained from the Security Council. If the countries concerned do not require the UN flag, then that is quite different." "West and UN Shamed into Aiding Kurds", *The Independent*, 18 April 1991.

⁵⁵ Shalikashvili, "Congressional Testimony".

motive behind these actions was not the Kurds' protection or comfort, but the coalition's ability to depart in a relatively short period of time.

Key to the success of the plan was the concept of security. If the refugees did not feel secure from Iraqi threats, no amount of food or "comfort" could induce them to exchange their mountain "sanctuaries" for coalition-built camps. As long as the coalition forces remained in Iraq, the Kurds' security within the safe haven was virtually assured. The success of the coalition's security measures were attested to by the fact that OPC did not experience one hostile encounter with Iraqi forces even though five Iraqi divisions were estimated to be in northern Iraq immediately prior to the coalition's deployment into the area. With the exception of Dohuk, the Iraqi military forces quickly complied with coalition ultimatums to leave the disputed areas, even when the coalition significantly expanded the zone.

One way in which the coalition reduced the probability of confrontation was through the creation of the Military Co-ordination Committee (MCC).⁵⁷ The MCC was a liaison unit designed to work with Iraqi forces in an effort to reduce the chances of accidental confrontations or to mediate them should they occur. The MCC later became a formal military mission staffed with American, French, and British soldiers. While the MCC was beneficial, the threat of massive coalition firepower was the supreme guarantor of security. Coalition aircraft patrolled the skies while ground forces in Iraq ensured that Iraqi military forces stayed out of the area. Additionally, there was a large contingent of ground forces located just inside the Turkish border in case a military confrontation should occur. Though there was ample military capability in the region, its primary

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

purpose was the protection of the coalition force, not the Kurds. As will be shown, any real protection the Kurds received was essentially "spill over" of the protection provided to Western troops.

UN Guards. As previously mentioned, the interveners were eager to transfer control of the operation to international relief agencies as soon as possible. Consequently, at the behest of coalition forces and Iraqi authorities,⁵⁸ the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had been preparing to take over the humanitarian dimension of the coalition effort and had been working alongside the coalition forces from the beginning of the operation. In fact, the UNHCR had actually taken over the humanitarian portion of the mission by 7 June 1999.⁵⁹ The chief obstacle to the coalition's withdrawal was finding an acceptable replacement force to handle the issue of security. The Kurds wanted the coalition to guarantee their security and threatened to return to the mountains if adequate security was not provided.⁶⁰ Once again, the coalition looked to the UN and investigated the possibility of a UN peacekeeping force or a UN police force. Without Iraqi consent or a new Security Council resolution, neither of these options were possible.⁶¹ It was after this point that the coalition unabashedly prioritised its desire for a quick exit over the protection of the Kurds.

The Iraqi and coalition authorities finally agreed that a deployment of UN Guards would replace the coalition forces. Because the UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) was not a peacekeeping force *per se*, it did not require separate Security Council authorisation.

⁵⁸ S/22513, 21 April 1991, "Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General, 21 April 1991, reproduced in Marc Weller (ed.), *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath*, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1993), 615.

⁵⁹ Shalikhshvili, "Congressional Testimony".

⁶⁰ Hugh Pope, *The Independent*, 11 June 1991.

⁶¹ Peter Riddell, "Iraq rejects UN police force to protect Kurds," *Financial Times*, 10 May 1991.

The stipulations for the UNGCI were spelled out in an annex to the Memorandum of Understanding developed for the UN humanitarian mission which had been operating concurrent with OPC throughout the rest of Iraq. The maximum number of guards was set at 500, with no more than 150 in any one region. The agreement stipulated that the guards could only be armed with a pistol, which would be provided by Iraq.⁶²

Though not explicitly stated in the agreement, the guards were not tasked with providing physical security to the Kurdish people. Instead, they were to provide security for relief supplies and humanitarian workers. According to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the purpose of the Guards was to

protect United Nations personnel and assets as well as non-governmental organisations working under the umbrella of the United Nations program. Moreover by their presence, the Guards were able to defuse tensions and greatly increase security in the areas in which the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program is being implemented.⁶³

The annex stated that the Guards would be granted freedom of movement between the humanitarian centres and would be given adequate communications equipment and transportation. Despite the Guards' limitations, both UN and coalition officials hoped that the Guards' presence and monitoring capability would instil confidence in the Kurds and caution in the Iraqi forces. What made these restrictions particularly telling of coalition priorities was the fact that the Kurds were not informed of them prior to the coalition's withdrawal. Instead, to avoid another Kurdish exodus which might further delay coalition withdrawal, the UN and coalition officials initially told the Kurds that the Guards would be capable of providing for their security needs.⁶⁴

⁶² S/22663, 22 April 1991, "Letter dated 30 May 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council". See Annex paragraphs 2-7.

⁶³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction," *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict: 1990-1996*, UN Blue Book Series, Volume IX, (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996), 57-58.

⁶⁴ Sadruddin Aga Khan, "Give the United Nations Guards a Chance in Iraq," *International Herald Tribune*, 13 June 1991.

Rapid Reaction Force. To further allay Kurdish fears in the face of the coalition's approaching withdrawal, and to prevent a rift from developing within the coalition, Western leaders decided to deploy a rapid reaction force to Turkey, in addition to maintaining the no-fly zone. The coalition had hoped that the Kurds and Iraqis would reach an agreement that would facilitate a smooth coalition departure. The various Kurdish factions had been meeting with the Iraqi government throughout the coalition deployment and had, at various times, been close to a compromise agreement. However, as the first coalition troops began withdrawing, the Iraqi government stiffened its negotiating posture causing concern among both the Kurds and the coalition. To make matters worse, conflicts among the Kurdish factions prevented a unified negotiating position.

The UK, France, Italy, and the Netherlands did not want to withdraw forces from Iraq until the Kurds had worked out an acceptable agreement with the Iraqis. Prime Minister Major declared that coalition troops would not be withdrawn from Iraq until the Kurds had the following assurances:

. . . firstly, an effective UN force on the ground; secondly, clear warnings to Iraq that any renewed repression will meet the severest response; thirdly, a continuing deterrent military presence in the region to back-up those warnings, and the maintenance of sanctions against Iraq. . . . Without these we will not leave.⁶⁵

American officials, on the other hand, prioritised getting their forces home. With what seemed to be an approaching European-American rift over the timing of the withdrawal, the coalition finally agreed to a compromise solution in which it would withdraw from Iraq after handing over the camps to the UN and their Guards, but would position a rapid reaction force, designated Operation Poised Hammer (and later incorporated into

Operation Provide Comfort II), just inside the Turkish border to maintain a protective response capability. Lt Gen Shalikashvili assured the Kurds, "We'll be just a phone call away".⁶⁶ A London Foreign Office official echoed this assurance by describing the force as being "prepared, if circumstances so demand, to respond swiftly; to go back in, if necessary, to protect the safety of the refugees and UN personnel and to take any other action as may be required".⁶⁷ These assurances mollified the Kurds and enabled the coalition to peacefully withdraw. The last OPC member departed Iraq on 15 July 1991, and the operation officially ended on 24 July 1991.⁶⁸ In spite of the coalition's promises, the rapid reaction force was withdrawn from Turkey two months later, even though the Kurds were far from secure.

3.3.3 Rules of Engagement

The coalition forces' rules of engagement (ROE) illustrated the seriousness with which the coalition viewed the provision of security to the region. Several of the "rules" and definitions which appeared on the "ROE Card" carried by US troops are listed below:⁶⁹

1. All military operations will be conducted in accordance with the laws of war.
2. The use of armed force will be utilised as a measure of last resort only.
4. US forces will not fire unless fired upon unless there is clear evidence of hostile intent.

Hostile Intent – The threat of imminent use of force by an Iraqi force or other foreign force, terrorist group, or individuals against the United States, US forces, US citizens, or Kurdish or other refugees located above the 38th parallel or otherwise located within a US or allied safe haven refugee area. When the on-scene commander determines, based on convincing evidence, that hostile intent is present, the right exists to use proportional force to deter or neutralize the threat.

⁶⁵ Cited in David Keen, *The Kurds in Iraq: How safe is their haven now?*, (London: Save the Children, 1993), 11.

⁶⁶ Bulloch and Morris, 43.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 44-5.

⁶⁸ Shalikashvili, "Congressional Testimony". Also "Operation Provide Comfort," http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/provide_comfort.htm. Accessed 8 July 2003.

⁶⁹ US Army Field Manual FM 100-23, "Appendix D: Sample Rules of Engagement", http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-23/fm100_10.htm. Accessed 8 July 2003.

Hostile Act – Includes armed force directly to preclude or impede the missions and/or duties of US or allied forces.

6. You may fire into Iraqi territory in response to hostile fire.
7. You may fire into another nation's territory in response to hostile fire only if the cognizant government is unable or unwilling to stop that force's hostile acts effectively or promptly.
11. Use the following guidelines when applying these rules:
 - a. Use force only to protect lives.
 - b. Use of minimum force necessary.
 - d. If necessary and proportional, use all available weapons to deter, neutralize, or destroy the threat as required.

These ROE clearly attest to the non-consensual nature of the mission. Ironically, the first rule demanded that the operation conform with the laws of war. Certainly non-combatant immunity had long been established and accepted in international humanitarian law, as had demilitarised zones and neutral zones, but the creation of a non-consensual safe haven in which armed opposition forces were provided sanctuary along with the civilian population was not.⁷⁰ Next, the ROE clearly established that American forces were expected to use deadly force in pursuit of their *mission* of protecting Kurds and establishing a secure environment. This stipulation was much different from the traditional peacekeeping norm of "force only in self-defence". Finally, the ROE indicated the manner in which Iraqi sovereignty was perceived in comparison to other states. The coalition was not attempting to be impartial in Iraq. Iraqi forces were clearly designated as the opposition. As such, coalition forces required no special permission to respond forcefully to Iraqi threats. This was further demonstrated by the manner in which coalition forces dealt with their Iraqi counterparts. On 18 April, prior to moving into Iraq in force, Lt Gen Shalikashvili met with Iraqi Brigadier General Nashwan. The tone of the meeting foreshadowed the tone of the entire operation. According to Shalikashvili:

I wanted to make absolutely sure that they [the Iraqi military] understood that we were going to move into northern Iraq, that we expected them to move out of the area to a distance we set at 30 kilometers from where we were working and that

⁷⁰ Adam Roberts, *Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and partiality in a policy vacuum*, Adelphi Paper 305, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, 40.

there was going to be absolutely no interference on the part of the Iraqis with what we were doing. It was not a negotiating session; it was to inform them and to expect compliance from them.⁷¹

The non-consensual aspect of this operation as well as the coalition's view of security was further demonstrated by the manner in which the coalition expanded the "safe" zone on two separate occasions. Since many of the refugees came from regions outside the initial security zone, the coalition expanded the zone significantly on two occasions to include these areas. On one occasion, the zone was expanded eastward 150 kilometres,⁷² and on another it was extended southward to incorporate the provisional capital of Dohuk. The latter expansion threatened to arouse hostilities when the Iraqis initially refused to withdraw their soldiers and did not want to admit coalition forces because of the large number of Arabs living in Dohuk.⁷³ Complicating matters even more was the large number of Iraqi forces, armour, and artillery in the area, as well as the coalition's perpetual uncertainty of Iraqi chemical weapons.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, because an estimated 150,000 to 180,000 Kurdish refugees came from that area and would need to return there, the coalition required Dohuk to accomplish its mission.⁷⁵ In the end, the two sides compromised. The Iraqis agreed to withdraw their military and secret police to a distance of at least four miles from the city, and the coalition agreed to deploy only non-combat troops into the area.⁷⁶

Security had to be maintained inside the security zone as well as outside. The presence of *peshmergas* in the zone had the potential of bringing international disfavour on the operation as well as retaliation from Iraqi troops, if these Kurdish combatants used the

⁷¹ Shalikashvili, "Congressional Testimony".

⁷² "Allied forces double size of 'safe haven' in northern Iraq," *Financial Times*, 3 May 1991.

⁷³ Alec Russell, "Pull-out orders defied by Iraqis," *Daily Telegraph*, 7 May 1991.

⁷⁴ Peter Riddell, "Iraq rejects UN police force to protect Kurds," *Financial Times*, 10 May 1991.

⁷⁵ Shalikashvili, "Congressional Testimony".

safe havens as bases for conducting attacks. This possibility was considered prior to the intervention but was not adequately addressed. The British government stated that the Kurds would not be allowed to use the camps for military activity but did not stipulate how they intended to prevent them from doing so.⁷⁷ The Americans were even less rigid on the issue. White House Deputy Press Secretary Roman Popadiuk optimistically claimed, "we don't believe that the Kurdish guerrillas that are still operating in the northern sector would endanger the lives of their own countrymen ... by exposing them to this kind of attack".⁷⁸ General McCarthy related that the coalition told the *peshmerga* fighters, "We're here to do a humanitarian mission. We'll give you no support for your operations".⁷⁹ Nonetheless, the coalition did not disarm the guerrillas and even accepted the "security" roles they performed in the safe areas.

3.4 RESULTS

As long as protecting the Kurds coincided with the self-interests of the coalition members, OPC was remarkably successful at the protection mission. The death toll was normalised and hundreds of thousands of people were returned to their homes within a month of the operation's initiation. When the coalition's interests diverged from the Kurds' desire for security guarantees, however, the West's prioritisation of self-interested objectives became clearly evident. As will be shown, the coalition's desire to withdraw from Iraq quickly led to a number of self-interested decisions which had negative effects on the Kurds' protection.

⁷⁶ Hugh Pope, "What when they leave?" *Middle East International*, 31 May 1991. Also, Michael Theodoulou and James Bone, "Refugees return to Dahuk after deal on UN guards," *The Times*, 25 May 1991.

⁷⁷ Freedman and Boren, 57.

⁷⁸ Quoted in *Ibid*, 57.

⁷⁹ McCarthy interview.

3.4.1 Population Protection

Following the withdrawal of coalition forces from northern Iraq, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, judged the coalition's intervention as "a case of successful humanitarian intervention"⁸⁰ as did the Western interveners. On 12 July, the British Foreign Office made the following assessment of Operation Provide Comfort:

Almost all of the 400,000 refugees who fled to the mountains in the area of the safe havens have returned home. The refugee camps have closed and the transit stations are almost deserted. Towns and villages are returning to normal. With our help water and power supplies have been restored, food distribution and basic sanitation systems established and health care brought to those in need. Many lives have been saved. The aims of our deployment have been successfully achieved.⁸¹

Certainly, Operation Provide Comfort succeeded in many humanitarian tasks. As a result of the delivery of almost 17,000 short tons of relief supplies, the immense death rate of nearly 1,000 people a day was brought back to normal levels.⁸² Coalition forces built and staffed medical centres that performed a range of services from routine procedures to complex surgeries. The coalition also succeeded in creating a secure environment long enough to persuade over 450,000 DPs along the Turkish border to return to Iraqi territory and, in most cases, to their homes. In an effort to return these DPs to a state of normalcy, coalition engineers rebuilt the infrastructure of war-torn Kurdish cities to include the repair of their electrical grids and water pumping stations. Cars that had been abandoned during the Kurds' flight toward Turkey were either repaired or filled with petrol and returned to their owners.⁸³

⁸⁰ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 170.

⁸¹ Bulloch and Morris, 44.

⁸² Shalikashvili, "Congressional Testimony".

⁸³ *Ibid.*, .

Despite its many noteworthy successes, the coalition failed in several key areas relating to the provision of protection. Virtually all of these failures resulted from the coalition's determination to withdraw from Iraq as quickly as possible, regardless of its replacement's ability to assume the protection mission. First of all, the coalition did not wait for a political settlement between the Iraqi government and the Kurds. In fact, by constantly stating its desire to withdraw its forces as quickly as possible, the coalition probably inhibited such a settlement by giving the Iraqi government an incentive to dismiss Kurdish negotiating attempts and wait out the coalition's departure. Similarly, the coalition failed to use its influence with the Kurds as a means of pressuring them into working together in the negotiations. As a result of this neglect, no firm agreement was ever reached that provided any guarantees for long-term Kurdish protection or autonomy.

The manner in which the coalition persuaded the Kurds to return to their homes was also questionable. Though the Kurdish departure from the mountains was reported as completely voluntary, humanitarian aid workers expressed concern that the repatriations were forced. As early as 4 May, the UN High Commissioner of Refugees, Sadako Ogata, was concerned about "false assurances being given to the Kurds about their security The UNHCR is aware that in some of the areas where people are returning there is no security".⁸⁴ Another UN official commented on these false assurances by recounting the following:

Allied generals would tell the Kurds, "The UN will do this and will do that". They were saying the security zone will go almost to Mogul . . . The initial movements were in my opinion forced repatriation. It was dishonest at best. . . . Don't forget they were military people, and the military people had an objective.⁸⁵

The security failure was perhaps most evident in the decision to utilise UN Guards as a "security" replacement for the coalition. Over 20,000 coalition troops with their combat

equipment were replaced by 500 UN Guards armed with pistols, questionable authority, and the operational expertise to secure UN buildings. According to Stefan de Mister, the chief UN envoy in Iraq in 1991, even the pistols were for “psychological and traditional reasons” because “the UN does not shoot”.⁸⁶ The inadequacy of the Guards’ protection was quickly evident. Though the UN was authorised to deploy 500 Guards according to the MOU, the actual number in Iraq often fell far below that number to include one period in October 1992 when only 20 Guards were on duty in Iraq. Even if the Guards had been sufficiently armed, they were not tasked with providing security to the Kurds. Their protection mandate extended only to UN personnel and supplies. Even this limited task proved beyond their capabilities, however, as the Guards were unable to prevent the deaths of several relief workers and fellow Guards. Ironically, Kurdish *pershmergas* were sometimes employed to protect the premises of the UN Guards.⁸⁷ Needless to say, the Guards’ presence was ineffective at preventing Iraqi attacks on Kurdish population centres. When Iraqi forces shelled the towns of Kalar and Kifri in 1991 in spite of the Guards’ presence, the Guards fled.

As previously discussed, the coalition justified its early departure from Iraq by promising a 5,000 strong “residual” force to be situated for rapid response in Turkey. This number was halved and then removed altogether in September 1991.⁸⁸ Significantly, the withdrawal of the rapid reaction force occurred at a time when security conditions for the Kurds inside Iraq had grown worse. The coalition justified this timing by emphasising their continuing enforcement of the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel, even though the no-fly zone proved ineffective at deterring Iraqi ground attacks.

⁸⁴ Leonard Doyle, “Americans seek autonomous Kurdish region,” *The Independent*, 4 May 1991.

⁸⁵ Keen, *The Kurds in Iraq*, 8.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

Finally, because the no-fly zone did not extend south of the 36th parallel, it left large concentrations of Kurds in northern Iraq vulnerable to Iraqi attack by a variety of means. Even north of the 36th parallel, coalition air attacks in response to Iraqi attacks were not a certainty. On 7 August 1991, when Iraqi and Kurdish forces were fighting in the city of Gerbil, which is north of the 36th parallel, no action was taken by coalition aircraft. In explanation for this apparent neglect, British Foreign Minister Archie Hamilton stated that the coalition force was only intended to protect those areas that were once part of the allied security zone—a small portion of the area north of the 36th parallel.⁸⁹

The actual success of the coalition's intervention must be further questioned in light of the sudden physical hardship which fell upon the Kurds after the withdrawal of coalition forces. Although the coalition provided the Kurds under its protection with the necessary supplies and infrastructure to return to their homes, it did nothing to prevent or ease the tremendous burden of the "double" economic blockade which was levied on the Kurds by the Iraqi government after the coalition's withdrawal from the region in October 1991. During the first half of 1992, some areas within Iraqi Kurdistan received an average of only forty percent of their rations from the Government of Iraq, a figure that went down to below ten percent for Gerbil and Sulaimaniya by the last half of the year.⁹⁰ In short, the blockade had terrible effects on agriculture, education, health, water, and sanitation services.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Ibid, 14.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 15.

⁹⁰ Keen, *The Kurds in Iraq: How safe is their haven now? Executive Summary*, (London: Save the Children, 1993), 7 (hereafter cited as *Executive Summary*).

⁹¹ Keen, *Executive Summary*, 7.

The success of OPC was further negated by Turkey's subsequent anti-terrorism operations into Iraq soon after the coalition's withdrawal. Turkey had long been concerned about its vulnerability to the Kurdish terrorist group, the PKK which based its operations in the mountains along the Turkish-Iraqi borders. By 1991, Turkish right wing supporters were using Turkey's recent "Kurdish tolerance" policies to build support against Özal's government.⁹² In response to this pressure, and because this period corresponded with the eighth anniversary of the PKK uprising, Özal's government reversed its tolerance policies and returned "to the hard-line tactics which had in the past encouraged the counter-violence of the PKK".⁹³ Since Turkish support was critically important to the success of OPC, the other coalition allies were constrained in what they could do or say regarding Turkish actions, even when they proved detrimental to Kurdish security.

As a result of a series of PKK attacks against Turkish soldiers and pro-government Kurds in July 1991, Turkey launched an attack against PKK bases inside Iraq and threatened to cancel the coalition's access to its rapid reaction base in Silopi.⁹⁴ The Turkish government also began co-operating with one faction of the Iraqi Kurds against the PKK, exacerbating tensions between Iraqi Kurds even further. After a 5 August PKK attack, Turkish forces responded with an operation that utilised a commando regiment and an assortment of fighter-bombers and attack helicopters. This action was followed by several additional robust Turkish attacks, one of which, in October 1991, reportedly made use of napalm bombs. In fact, in the months immediately following the coalition's withdrawal, the Turks flew over 130 sorties against rebel strongholds, though there were claims that some of the attacks hit refugee centres and resulted in the deaths of innocent

⁹² Nicole and Hugh Pope, 265-6.

⁹³ Bulloch and Morris, 45.

civilians. According to Freedman and Boren, at least three of the villages that were attacked were within the allied security zone.⁹⁵

Regarding the coalition's deliberate inaction in response to Turkish aggression, one coalition pilot tasked with patrolling the NFZ commented sarcastically, "One day a week we stop protecting the Kurds from Iraqi bombardment to allow the Turks to bomb them".⁹⁶ Essentially, the continuance of Turkish attacks on Kurds in Iraq rendered the "no-fly zone" protection virtually useless. In March 1995, the *Geneva Post* reported the following:

This week the allies conveniently grounded their overflights of Iraqi Kurdistan to allow Turkish jets to bomb the very territory the allies are committed to protect from Iraqi aggression. It is small comfort to the Kurds of Iraq that the bombs raining down belong to an ostensibly friendly power and of little consequence to the Turkish pilots whether the people below are good Kurds or bad Kurds.⁹⁷

3.4.2 Other Results

In spite of the poor results regarding the protection of the population, the coalition strategy achieved a number of positive results for the West. First of all, the coalition bolstered alliance unity at a time of vast political change. By supporting Turkey's closed-border policy, assisting the Kurds within Iraq's borders, and allowing the Turkish attacks into Northern Iraq, the coalition states preserved good bilateral relations as well as NATO cohesion. In return for the West's support of Turkey's policies, the US (and, therefore, NATO) retained its air bases in Turkey, which were considered critical as a Middle East staging ground, and received permission to stage its overflight missions of Northern Iraq from the air base at Inçirlik. The importance of alliance unity in northern Iraq cannot be

⁹⁴ Ibid., 46.

⁹⁵ Freedman in Boren, 79.

⁹⁶ Comment made in the presence of the author.

overstated in terms of NATO ability to adapt and survive as an alliance after its *raison d'être* had vanished.

Second, the coalition preserved regional and international stability. By resettling Kurdish IDPs in northern Iraq without creating or legitimising a separate Kurdish state, the coalition reduced tension in the volatile region and eased the worries of several governments that had large Kurdish populations of their own. The West's minimalist strategy also had the positive effect of avoiding a major rift among the permanent members of the Security Council. While certain members of the Security Council had expressed their lack of support for a resolution authorising further enforcement action in Iraq, they did not interfere when the coalition intervened citing SCR 688 as its authority. The coalition preserved this acquiescence by limiting the tasks it sought to accomplish and by withdrawing quickly from Iraq, both of which reduced the appearance of neo-imperialism, which was especially important in the West's relations with the reform-minded Soviet government. The limited aims and speedy withdrawal also minimised the challenge to the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.

Third, the coalition's strategy satisfied the demands of the Western public and minimised the negative effect of the crisis on the post-Gulf War victory. The coalition was able to alleviate the Kurds' most immediate dangers, thereby removing the media interest and silencing the demands of sympathetic television viewers. More importantly, the coalition accomplished these results without getting bogged down in a long, drawn-out, dangerous mission and without suffering a single combat casualty.

⁹⁷ *Geneva Post*, 23 March 1995, Quoted in Bill Frelick, "Safe Havens, Broken Promises," http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/safehavens_98.htm. Accessed 8 July 2003.

Finally, as a result of the manner in which the coalition provided aid and protection, the coalition bolstered its credibility. By stressing the humanitarian justifications for the intervention, the coalition was able to reply to the charge that its concern for human rights and oppressed peoples was simply rhetoric. The efficiency with which the coalition accomplished the mission also further demonstrated its dominant capabilities to the rest of the world.

CONCLUSION

At the time of its execution, Operation Provide Comfort represented the largest contingent of military forces ever deployed for the stated purpose of providing security to an endangered population. In the short term, the coalition's stated humanitarian objective was achieved. Thousands of lives were saved and over 400,000 Kurds were moved from the Turkish border and resettled into their homes by the time OPC was turned over for long-term care to the UN. As laudable as these achievements were, two considerations should be borne in mind when evaluating the ultimate success of OPC. The first is that the situation in Iraq was unique in many ways that made success easier to achieve and at a lower cost than in most other conflicts of the 1990s. These unique factors, such as the pre-deployment of coalition troops and equipment, the tacit approval of key Security Council member states, the thorough knowledge of the opponents' capabilities, and the pariah status of the antagonist, meant that applying lessons from Operation Provide Comfort to future interventions would lead to very different results.

Secondly, while the humanitarian successes of OPC are obviously important, certain actions taken by the coalition both prior to and after the intervention suggest that the

Kurds were protected only as long as doing so coincided with the self-interests of the Western interveners. The West initially eschewed intervention on behalf of the endangered populations because the humanitarian crisis did not pose obvious threats to self-interests. In this situation, there were simply too many uncertainties associated with robust action on the Kurds' behalf. Many Western states feared that such action on the Kurds' behalf could fragment Iraq, destabilise the region, and cause the Gulf War victory to be called into question. It was only when the Western public's demand for action joined with Turkey's call for assistance that Western interests were affected enough to generate action.

When it did act, the West constantly sought ways to minimise its protective response so as to safeguard its interests in the face of uncertain dangers. Initially, the West emphasised the relatively easy task of providing aid over the more dangerous and uncertain task of providing protection. Had the initial air-drop strategy been an effective way to conciliate Turkey, stabilise the death rate, and satisfy the media-inflamed public, the coalition may very well have left the Kurds up in the mountains until they either decided to go home or the UN was able to do something for them. However, when air-drops were ineffective, the coalition designed a plan that emphasised force protection and the rapid resettlement of IDPs. While the plan worked well, the IDPs returned to their homes having been given assurances for their future security which the coalition never intended to guarantee. In order to withdraw quickly, the coalition transferred the security of the Kurds to the symbolic presence of UN Guards who were not even tasked with the Kurds' protection. Similarly, after OPC had withdrawn from Iraq and the public focus had shifted to other matters, the coalition's rapid reaction force was withdrawn, despite the Kurds' worsening security situation. At last, only airpower remained, and even its

limited mission shifted from providing protection to providing surveillance and early warning of Iraqi activities.

These Western actions were the result of the West's shifting insecurities. When the Kurds returned to their homes from the mountains, they ceased to provide the media with a story that captured the public's attention. Turkey's security concern reverted back to its long-standing feud with PKK terrorists. In the US, President Bush was left with a sagging economy, an imposing presidential challenger, and no visible enemy on which to build a vote-winning foreign policy platform. In the UK, Prime Minister Major's Conservative Party was facing its first serious challenge by the Labour Party. The European Community was tackling the tough questions of enlargement and the developing crisis in Yugoslavia. To put it bluntly, the Kurdish predicament in Iraq no longer generated sufficient levels of insecurity in the West to compete with the insecurity generated from a host of other issues. When that happened, the Western coalition packed its bags and went home, confident in the knowledge that it had done a good deed for the Kurds, and a great deal for itself.

CHAPTER 4 BOSNIA

INTRODUCTION

Efforts to protect non-combatant populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina¹ (hereafter referred to as Bosnia or BiH) evolved more slowly and spanned a much longer period of time than protection efforts in Iraq. Unlike the Kurdish crisis, the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia did not end with a Western military coalition quickly imposing its will on a defeated enemy, returning IDPs to their homes, and quickly withdrawing its forces. Instead, Western protection in BiH took the form of a consensual UN operation that developed incrementally over a period of years.

Confronted with the ethnic cleansing of non-combatant populations in Bosnia by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and paramilitaries, the Security Council, led by Western Member States, delineated six predominately Muslim enclaves within BSA-held territory as "safe areas". To ensure that the safe areas were respected, the Security Council eventually deployed UN troops and utilised humanitarian agencies to care for the internally displaced people (IDPs). The Security Council passed numerous resolutions, and individual Western states made countless statements denouncing the treatment of non-combatants. Yet, for all the rhetoric and activity that went into the humanitarian effort, the West's safe area strategy in Bosnia was characterised by minimalist, self-interested behaviour that ultimately failed to provide adequate protection to the endangered population.

¹ Also referred to as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Though there were various protection methods utilised in Bosnia, this chapter focuses primarily on the West's purported efforts to protect non-combatant populations through the use of safe areas. As their name implies, safe areas represented the most conspicuous method by which interveners attempted to accomplish their protection mission. While the safe area strategy in Bosnia formally occurred under the auspices of the United Nations, Western states, particularly those on the Security Council, played a key role in determining its nature and scope, as well as the composition and mandate of the deployed forces. Examining the safe areas thus provides useful insight into the thinking of those Western decision-makers who formulated and implemented protection efforts through the Security Council and NATO.

Rather than examine all six areas individually, this chapter devotes special emphasis to the safe area in Srebrenica. It is an appropriate focus for several reasons. The humanitarian situation in and around Srebrenica in 1992 and 1993 was a major catalyst for robust international action on behalf of populations. Moreover, as it was the first safe area to be designated as such, the conditions that led to its designation and the means dedicated to its preservation reveal some of the motivations and expectations of Western states and the international community. Finally, the eventual failure and surrender of the safe area in Srebrenica was a marked turning point in the West's willingness to use decisive force in Bosnia. Thus, Srebrenica was key to the West's efforts in BiH from start to finish, and its legacy has affected Western protection interventions ever since.

4.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTION

Western protection efforts in Bosnia had their origins in Croatia's determination to secede from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the Yugoslavian National Army's (JNA) attempt to prevent it. In response to the war in Croatia and the instability within all of Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution (SCR) 713 on 25 September 1991. In the resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposed a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia..."² This decision had a dramatic effect on the upcoming war in Bosnia since it froze existing stockpiles of weaponry to the advantage of the JNA-supported Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). When the conflict in Croatia intensified and it became apparent that the combatants would not be easily swayed by Western and international efforts to achieve a negotiated peace, the once unified Western position of keeping Yugoslavia intact began to fracture and recognition of the seceding republics became inevitable, largely as a result of German insistence. Faced with this situation, the Bosnian government, led by President Alija Izetbegović, held a referendum in which the population voted overwhelmingly to declare independence from Yugoslavia.³ The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally recognised by the EC and the US on 6 and 7 April 1992 respectively.

The UN peacekeeping mission to Bosnia emerged gradually and incrementally. Initially, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was mandated by Security Council Resolution (SCR) 743 of 21 February 1992 to demilitarise and enforce four UN Protected Areas

² S/RES/713 (1991), 25 September 1991, paragraph 6.

³ The Bosnian Serbs who made up approximately 31 percent of the Bosnian population, boycotted the referendum.

(UNPAs) in Croatia.⁴ As the Yugoslav Army (JNA) withdrew from Croatia, it moved into Bosnia where there was a significant minority population of ethnic Serbs, and began conquering and ethnically cleansing large parts of Bosnian territory, in spite of UNPROFOR's headquarters being situated in Sarajevo, BiH. In May 1992, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for its support of the Bosnian Serbs and called for the Secretary General to find a way to get humanitarian aid to the needy and to establish a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. Due to international pressure, the JNA withdrew from Bosnia in May 1992 but allowed Bosnian Serbs within its ranks to join the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA).

UNPROFOR negotiated an agreement with the Bosnian Serbs to reopen the Sarajevo airport on 5 June.⁵ Three days later, the Security Council passed Resolution 758 in which UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded to include monitoring operations in Bosnia. From this point on, the Security Council slowly expanded UNPROFOR's mandate in BiH through a host of resolutions that generally had very little enforcement capacity. Despite these statements and resolutions denouncing the treatment of civilians, non-combatants within Bosnia continued to be targeted on a massive scale with no political solution on the horizon. Faced with an escalating humanitarian crisis and international intransigence, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) twice pressured the international community to help the endangered populations within their places of residence by creating "protected zones". Although the ICRC offered to help administer the zones,⁶ the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Secretariat, and the

⁴ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 223. Also Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 221.

⁵ Ibid.

UNPROFOR Force Commander were all against the idea, principally due to the dangerous, non-consensual environment which characterised Bosnia.⁷

By January 1993, the BSA had conquered approximately seventy percent of Bosnian territory and was besieging the capital city of Sarajevo. Moreover, the Bosnian Serb attacks had already generated over 500,000 IDPs and refugees.⁸ On 2 January 1993, the joint EC-UN peace plan, known as the Vance Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) for Bosnia was unveiled. After much negotiation and arm-twisting, it looked as if the parties would agree to the VOPP. Only when the newly-established Clinton administration withheld its full support for the plan did the Bosniacs reconsider in hopes of achieving an American-backed pro-Bosniac settlement.⁹ Similarly, after it became apparent that a Bosnian peace settlement would divide the republic into ethnically dominant provinces, all parties to the dispute sought to consolidate and control as much territory as possible in order to negotiate from a position of strength.

The Bosnian Serb desire to consolidate their territorial gains resulted in an intensification of ethnic cleansing. Consequently, many Bosniac IDPs fled to small enclaves controlled by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) or Bosniac paramilitaries. In spite of the Security Council resolutions demanding humanitarian access, the Bosnian Serb forces continued to prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance and harassed UN workers. The area around Srebrenica was particularly hard hit and was the first of the enclaves that

⁶ Jean-Philippe Lavoyer. "International Humanitarian Law, Protected Zones and the Use of Force," in *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia*. Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset eds., (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 271-2.

⁷ A/54/549, 15 November 1999, "Report to the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica".18-19. (Hereafter *UN Srebrenica Report*.)18-19.

⁸ David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 91. Also *UN Srebrenica Report*, 12, and S/23900, 12 May 1992, "Further Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749", 3.

looked poised to fall. The UNHCR successfully evacuated between 8,000 and 9,000 displaced Muslim non-combatants from the town before Bosniac authorities finally terminated the practice on 2 April 1993¹⁰ because evacuations interfered with their objectives of preserving territory and arousing international assistance.¹¹ With evacuations no longer an option and humanitarian aid prevented from reaching its target, the international community was forced to find another solution to the humanitarian plight.

On 13 April, Serb commanders announced that they would capture the town if it did not surrender and evacuate its Bosniac population by 15 April. On 16 April, the Security Council was informed that, though Srebrenica had not surrendered, it was prepared to do so if acceptable terms could be negotiated. Faced with this immediate deadline and the impending humanitarian crisis, the Security Council members, "without knowing quite what they were doing",¹² resurrected an altered version of the ICRC's proposal and designated the area around Srebrenica a "safe area" on 16 April 1993.

4.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES

The West had various official and unofficial motives for designating safe areas in Bosnia. According to the relevant Security Council Resolutions, the primary motive was the humanitarian impulse to protect the vulnerable Bosnian non-combatants who were

⁹ Owen, 101-3, and Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, (London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), 230-236.

¹⁰ *UN Srebrenica Report*, 14.

¹¹ General Sir Michael Rose, *Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia*, (London: Warner Books, 1998), 12-13, 26. Rose tells of Bosnian forces firing mortars on the Sarajevo airport to "sustain the image of a city under siege." 240. Also Burg and Shoup, 165-168.

¹² Nik Gowing, "Real-time TV Coverage from War: Does it Make or Break Government Policy?", in James Gow, Richard Paterson and Alison Preston (eds.), *Bosnia By Television*, (London: British Film Institute, 1996), 87.

suffering from the brutal ethnic cleansing tactics of the Bosnian Serb Army and paramilitaries. Secondly, the safe areas were motivated by the desire to bring about a peaceful agreement in the Bosnian civil war. The official objectives of the operation flowed directly from these motives. The safe areas were established to ensure that endangered population had a safe place where they could live. They were also designed to help bring about a peaceful settlement by preventing the Bosnian Serbs from consolidating their territory. In addition to these official motives and objectives, the West was motivated by a number of unofficial, self-interested factors. It hoped that the safe areas would preserve regional stability, satisfy the Western public's demand for action on the Bosnians' behalf, and bolster the West's international credibility.

4.2.1 Official Motives

Humanitarian Concern. By far the Council's strongest official motive for creating the safe areas was the urgent plight of the endangered populations in the Bosnian enclaves. SCR 819 of 16 April 1993, which dealt solely with Srebrenica and its surrounding region, opened with several paragraphs listing the Security Council's humanitarian motives for its actions. These concerns included potential genocide, violations of international humanitarian law, ethnic cleansing, armed attacks on non-combatants, the targeting of humanitarian assistance convoys, the "tragic humanitarian emergency", and the "large scale displacement of civilians".¹³

In SCR 824 of 6 May 1993, which expanded the number of safe areas to six, the Security Council also gave primarily humanitarian reasons for its actions. In addition to those already cited in SCR 819, the Council referred to the "denial of access to humanitarian aid and services such as medical assistance and basic utilities", "urgent security and

humanitarian needs”, the “influx of large numbers of displaced persons”, and the need to preserve the multicultural city of Sarajevo from further destruction.¹⁴ Finally, SCR 836 of 4 June 1993, which mandated a protection role for UNPROFOR in the safe areas, was also justified primarily on humanitarian grounds. In SCR 836, the Council repeated *inter alia* its condemnation of ethnic cleansing, the violation of international humanitarian law, and the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Political Settlement. The Security Council also listed its desire to bring about a political settlement to the crisis in which the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain territorially intact. The Council expressed this motive by reaffirming “the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence” of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” in all three resolutions. By doing so, it identified the BiH government as the legitimate state authority, declared its intention to preserve the territorial integrity of the Bosnian state, and reinforced that its actions were in conformity with the traditional norm of state sovereignty. Having clearly stated its position, the Security Council reaffirmed its position in SCR 819 that the acquisition of territory by force was “unlawful and unacceptable”. In SCR 824, the Council announced that it was “convinced that treating the towns ... as safe areas [would] contribute to the early implementation of the peace plan”. In SCR 836, which was approved after the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance Owen Peace Plan, was even more explicit in its political motives. It stated that the safe areas were not meant to be an end in themselves but were mechanisms for bringing about a lasting peace in Bosnia as part of the Vance-Owen process. Moreover, in SCR 836, the Security Council urged the Bosnian Serbs to sign the VOPP and reiterated its insistence that a lasting solution could only occur when all parties withdrew from land

¹³ S/RES/819 (1993), 16 April, 1993.

¹⁴ S/RES/824 (1993), 6 May 1993.

seized by force, allowed refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, and respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Bosnian Republic.

4.2.2 Unofficial Motives

Regional and International Stability. Though not included in the Security Council Resolutions, a key motive behind the designation of the safe areas was the European desire to keep the endangered Bosnians within their own borders.¹⁵ Though all of Europe was having to adjust to the rising level of refugees from the Balkan conflicts, Germany was particularly affected. After only a few months of war in the Balkans, over 324,000 refugees from various Yugoslav areas had flooded into Germany, and this at a time when Germany was already dealing with the economic difficulties surrounding its reunification.¹⁶ The presence of so many refugees made the tensions associated with reunification much worse and, as hate crimes and anti-foreigner sentiment dramatically increased, so did overall European instability.¹⁷ In response to this growing instability, Germany pressed other European countries to set quotas for the number of refugees they would accept. The UK, accused of not taking its share of the refugees, proposed that safe areas be set up to care for the people within their own countries.¹⁸ While this suggestion initially generated very little interest, it reinforced the growing European desire to deal with the problem of displaced people from a distance. European leaders recognised that, if the Bosniac enclaves, with their thousands of endangered people, were allowed to be ethnically cleansed, the refugee problem, and the problems generated from it, were sure to get worse. Consequently, to refugee-conscious European decision-makers, the possibility

¹⁵ Bill Frelick, "The Dangers of "Safe Havens" for Kosovo", US Committee for Refugees, http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/safehavens_99.htm, Accessed 16 July 2003.

¹⁶ Marie-Janine Calic, "German Perspectives", in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 69.

¹⁷ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 368-9.

of providing for the endangered Bosnians prior to their becoming refugees was an idea worth pursuing.¹⁹

Also of concern to Western states was the possibility that the ethnic tensions at work in Bosnia could spread to surrounding regions, eventually culminating in a wider European war. This possibility was especially worrying to many Europeans, not only because of historical memories of the Balkan beginning to World War I, but also because the European Community was in the process of transitioning to the European Union. Clearly, European unity during this phase was paramount, as was demonstrated by the EC's early attempt to solve the Yugoslavian imbroglio and its decision to recognise break-away republics at Germany's behest.²⁰ Moreover, a wider European war could have eventually set NATO states against one another.²¹ As NATO was already trying to redefine itself in the absence of its chief antagonist, the alliance leaders may have given Bosnia more attention than they would otherwise have done.

Countering these motives for greater involvement, the West, and the United States in particular, was concerned that involvement in Bosnia could jeopardise the reform movement in Russia. Though the West largely viewed the Serbs as the aggressors and the instigators of the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia, it was hesitant to react too

¹⁸ Ibid., 295. Also Susan L. Woodward, "Humanitarian War: A New Consensus?", *Disasters*, 2001, Vol. 25, No. 4, 338.

¹⁹ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 110-11.

²⁰ Among a host of others, see Jonathan Eyal, *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons From a Failure*, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), 30 and Olivier Lepick, "French Perspectives", in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 77-8.

²¹ US Secretary of State Warren Christopher made this argument in February 1993 but abandoned it by June 1993. See Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and Peacekeeping", *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 1994, 36-7.

forcefully against them because of their religious and historical ties to the Russians.²² The reform-minded Russian government was in a perilous state of transition as hard-line communist forces sought to reconsolidate control. Because Russian President Boris Yeltsin's challengers were urging Russian support of its traditional Serb allies, the US was very cautious in advocating any action that might give hard-line communist forces a rally cry that would resound with the Russian people.²³

Domestic Support. Western governments were also motivated to set up the safe areas by a desire to secure and maintain the support of their voting publics. Unlike with the Kurds in Iraq, public support for military intervention in Bosnia was ambiguous. In fact, throughout most of the Bosnian conflict, Western publics were generally against becoming involved militarily.²⁴ This public stance reaffirmed the belief of Western leaders that military action in a difficult intrastate conflict would win little praise from their domestic publics. The US had already shunned a leadership role in the early stages of Yugoslavia's dismemberment because the Bush administration felt that the American public wanted another entity to shoulder some of the burdens associated with maintaining international order. Even though Governor Bill Clinton had urged American action in Yugoslavia while campaigning for the presidency in 1992, after his election he was as unwilling as Bush had been to agree to any plan that required the involvement of US ground forces.²⁵ Richard Holbrooke described the feeling in the US as "post-Iraq American fatigue".²⁶ Now that the superpower threat had receded, American voters were

²² Thomas Halverson, "American Perspectives", in., Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 4,7.

²³ Wayne Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 184-6.

²⁴ For statistics, see Burg and Shoup, 163-4.

²⁵ See Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 13-14 and Thomas Halverson, "American Perspectives", 11-24.

²⁶ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, Revised Edition, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1998), 26.

ready to enjoy the "peace dividend" and expected to relish the fruits of victory and the spoils of war.²⁷

An important factor in the eventual formation of safe areas was the effect of the media on Western publics and their governments. As the situation around Srebrenica worsened, the media began in earnest to document atrocities against Bosnian civilians. By August 1992, the Western public was seeing and hearing first-hand accounts of Serbian concentration camps, executions, and massive human rights violations.²⁸ Though Nik Gowing and others have argued persuasively that the media did not actually "drive" Western foreign policy in Bosnia, even Gowing observed that key, unexpected events reported by the media generated "policy panic" or ad hoc actions in response to public outcry.²⁹ In his study, Gowing credited a reporter's smuggled video footage from inside Srebrenica as the key factor that swayed the Security Council to declare Srebrenica a safe area.³⁰ In response to the footage, the public demanded action from their governments on behalf of the civilian victims. Although the UN had been involved in Bosnia for months, the primary focus of the Security Council effort had been the achievement of a long-term political settlement and the delivery of humanitarian aid rather than the protection of vulnerable civilians. The media-induced public pressure motivated Western leaders to "do something" tangible to better the plight of the civilians.³¹ As pressure mounted, the US advocated its "lift and strike" policy, which the British and French found

²⁷ See Donald Kagan and Frederic W. Kagan, *While America Sleeps*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 267-320.

²⁸ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 295.

²⁹ Gowing, 86-7.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Mario Zucconi, "The West and the Balkan Conflict", in Stefano Bianchini and Robert Nation (eds.), *The Yugoslav Conflict and Its Implications for International Relations*, Ravenna: A. Longo Editore, 1998), 36.

unacceptable. Their subsequent advocacy of safe areas was, thus, partly motivated by their desire to preclude the implementation of "lift and strike".³²

International Credibility. Credibility was another significant, though unofficial, motive for implementing safe areas in Bosnia. Western states had long emphasised the ethical dimension to their foreign policies. They frequently spoke out against human rights abuses and considered themselves to be champions of the oppressed. Moreover, as the undisputed victors of the Cold War and the advocates of the "New World Order", they had expected the various Bosnian factions to concede to their demands. However, the Bosnian combatants had refused to be swayed by the West's attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement. Western states realised that their humanitarian statements would be exposed as empty rhetoric and their international credibility jeopardised if they were unable to prevent the displacement and murder of large numbers of civilians in their own "front yard".

Western credibility was already suffering in the eyes of various Middle Eastern states. As the plight of the predominately Muslim Bosniac population became more widely known throughout the international community, a number of predominately Muslim countries expressed doubt as to the credibility of the UN response. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference condemned UN inaction on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and called for the exemption of the Bosnian government forces from the arms embargo.³³ The United States was particularly affected by warnings from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt that

³² Mats R. Berdal, "The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict After the Cold War", *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law*, vol. 7:71, 1996, 80.

³³ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 296.

the UN's refusal to assist the Bosnian Muslims was legitimising the claims of radical Muslim fundamentalists in the Middle East.³⁴

Western credibility was further imperilled in March 1993 when UNPROFOR's BiH Force Commander, French General Phillipe Morillon, promised the inhabitants of the enclave in Srebrenica, "We will never abandon you. You are now under the protection of the United Nations".³⁵ Although Morillon said this after effectively being taken prisoner by the residents of the town who were desperately seeking UN protection, he was reprimanded for exceeding his mandate and dismissed early from his position. Nevertheless, he had made a commitment on behalf of the UN, and the organisation's credibility would be affected by whether or not it was fulfilled.

4.2.3 Official Objectives

Humanitarian Space. In all three of the relevant resolutions, the Security Council claimed that the primary objective of the safe areas was to provide a safe place for endangered populations to live. According to SCRs 819 and 824, the Council sought to safeguard the endangered people by designating areas that were to be "free from any armed attack or any other hostile act". Although the creation of an attack-free zone was the objective, the Security Council was unwilling to make any guarantees that the safe zones would be protected.

In Operative Paragraph (OP) 7 of SCR 824, the Security Council warned that "in the event of the failure of any party to comply with the present resolution" it would "consider immediately the adoption of any additional measures necessary with a view to its full

³⁴ Ibid, 296.

³⁵ Ibid., 295-6.

implementation...".³⁶ Therefore, when attacks against the safe areas continued, the Security Council adopted SCR 836 on 4 June 1993, which expanded the UNPROFOR mandate and augmented its force structure. SCR 836 was largely the brainchild of Western states as it was sponsored by France, Spain, the UK, and the US, in addition to the Russian Federation. In it, the Security Council sent confusing signals as to the objective it was hoping to achieve. The carefully worded, highly ambiguous mandate of SCR 836 reveals the uncertainty and ambiguity that often characterised the West's assessment of complex post-Cold War hazards. According to Mats Berdal, SCR 836

illustrates, perhaps more clearly than any other decision by the Security Council between 1992 and 1995, the adverse effects on the conduct of U.N. field operations of competing political pressures and of the differing perceptions of interests among permanent members of the Security Council.³⁷

For example, in one of the preliminary paragraphs of SCR 836, the Security Council stated that it was "[d]etermined to ensure the protection of the civilian populations in safe areas...".³⁸ This objective was repeated in OP 4. However, in OP 5, it announced that UNPROFOR was merely mandated to

deter attacks against the safe areas, to *monitor* the cease-fire, to *promote* the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina and to *occupy* some key points on the ground, in addition to *participating* in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992 [Italics added].³⁹

Key to the passage of this resolution was the Security Council's selection of certain benign verbs such as "deter", "monitor", "promote", "occupy", and "participate" which were intentionally chosen over more forceful words like "protect", "defend", "secure", or "safeguard".⁴⁰ In short, the Security Council crafted a resolution in which the safety of the non-combatant population rested on the passive activities of UNPROFOR and the

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Mats R. Berdal, "The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict", 79.

³⁸ S/RES/836, 4 June 1993.

³⁹ Ibid.

active co-operation of the combatant parties. To add to the confusion of the resolution, OP 7(a) identifies UNPROFOR as "elements entrusted with protection of safe areas". Shashi Tharoor, an advisor to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, called SCR 836 "a masterpiece of diplomatic drafting, but largely unimplementable as an operational directive".⁴¹

Political Settlement. SCR 836 emphasised that the safe areas were "temporary measures" and were not to be seen as ends in themselves. According to the resolution, "the primary objective remains to reverse the consequences of the use of force and to allow all persons displaced from their homes ... to return to their homes in peace".⁴² The resolution also called on the parties to implement those portions of the VOPP on which they could reach agreement.

Although SCR 836 does not state it clearly, the purpose of "ensuring full respect of the safe areas" was supposed to contribute to the eventual implementation of the peace plan by preventing the Bosnian Serbs from consolidating their territorial gains and, thus, giving the Serbs an incentive to negotiate. This objective was bluntly stated by the French representative in his remarks prior to the vote on the draft resolution. He said that protecting the safe areas addressed a "paramount political objective: maintaining the territorial basis needed for the development and implementation of the Peace Plan"⁴³

⁴⁰ *UN Srebrenica Report*, 24.

⁴¹ Quoted in Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2002), 265.

⁴² SCR 836, OP 6.

4.3 MEANS AND METHODS

The West's minimalist manner of implementing the safe area strategy indicated that the protection of the endangered population was not its primary objective. The success of the safe area strategy depended on the lasting consent of the combatants and, yet, no such consent was ever given. Nevertheless, the force structure, strategy, and rules of engagement were predicated on peacekeeping principles. The authorised force was too small and inadequately armed to ensure the respect of the safe areas, and the restrictive rules of engagement often kept it from effectively employing the few means that it did have at its disposal.

4.3.1 Troops and Equipment

Personnel. One of the primary reasons that reticent Western states agreed to the passage of SCR 836 was because of France's determination that a "light option" of less than 10,000 troops would be sufficient for the "monitoring of a limited perimeter".⁴⁴ This light option proposed by the French meant that "ensuring the protection" of endangered populations and salvaging Western credibility might not be as costly as originally thought. In spite of the French light option, the Secretariat advised the Security Council that 32,000 additional troops would be needed to implement the safe area policy.⁴⁵ Western states, particularly Britain and France, opposed this figure and instructed the Secretariat to plan along the lines of the light option defined in the French

⁴³ S/PV.3228, 4 June 1993.

⁴⁴ S/25800, 19 May 1993. "French Memorandum Relative to Safe Areas".

⁴⁵ Retired Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie briefed the United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that it would take 80,000 to 100,000 troops to defend the safe areas. He also said that General Morillon's replacement, Belgian General Briquemont "was prepared to undertake the task with 65 thousand". See Major General Lewis Mackenzie (ret.), "Bad news for future victims", *The McGill International Review*, <http://www.unsam.qc.ca/mir/issue1/mackenzie3.htm> Accessed 15 June 2001.

memorandum.⁴⁶ When Boutros-Ghali gave his report to the Security Council on 14 June, he cited the UNPROFOR Force Commander's estimate that 34,000 additional troops would be needed to "ensure full respect for the safe areas . . . to obtain deterrence through strength".⁴⁷ Having been told by Western representatives on the Security Council that such a figure would never be authorised, Boutros-Ghali recommended a light option of 7,600 additional troops with an accompanying air component.⁴⁸ Although his recommendation was accepted and incorporated into SCR 844 of 18 June 1993, it took months for the troops to be deployed, "and then only in part and inadequately armed".⁴⁹ Significantly, none of the sponsors of SCR 836 initially agreed to send any additional troops.

Though Boutros-Ghali recommended the light option, he did so with important qualifications. His recommendation was not based on an analysis of what was needed to accomplish the mission, but on what resources could "realistically be expected from Member States".⁵⁰ He insisted that the light option was merely a start to the implementation of the resolution and should be viewed as "the core of a subsequent increased presence in the event that further troop reinforcements become necessary".⁵¹ He went on to say that the light option was an "initial approach" with limited objectives that "assumes the consent and cooperation of the parties and provides a basic level of deterrence", while also emphasising that such a deployment was dependent on an effective threat of air action.

⁴⁶ Berdal, "The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict", 82.

⁴⁷ S/25939, 14 June 1993. "Report of the Secretary-General Relative to Safe Areas."

⁴⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, (New York: Random House, 1999), 86.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 86. In mid-March 1994, nearly nine months later, only 5,000 had arrived in theatre according to S/1994/300 of 16 March 1994, "Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871".

⁵⁰ S/25939, 14 June 1993.. "Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836.

Equipment. Not only was the number of troops insufficient to provide adequate protection to the population, but the amount of equipment allotted to them was also generally lacking. While several African Member States volunteered soldiers for the mission, most of them were insufficiently equipped and trained. In Boutros-Ghali's report pursuant to SCR 836, he conceded that, without the appropriate equipment (such as armoured personnel carriers and communications equipment), the tasks set forth in the resolution could not be accomplished. He appealed to those Member States who were not deploying troops to provide the equipment.⁵² Six months after this request, the Secretary-General reported that two of the largest contingents in Bosnia were still lacking "extensive equipment", including such necessities as winter clothing.⁵³ Even those who deployed with the right equipment found it impossible to get re-supplied. In Srebrenica, the Dutch battalion was equipped with armoured personnel carriers armed with .50 calibre machine guns and TOW antitank weapons. Soldiers also had shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons and small arms. However, because the BSA regularly prevented the safe areas from being re-supplied, many of the vehicles and larger weapons were rendered completely inoperable due to the lack of ammunition or spare parts.⁵⁴

Had the West prioritised the population protection mission, it would have ensured that the mission was adequately resourced with capable personnel and equipment. Instead, UNPROFOR's constant struggle to maintain even this minimal force authorisation indicates the true priority of the humanitarian mission to Western states.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994, "Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to SCR 836 (1993).

⁵⁴ Lane, 15, Also *Srebrenica: a 'safe' area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a safe area*. Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, "Summary for the Press", *Srebrenica*:

4.3.2 Strategy

The methods used within the safe areas in Bosnia varied according to the particular contingent of peacekeepers deployed at the time in question. While the specific tactics of the peacekeepers depended on their culture, capabilities, and interpretation of the mandate, the minimalist nature of the peacekeeping mission meant that they all utilised certain common methods. Although some of the contingents had more combat capability at their disposal than others, none were equipped to engage in extended combat operations. With the resources unavailable, the peacekeepers realised that they would stand no chance against a determined foe. Consequently, they understood that, for their mission to have any chance of success, they had to remain impartial, use force only in self-defence, and try to maintain the consent of the belligerents. To accomplish this last task, the peacekeepers emphasised negotiation and regular communication with the combatants.

Minimally equipped as they were, their primary method of ensuring respect for the safe areas was their presence, not their capability. To demonstrate their presence, most contingents patrolled the safe areas, though some did so more actively and consistently than others. They used their patrols to observe, monitor, and report on the combatants' actions. Most contingents utilised a series of observation towers located around the perimeter of their areas from which they could monitor and locate sources of incoming fire. They hoped their surveillance would deter attacks, but if it did not, the peacekeepers could serve as forward observers for military airstrikes

a 'safe' area. *Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a safe area*, Paragraph 5, http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/content_perssamenvatting.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.

In Security Council Resolution 844, the Security Council recognised that the small number of peacekeepers that were authorised to augment the safe areas would not be able to accomplish the protection mission alone. Therefore, it authorised NATO airpower to serve as the primary self-defence force if deterrence failed. While this was the intention, it rarely happened according to plan. In the absence of airpower, the peacekeepers and the population they were protecting were at the mercy of the combatants.

This was the case in Srebrenica in 1995. A hostile, determined force confronted an incapable contingent of peacekeepers with no supporting air cover. The Dutch forces attempted to shrink the perimeter of their area so that they could operate more closely together. While the tactic was technically sound, in the end, it did not prevent the Bosnian Serb forces from overrunning the safe area without encountering a single shot from the peacekeepers.

4.3.3 Rules of Engagement

Ground Forces. SCR 836 was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The framework for the ROE was stated in OPs 9 and 10 of the resolution. OP 9 of the resolution stated the following:

Authorizes UNPROFOR . . . acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys.⁵⁵

This statement proved to be very confusing because of its mixture of Chapter VI and Chapter VII language. First of all, it must be remembered that UNPROFOR was originally deployed as a peacekeeping force and operated according to peacekeeping rules

⁵⁵ S/RES/836.

which required the consent of the belligerents, force only in self-defence, and strict impartiality. Though SCR 836 authorised “necessary measures, including the use of force”, it was predicated on UNPROFOR’s acting in self-defence. The authority to use force in self-defence was nothing new as UNPROFOR had been given this right prior to the passage of SCR 836. OP 9 went on to list occasions in which force “in self defence” could be used. This caused further confusion because it was unclear whether the Security Council was authorising force in defence of the *mandate*, which would have included defence of the non-combatants, or simply giving examples of when peacekeepers might find *themselves* in sufficient danger to use force legitimately. For example, SCR 836 authorised UNPROFOR to use force “in self-defence” in response to the shelling of a safe area. Because the intent was unclear, UNPROFOR troops were unsure about using force if the shelling did not directly endanger themselves.⁵⁶ To peacekeeping forces who had been trained to use restraint and to foster consent by transparent impartiality, OP 9 was extremely difficult to understand. When the Dutch battalion was ordered to stand and fight in Srebrenica, one peacekeeper described the confusion in the Situation Room regarding the peacekeepers’ ROE:

Everybody got a fright. You could easily get killed in such an operation. As far as I knew, we had not been sent to Srebrenica to defend the enclave, but rather as some kind of spruced-up observers.⁵⁷

This impression regarding the use of force was reinforced in numerous statements made by the Secretariat and the Force Commander throughout the safe area operation. They consistently emphasised the peacekeeping nature of the mandate.⁵⁸ Furthermore,

⁵⁶ Canadian Major-General John A. MacInnis, Deputy UNPROFOR Commander from June 1993 to August 1994, explained the rules for using force automatically this way: “. . . the fact that they, their mates, or their positions were being targeted: that they could identify the source of fire; and that they could engage their attackers without causing harm to non-combatants.” “The Rules of Engagement for U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Former Yugoslavia: A Response”, *Orbis*, vol. 39, no. 1, Winter 1995, 98.

⁵⁷ From ‘Een cynisch spelletje Stratego’ (‘A cynical game of “Stratego”’), *Algemeen Dagblad*, 14 October 1995. Quoted in Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a war crime*, (London: Penguin, 1996), 14.

⁵⁸ See *UN Srebrenica Report*, 36.

peacekeeping concerns of consent and impartiality were emphasised in numerous reports from the Secretary-General to the Security Council, as well as in many statements from the various Force Commanders.⁵⁹ In one instance, the Secretariat emphasised to UNPROFOR that it was to accomplish its mission through “persuasion not coercion” and that UNPROFOR’s deterrent capacity flowed from its “presence” not its military strength.⁶⁰ In a report to the Security Council in May 1994, Boutros-Ghali summarised UNPROFOR’s understanding of their mission as follows:

To protect the civilian populations of the designated safe areas against armed attacks and other hostile acts, *through the presence* of its troops and, if necessary, through the application of air power, in accordance with agreed procedures [*Italics added*].⁶¹

This corresponds with the findings of the 7,000 page report compiled by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation which concluded: “active defence of the enclave by military means was not in accordance with the mandate, the UN policy ... or the rules of engagement”, and that “military means could only be deployed if the safety of the battalion was in danger and if it was the target of direct fire...”.⁶²

Obviously a great deal of emphasis was placed on the peacekeepers’ safety, which was often prioritised over the safety of the non-combatants. UNPROFOR Directive 2\95 of 29 May 1995 stated that “the execution of the mandate [was] secondary to the security of UN personnel”.⁶³ To complicate the soldiers’ decision-making process even further, it stated that force was only to be used as “a last resort”.⁶⁴ The combination of these written and oral statements, in addition to UNPROFOR’s initial peacekeeping mandate, reiterated that force was only to be used according to a strict definition of self-defence.

⁵⁹ For example, see the Secretary-General’s report of 16 March 1994, S/1994/300.

⁶⁰ *UN Srebrenica Report*, 27.

⁶¹ S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 844”, 5.

⁶² Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, “Summary for the Press, para 5.

⁶³ Quoted in Honig and Both, 8.

After the passage of SCRs 836 and 844, the shelling of the safe areas continued at about the same rate as before with no significant change in UNPROFOR responses. Even when the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica came under direct attack in July 1995, the peacekeepers refrained from responding with force. According to the UN report on the fall of Srebrenica, the B Company Commander of the Dutch battalion, Captain Groen, ordered his company not to return fire because he feared it would escalate tension and jeopardise the lives of his crew.⁶⁵ Even more telling as to UNPROFOR's understanding of the ROE was the fact recounted earlier; that the soldiers assigned to "ensure the respect" of Srebrenica had let it fall to the BSA without firing a shot in its defence. The Dutch contingent's refusal to use force in Srebrenica, even under these circumstances, was especially significant because it had earlier refused to release the heavy weapons under its control to ARBiH forces who wanted to defend the safe area. When queried as to why this decision was made, a senior Dutch commander who had been involved in the decision responded: "It was UNPROFOR's responsibility to defend the enclave, and not theirs'... We didn't want to escalate the situation further by bringing the BSA and ARBiH into direct fighting".⁶⁶

The issue of demilitarisation of the safe areas was another source of confusion for ground forces. After the passage of SCR 819, UNPROFOR Commander Lars-Eric Wahlgren negotiated two agreements between the BSA and ARBiH. One of the key provisions of the agreements was the demilitarisation of Srebrenica. The ARBiH forces were to hand in their weapons first, then the BSA was to withdraw to a distance that would not threaten

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ From *Dutchbat in Vredesnaam, Januari 1995-Juli 1995 (Dutchbat in the Name of Peace, January 1995-July 1995)* (Rijswijk: Début, 1996), p. 296, Cited in Honig and Both, 15.

⁶⁶ *UN Srebrenica Report*, 59.

the area. After the Bosnian Serbs refused to ratify the VOPP, the Secretariat informed UNPROFOR that the arrangements for demilitarisation were unacceptable.⁶⁷ From that point on, the Security Council never again required that the safe areas be disarmed.

The Security Council then passed SCR 824 which made the one-sided demand that all Bosnian Serb forces withdraw to a distance "that ceases to be a menace" to the safe areas but said nothing about ARBiH forces located within them.⁶⁸ Not until 22 April 1994 did the Security Council pass a resolution that dealt with ARBiH activity within the safe areas. Security Council Resolution 913 called for "an end to any provocative action by whomsoever committed in and around the safe areas".⁶⁹ The presence of Bosniac fighters within the safe areas had the negative effect of giving the BSA a justifiable reason to attack them. Likewise, any Bosniac attack out of the areas invited retaliatory strikes from the Bosnian Serbs. Though the UN report on the fall of Srebrenica concluded that ARBiH attacks out of Srebrenica were minimal, the ARBiH and paramilitary presence legitimised BSA attacks and jeopardised the safety of the non-combatants living there.⁷⁰ The ARBiH presence inside the areas also gave the dangerous appearance (or exposed the reality) of Western partiality toward one side of the conflict. In numerous reports, the Secretary-General warned against allowing the Bosniac fighters to rest, train, and equip inside the safe areas because of the damaging effects this would have on the security situation. Boutros-Ghali recommended that the areas be completely demilitarised on a number of occasions.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 22.

⁶⁸ S/RES/824, 6 May 1993, para 4a.

⁶⁹ S/RES/913, 22 April 1994.

⁷⁰ Examples of the Secretary-General's advice to the Security Council to demilitarise the safe areas can be found in S/1994/291, 11 March 1994, "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 900 (1994), and S/1994/555.

Recognising the need for a greater military capability to protect their forces on the ground, the British, French, and Dutch agreed to contribute forces to two heavily-armed brigades which would act as a rapid reaction force in early June 1995. Though the UNPROFOR Commander of BiH wanted the force to be able to operate under robust rules of engagement, the overall UNPROFOR Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Bosnia disagreed and demanded the force operate as peacekeepers.⁷¹ The 12,500 member force was eventually approved by the Security Council in Resolution 998 of 16 June 1995 as a peacekeeping force. It was subject to the same rules of engagement and narrow interpretations as the rest of UNPROFOR.⁷²

Air Forces. The rules of engagement regarding airpower evolved in piecemeal fashion. As already mentioned, the Security Council chose to implement the “light option” of 7,600 additional ground troops reinforced by airpower. In paragraph ten of SCR 836, the Security Council declared that

Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.

The manner in which airpower would be utilised was not determined until BSA forces threatened to close off the last remaining road into Sarajevo in August 1993.

“Dual Key” Approach. As a result of the Sarajevo crisis, NATO and the UN Secretary-General agreed to a plan in which the Secretary-General would authorise the first use of airpower. They also agreed that air attacks “would be executed only with the agreement

⁷¹ *UN Srebrenica Report*, 52-3.

of the UNPROFOR Force Commander and the NATO Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces South ... and then only when each had authority to proceed".⁷³ Boutros-Ghali, backed by several of the troop contributing countries, emphasised the difference between close air support (CAS) and airstrikes. CAS was defined as defensive air action that directly supported the troops on the ground against a specific threat such as a tank or mortar position. Airstrikes, on the other hand, were seen as an offensive weapon in which strategic targets were attacked to weaken a force's ability to wage war. According to Boutros-Ghali, since UNPROFOR could use force only in self-defence, the airpower supporting UNPROFOR should also be used as a defensive weapon.

The "dual key" approach resulted in a number of problems which affected the protection of UNPROFOR and the safe areas in general. Units on the ground made requests that were often rejected before ever making it to UN Headquarters. When they did reach the UN, the decision to act, which was by no means certain, was often so slow as to render the request useless. On one occasion, a request was delayed because the proper request form was either not used or was filled out incompletely.⁷⁴ Often, because of the number of people who had to agree to each request, forces on the ground did not know whether to expect air support or not. At several critical moments, UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica waited expectantly for close air support when the request had either been rejected or lost. Only after the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa had fallen to the Serbs did Boutros-Ghali delegate his authorisation directly to the Force Commander.

Airpower was also of limited utility because NATO often prioritised the lives of its pilots over the lives of UNPROFOR ground forces or safe area inhabitants. On the rare

⁷² S/RES/998, 16 June 1995.

⁷³ S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, 15. Also *UN Srebrenica Report*, 32.

occasion when an aircraft was shot down by BSA missiles, air missions stopped while search and rescue missions took place. After one such incident, Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander in Chief of NATO's Southern Command, decided to halt all missions on tactical targets due to the danger they posed to the pilots. Though he later reconsidered this stance, he was far more reluctant to approve airstrikes in the future.⁷⁵ Similarly, after the BSA had shown the capability to fire medium and high-altitude surface to air missiles at NATO aircraft in late 1994, NATO doubled the number of aircraft flying combat air patrols making it impossible for them to provide around-the-clock protection to UNPROFOR soldiers and endangered civilians.⁷⁶

Hostages. Because UNPROFOR was a peacekeeping force in an environment where there was no peace to keep, the UN forces were vulnerable to attack and capture. UN officials, UNPROFOR leaders, and contributing Member States were constantly concerned about the possibility of UN forces being taken hostage in response to broader military action taken against the BSA. This happened on 14 April 1994, when UNPROFOR responded to the BSA shelling of the Gorazde safe area by requesting and receiving close air support on two consecutive days. The BSA reacted by taking 150 UN personnel hostage only to release them in return for assurances that the combat air patrols over Gorazde would cease.⁷⁷

Again on 25 May 1995, UNPROFOR called for airstrikes to halt BSA attacks against Sarajevo. NATO aircraft bombed ammunition bunkers in Pale over the next two days. The BSA responded by taking 370 UN personnel hostage and using 17 of them as human

⁷⁴ *UN Srebrenica Report*, 70.

⁷⁵ Rose, 168.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 294-5.

⁷⁷ *UN Srebrenica Report*, para 137, 36-7.

shields.⁷⁸ In view of the hostages' safety, the Secretariat advised the senior UN civilian in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, not to authorise further strikes unless there was a "major violation ... in the exclusion zones, leaving no choice".⁷⁹

Thus, the vulnerability of the hostages severely curtailed UNPROFOR's ability to act. Because of them, the Force Commander told the UNPROFOR BiH Commander that his top priority was the safety of UN personnel and that UNPROFOR should avoid any action that could "degenerate into confrontation".⁸⁰ So pervasive was the concern for the hostages that when the first UNPROFOR observation post in Srebrenica was being overrun by the BSA in June 1995, the Dutch request for close air support was declined. On 11 July 1995, as the entire safe area looked poised to fall, NATO airstrikes were called off by Akashi because of BSA threats to shell the concentration of civilians in the town and kill Dutch peacekeepers under BSA control.⁸¹ Only after the fall of Srebrenica, the subsequent slaughter of thousands of men and boys, and the forced deportation of thousands of Bosnian Muslims did the Security Council agree to pull back UNPROFOR troops from vulnerable areas and utilise airstrikes in earnest.

4.4 RESULTS

The safe areas provided a measure of safety for thousands of Bosnian civilians between 1993 and 1995. Yet, by examining the results of the West's protection efforts in accordance with the objectives that were set for the operation, it quickly becomes apparent that the West was not primarily concerned with protecting the population.

⁷⁸ Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, 234.

⁷⁹ *UN Srebrenica Report*, para 191, 48.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, para 194, 49.

⁸¹ Lane, 16.

Instead, it consistently made decisions that prioritised its self-interests at the expense of the Bosnian population it was supposed to protect. While this was most dramatically illustrated by the collapse of the safe areas in Srebrenica and Zepa, the self-centred priorities and decisions that led to these tragedies were widespread throughout the duration of the intervention.

4.4.1 Population Protection

In accordance with their humanitarian objectives, the safe areas provided a measure of protection for many people who had been forced to flee the Bosnian Serb onslaught. Though deliveries of humanitarian goods were often sparse and inconsistent, the safe areas did provide locations in which subsistence-level foodstuffs could be distributed to the displaced people. For all the woes documented about the safe areas, starvation was rarely one of them. General Sir Michael Rose estimated that UNPROFOR sustained 2.4 million people during the course of the conflict and delivered an average of 2,000 metric tonnes of stores a day.⁸² Moreover, while two of the safe areas were overrun and ended as terrible tragedies, four others were still intact upon the commencement of the peace negotiations in 1995. Some analysts have concluded that if the safe areas had not existed, the people living within them may have shared a fate similar to that of the inhabitants of Srebrenica. It is almost certain that the best they could have hoped for within the borders of BiH would have been the forcible displacement to an area more firmly under Bosniac control.

While lives were undoubtedly saved as a result of the safe areas, the strategy as a whole was unsuccessful at providing endangered populations with secure humanitarian space.

⁸² Rose, 363.

The failure to protect the inhabitants of the safe areas has been well documented. The peacekeeping force was far too small and operated under rules of engagement that were much too restrictive to "ensure" the safety of the areas. In some cases, forces did not even arrive in the safe areas for a significant amount of time after the passage of the resolutions. The situation in the Gorazde safe area was so dangerous that the Security Council waited a full year after its designation to commit forces, and then only in response to a direct Serb attack.⁸³ Even though only two of the safe areas were overrun, civilians living within all the areas were shelled on a fairly constant basis throughout UNPROFOR's deployment, leading to numerous civilian casualties. Humanitarian aid was often obstructed from entering the areas and medical evacuations were frequently prevented.

Living conditions within the safe areas were notoriously poor. Within the safe areas, thousands of IDPs were crowded together in the streets, some under makeshift shelters, and some completely exposed to the elements. Left with only what they could carry, "residents" of the safe areas were completely dependent on UNPROFOR to keep them safe. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General wrote many reports describing the horrific conditions in the areas as well as their lack of safety. He called for either a redefinition of the safe areas or a reconsideration of their mandate, neither of which was accomplished. In his 11 March 1994 report to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali summed up the safe area operation this way:

UNPROFOR has saved lives by its presence in the safe areas, but that has not made these areas truly "safe". Living conditions in the safe areas remain appalling; the areas are unviable socially and economically, and they suffer from high levels of unemployment, overcrowding, crime and prostitution, as well as the tension of an uncertain future.⁸⁴

⁸³ *Gorazde: The Peacekeepers' Tale*, Compact Disc Flycover, Produced by GMS Media, 2001.

⁸⁴ S/1994/291, 5.

In spite of UNPROFOR's presence, the civilian population was at risk from hostile elements inside and outside the safe areas. The presence of ARBiH and Bosniac paramilitary troops led to Bosnian Serb "retaliatory" strikes against the areas.⁸⁵ The Bosniac government also endangered the lives of civilians in its efforts to maintain international sympathy and involvement. It would not allow the civilians to be evacuated to safer places because it claimed that this would play into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs who wanted to ethnically cleanse all Bosniac government-held territory. Various reports and speculations also exist saying that government forces staged attacks against their own civilians, or else intentionally acted in ways designed to bring about BSA retaliation, in an effort to maintain international sympathy and draw the West further into the conflict.

The lives of non-combatants were further jeopardised by the West's use of misleading language. By choosing to call the enclaves "safe areas", the West created an impression within the civilian population that their safety was assured. The areas thus acted as a magnet for desperate IDPs looking for protection. Even after two safe areas had fallen to the Bosnian Serbs, the displaced people were left with no choice but to remain hopeful that the UN would keep them safe. One survivor of Srebrenica recounted his expectations of the areas:

We thought that soon the West and U.N. would demand that the Serbian forces retreat from Srebrenica and that the "safe area" status would be restored. "It was a U.N. 'safe haven,' there is no way it will be allowed to fall," I thought.⁸⁶

Instead of protecting the non-combatants, in many cases the safe areas simply concentrated the population into small, densely populated areas that made Serb targeting and capture quite easy. For the endangered populations—even those whose safe areas

⁸⁵ S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994, 8-9.

⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping", Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 16.

were not overrun, it may have ultimately been better to flee to Bosniac controlled areas rather than endure the dangerous, ghetto-like atmosphere of the safe areas.

In spite of all the West's rhetoric about ensuring the respect of the safe areas, when military confrontations arose involving UNPROFOR, the peacekeepers' lives were prioritised over those of the Bosniac civilians. Those areas that were completely overrun by the BSA were taken without a fight in the presence of UNPROFOR troops and with NATO aircraft in the skies overhead. This inaction led to tragic results. The Dutch report from the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation concluded that the BSA Commander's decision to overrun the safe area at Srebrenica was "primarily motivated by the lack of any significant armed resistance".⁸⁷ After the fall of Srebrenica, thousands of women and children were forcibly evacuated, separated from their military-aged male family members, and stripped of any valuables they still possessed. Many were raped and brutalised before being released. Many are still missing. The men and boys suffered a more permanent fate. Most of the fighting-aged males fled prior to the town falling. Of the 15,000 that fled, 5000 were massacred and many others went missing and are now presumed dead.⁸⁸ Of those adult males who stayed in Srebrenica, most were executed. As of November 1999, over 7,000 people from Srebrenica remained unaccounted for and are now presumed dead.⁸⁹ The fact that UNPROFOR troops were on the scene and unable to do anything to prevent the slaughter makes this event especially tragic.

After Srebrenica, Zepa was the next safe area to fall. Aware of Zepa's tenuous position, the Security Council focused on the fate of Gorazde and was not prepared to act on Zepa's behalf. Once overrun, the future of Zepa's inhabitants was left to the

⁸⁷ See Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, "Summary for the Press", Paragraph 5.

⁸⁸ Findlay, 251.

determination of BSA and ARBiH negotiators. In accordance with the agreement, UNPROFOR troops accompanied over 5,000 women and children to government-held territory between 25 and 27 July 1995.⁹⁰ The combatants and males of fighting age were initially going to be exchanged for BSA prisoners, but when this agreement collapsed, UNPROFOR forces claimed that a Srebrenica-style attack appeared likely. Fortunately for the areas inhabitants, a Croat attack on BSA forces in south-west Bosnia caused the BSA leadership to abandon this attack on Zepa in order to respond to the Croat offensive. Consequently, the males in Zepa were able to escape to friendly territory.

Only after these two safe areas had fallen and thousands of people had been abandoned to their deaths at the hands of the BSA did the Security Council choose to act more forcefully. Rules of engagement were expanded resulting in an intensive bombing campaign that eventually led to the signing of a peace agreement in the US. For thousands of Bosnian non-combatants, the peace agreement signed in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995 was too late to do any good.

4.4.2 Political Settlement

In spite of their dismal humanitarian results, the safe areas may actually deserve credit for the preservation of the Bosnian state, merely because they kept the international community engaged in the conflict. According to General Rose, had the Bosnian Serbs been able to eliminate these safe areas and consolidate their territory, they may have been able to eliminate the Bosnian state altogether.⁹¹ Similarly, had the Bosnian Serbs been able to consolidate their territory, negotiators may not have had the leverage necessary to

⁸⁹ *UN Srebrenica Report*, 92.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 361.

reach agreement on the compromise peace plan signed in Dayton, Ohio. In this way, the safe areas contributed to the accomplishment of the UN's second official objective.

4.4.3 Other Results

Although the West was only marginally successful in the achievement of its official objectives, it achieved a number of other benefits which satisfied its unofficial, self-interested aims. First, the Bosnian intervention benefited international order in several ways. By preventing the formal disintegration of BiH into ethnically pure states, the West satisfied its desire to keep international borders unchanged and avoided the establishment of a destabilising precedent that could lead toward unrestrained self-determination and ethnic separatism. The safe area strategy, as ineffective as it was for protecting endangered populations, kept many thousands of displaced people within the borders of their own country. Not only did this "*in situ*" protection relieve the neighbouring states of the economic and logistical hardships that come with hosting refugees, but it also may have prevented the spread of the conflict into other parts of Europe by limiting the numbers of dependant refugees from various and often oppositional ethnicities in host states.

Second, the safe area strategy provided a way for Western decision-makers to maintain a degree of public support for their policies. Western publics were legitimately concerned about the humanitarian crisis underway in Bosnia and demanded action from their governments, as long as that action did not result in large numbers of friendly casualties or Vietnam-like stalemates. The safe area strategy did "something" without doing too much.

Finally, the safe area strategy salvaged a degree of Western credibility. Acting through the Security Council, Western states were able to register strong, vocal opposition to the Bosnian Serbs without having to make a significant "personal" sacrifice to "protect" endangered Muslims populations. Simultaneously they were able to avoid the danger of being drawn into a full-scale war in the Balkans. When critics of Western policy asked what was being done for the endangered civilians in Bosnia, Western leaders could point to the safe areas. When questioned about instances in which non-combatants were clearly left unprotected, they could blame the peacekeepers, the UN Secretariat, or another reticent Member State. Moreover, the West could (and did) claim that NATO bombing, bolstered by the prowess of Western negotiators, eventually brought the conflict to a close.

CONCLUSION

The West's decision to protect populations in Bosnia was claimed by many Western leaders to have been motivated solely by their humanitarian concern for the endangered Bosnian non-combatants. Yet, from the beginning of the intervention, the West prioritised its self-interests at the expense of the endangered population. The humanitarian mission was largely the result of the West's refusal to devote sufficient resources and political capital to bringing about a settlement in the Bosnian civil war. Because the war was dangerous and the West's interest in the conflict was limited to a desire to keep it from spreading, the West opted merely to protect endangered civilians. But even this decision was resisted until Western credibility and domestic support began to suffer. These factors, combined with the West's recognition that preventing the

Bosnian Serb's consolidation of territory was key to a future negotiated peace plan, moved the West to designate six safe areas ostensibly for the population.

Even in its limited role, the West constantly sought to minimise its responsibility as it prioritised its self-interest. Initially, only fifty additional military observers were authorised for each area, but as their name implied, they had no responsibility for protection. Finally, when the Security Council voted to "ensure the respect" of the safe areas, Western leaders dismissed military estimates and opted for a "light option" of peacekeepers who were supposed to ensure the respect of the areas by their 'presence'. To account for the inadequacy of personnel, members of ARBiH were allowed to remain in the safe areas, which endangered the non-combatants even more. Additionally, the airpower which was supposed to provide a measure of protection was largely ineffective because of difficult approval procedures, sophisticated air defence systems, poor weather, and complex ROE. In the end, two safe areas were overrun and thousands were killed, beaten, or severely abused. Only out of concern for the potential effects on the West's credibility and domestic support did the West institute more robust military action. In spite of its humanitarian claims, the West clearly prioritised the protection of its self-interests over the protection of the population.

CHAPTER 5 RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

The efforts of Western states to protect endangered Rwandans between 1993 and 1995, either as part of a UN force or a multinational coalition, are particularly worthy of examination because of the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe that served as their catalyst. The genocide in Rwanda was perhaps the most obviously justifiable case for a population protection intervention in the 1990's. Between 500,000 and 1 million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were systematically murdered by extremist Hutu militias, often with machetes, hoes, and axes. The Hutu rate of killing exceeded that of the Nazi death camps by five times, yet the Western states, and the international community more generally, were slow to act and, when they did, their protection efforts were largely ineffective.¹

Throughout the tragedy, Western representatives called for an end to the killing and spoke forcefully of the imperative to protect the targeted population. Numerous Security Council resolutions were passed and official statements were delivered condemning the violence against the population. Scores of observers were sent to document and report the evidence of the killings. Tragically, decisive action to protect Rwandan civilians rarely matched the rhetoric. The West's failure to protect the population was all the more remarkable in light of the fact that the UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), was in the country throughout the genocide providing first-hand reports of the massacres to the Security Council. Additionally, there were two separate international interventions, UNAMIR II and *Opération Turquoise*,

which were ostensibly launched for the specific purpose of providing protection to the endangered non-combatants.

Although Rwandan civilians needed protection inside and outside Rwanda's borders, this chapter focuses only on the international efforts aimed at protecting those who remained within Rwandese territory. To accomplish the protection objective, the Security Council specifically advocated the use of "secure humanitarian areas" to protect the populations where it was feasible to do so. The UN-directed French intervention, *Opération Turquoise*, which temporarily assumed the protection mandate, utilised the Council's authorisation to establish a Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ). The SHZ was a large region demarcated for humanitarian purposes within which small camps were established for the protection of displaced and endangered people. Because it was allegedly created to protect populations and was to become the focal point for coalition and UN efforts, this chapter concentrates on actions that occurred within this safe zone. Through a detailed examination of the West's involvement in Rwanda, it will reveal that Western states were more concerned with protecting their own self-interests than with preserving the lives of the endangered Rwandans despite their humanitarian rhetoric to the contrary. In other words, the West protected the endangered population only as long as doing so coincided with the preservation of its own self-interests. Nevertheless, by comparing the motives, objectives, and results of the interveners, this chapter will illustrate the difficulty Western states had in correctly identifying the potential hazards to their self-interests and in selecting a strategy that successfully safeguarded those interests when confronted with the complex issues of intrastate war and humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War security environment.

¹ Linda R. Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*, (London: Zed Books, 2000), 4.

Because UNAMIR II and *Opération Turquoise* were two very distinct interventions, each section of this chapter is divided into two parts. The order in which the interventions are addressed in each section reflects the order in which that aspect of their operations actually took place.

5.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTIONS

This section is not meant to be an exhaustive account of all that happened from the time UNAMIR was first deployed until its mandate was expanded to protect endangered populations in Rwanda on 17 May 1994. Instead, it merely highlights some of the key events in the West's involvement with Rwanda that led up to the authorisation of the expanded UNAMIR (informally designated UNAMIR II) operation. These events demonstrate that even before the protection interventions had begun, Western states had prioritised their self-interests over the population's safety by constantly limiting their involvement to relatively safe tasks requiring minimal resources. Only by recognising this self-interested predisposition in Western states can one begin to grasp why the eventual protection efforts were so inadequate.

In Rwanda, fighting between the two primary ethnic groups, the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis, had been intensifying since October 1990 when 4,000 Tutsi exiles serving in the Ugandan military, along with 3,000 other exiles, invaded Rwanda. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), as the rebel force was called, conquered significant territory before being driven back less than a month later by the Rwandese military, known as the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* or FAR, and their French allies. Several cease-

fires and agreements were signed over the two years that followed, but none held. The result was renewed heavy fighting and massive civilian displacement by January 1993.²

On 3 August 1993, with the assistance of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the support of diplomats from the UN, Belgium, France, Germany, and the US, the government and the RPF signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania. The combatants requested a UN peacekeeping force to accomplish an array of difficult and dangerous tasks such as “ensuring the overall security of the country”, and “disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and retraining of the military personnel of the parties to be integrated in the national army”.³

On 5 October 1993, in the midst of an expanding UN mission in Bosnia and a collapsing UN-US nation-building mission in Somalia, the Security Council unanimously approved SCR 872 authorising the establishment of UNAMIR.⁴ Although the Security Council authorised the Chapter VI peacekeeping effort, it either rejected or significantly reduced many of the tasks requested of it by the Rwandans. Moreover, the Secretariat insisted that the Force Commander, Major General Romeo Dallaire, should strictly interpret UNAMIR’s peacekeeping mandate. In short, the Security Council made it clear that there would be no UN enforcement action in Rwanda and that the success of UNAMIR’s mission relied on the co-operation of the combatants.

² Organization of African Unity, *Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events*, June 2000, (hereafter *OAU Rwanda Report*). Executive Summary, Paragraph 25. According to the report, at least 6 mass murders of Tutsis by Hutus occurred between 1990 and 1993.

³ S/26488, 24 Sept 1993.

⁴ S/RES/872, 5 Oct 1993.

On 6 April 1994, Rwanda's president Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryimira were killed when Habyarimana's aeroplane was blown up as it approached to land in Rwanda. Violence and chaos immediately erupted in Kigali resulting in the murder of numerous government officials and ten Belgian peacekeepers. The first priority of the Western states was the safety of their citizens living in the area. Without notifying or co-ordinating with UNAMIR, France and Belgium had a force of 900 elite soldiers in Kigali by 10 April. Shortly thereafter, the US had a back-up force of 300 US Marines in Burundi, and Italy had deployed 80 additional soldiers to rescue their nationals.⁵ Even more telling as to the prioritisation of Western lives over those of endangered foreigners was the fact that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in the midst of the political assassinations and mass killings of the Rwandese population, directed UNAMIR to assist the Western militaries in their evacuation operations. A 9 April cable from DPKO to Dallaire requested that he

cooperate with both the French and Belgian commanders to facilitate the evacuation of their nationals, and other foreign nationals requesting evacuation. You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate but you may exercise your discretion to do [so] should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals.⁶

As the OAU report on Rwanda pointed out, this evacuation of European nationals was the only instance in which UNAMIR was given the latitude to go beyond its mandate.⁷

After evacuating their ex-patriots, the second priority of many Western states was to withdraw UNAMIR completely. Belgium announced its intention to withdraw its forces

⁵ 600 French forces were actually on the ground in the early morning hours of 8 April. See Alison Des Forges, *"Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda"* (New York: Human Rights Watch), 606.

⁶ Cited in S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, "Letter dated 15 December 1999 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council", Enclosure: *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, 16 December 1999, Accessed 21 July 2003. <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement>. Hereafter referred to as *UN Rwanda Report*.

⁷ OAU *Rwanda Report*, Chapter 15, Paragraphs 15.6 and 15.7. <http://www.oau-oua.org/document/ipep/report/rwanda-e/EN-15-CH.htm>. Accessed 2001.

and urged the Security Council to terminate the mission. Although France, New Zealand, Nigeria, Russia, and Rwanda rhetorically favoured augmenting the force, none of them offered any additional troops to conduct an expanded mission, and several other states, including the US and UK, were in favour of a complete pull-out.⁸ After two weeks of indecision, the Council reduced UNAMIR's size from its original authorisation of 2,548 to 270 and restricted its mission to mediation, monitoring, and humanitarian assistance "to the extent possible".⁹

In the weeks that followed, the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda continued unabated. As international pressure favouring intervention grew, the Security Council was compelled to consider authorising an expansion of UNAMIR in size and mandate. On 17 May 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 918 authorising an expanded UNAMIR force to protect the endangered population. The motives that lay behind this decision and the specific objectives that UNAMIR II was to pursue will be addressed fully in the next section.

Even with the UNAMIR II authorisation in hand, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was forced to admit on 20 June 1994 that, despite soliciting support from fifty Member States, only 503 forces were on the ground as of 18 June—one month after the initial UNAMIR II expansion. Even worse, he projected that it would be another three months before UNAMIR II could be expected to fulfil its tasks.¹⁰ Western states would not volunteer any additional forces to meet the requirements, and African states were unable to equip their forces adequately. In light of the delay, France offered to lead a multinational

⁸ Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2002), 280-1.

⁹ S/RES/912 (1994).

¹⁰ S/1994/728, 20 June 1994.

mission commanded and funded by the French provided that it operated with UN backing. Though many Member States questioned the motives of the French offer because of previous French involvement with the Hutu regime, their offer to lead the force proved irresistible to a sufficient number of Member States to secure passage of Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994 authorising the French-led mission. Part two of the next section examines the motives and objectives of the French-led force more closely.

5.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES

The decisions by Western states to augment the UNAMIR mission and authorise the French-led multinational intervention to Rwanda, were influenced by a number of competing motives. Although many of these were self-interested in nature, Western states justified their involvement in the crisis almost completely on the humanitarian necessity for action. The humanitarian motive to protect endangered non-combatants and the specific objectives which flowed from them, were often in conflict with the West's self-interested aims of limiting its involvement in distant crises and avoiding long-term commitments to enforcement missions that would be both costly and dangerous.

5.2.1 UNAMIR II

Official Motives.

Humanitarian Concern. The official motives for expanding the size and mandate of the UNAMIR force were included in Security Council Resolutions 918 of 17 May 1994 and 925 of 8 June 1994. According to these resolutions, the primary motive behind the decision to bolster UNAMIR's force structure and mandate was a concern for the safety of the non-combatants in Rwanda. By mid-May 1994, the Secretary-General estimated

that over 200,000 people had been killed and 2 million others displaced from their homes.¹¹ Additionally, various reports from the UN and human rights organisations cited evidence of the genocide that could not be denied. Consequently, six different preliminary paragraphs in Resolution 918 focused entirely on the devastating effects of the conflict on the Rwandese civilians. Though the Security Council stopped short of declaring that a genocide was taking place or naming a perpetrator, it conveyed the point by including the definition of genocide in the resolution.

Both resolutions also addressed the need to protect humanitarian aid workers and their operations. In order for the huge number of displaced people to be cared for, the Security Council recognised that the presence of humanitarian organisations was crucial. If the operational environment was too dangerous, these organisations would be unwilling or unable to work effectively, thereby exacerbating the plight of the non-combatants and rendering the augmented UNAMIR force ineffective.

In Resolution 925, which authorised the deployment of two additional infantry battalions, the Security Council was more explicit in justifying its humanitarian motives. It cited “violence and carnage affecting civilians”, “acts of genocide”, “the systematic killing of thousands of civilians”, and the “displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing starvation and disease and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries” as motives for its actions. Nevertheless, the Security Council, persuaded by the French and Rwandan representatives to the UN, still did not identify the Hutus as the perpetrators of the genocide.

¹¹ S/1994/518, 29 April 1994 and S/1994/565, 13 May 1994.

Regional Stability. To a lesser degree, the Security Council professed to be motivated by concern about the potential regional implications of the humanitarian crisis should it continue unchecked. In the final preliminary paragraph of Resolution 918, the Council said that it was “concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region”. This concern for peace and security, however, was not formally mentioned two weeks later in SCR 925. Instead, the “massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries” merely constituted a “humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions”.¹² This change of emphasis was probably due to the West’s refusal to accept the costs associated with launching a Chapter VII enforcement operation in Rwanda.

Unofficial Motives.

Domestic Support. One of the key unofficial motives that influenced the decision of Western states to expand UNAMIR’s mandate was the desire to maintain the support of their domestic publics. As serious as the Rwandan crisis was in humanitarian terms, it never really generated a consistent demand from Western publics to intervene militarily, though it did, at times, create a demand “do something” on the Rwandans’ behalf. Part of the reason for the Western public’s indifference was that the crisis occurred at a time when most Western states were preoccupied with other conflicts. As previously mentioned, Western Europeans were primarily focused on dealing with the crisis in Bosnia and its effects on themselves. Several had deployed peacekeeping forces as part of UNPROFOR, and were finding the mission there to be much more difficult than they had originally anticipated.

¹² S/RES/925, (1994), 8 June 1994, page 2.

Similarly, the US was involved in a host of other complex commitments at the time. American decision-makers were aware that the US public would not support another large American military deployment. Instead, they were preoccupied with withdrawing their forces from Somalia and with confronting the troubling events in Europe and Haiti. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the US had consistently refused to send military forces to Bosnia, despite the fact that, when compared to Rwanda, it was of much greater interest to the US. Nevertheless, as media attention to Bosnia increased and the need for NATO airpower to protect UNPROFOR's "safe area" mission was publicised, the US had little choice but to address the conflict. Similarly, the 1991 military coup that deposed Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide posed a humanitarian crisis much closer to home—a crisis that not only produced Haitian refugees on American shores, but that also challenged US credibility in its traditional sphere of influence.¹³

In Somalia, what the US public had initially seen as an altruistic effort to provide aid to a starving Somali population had evolved into a comprehensive nation-building exercise involving combat operations. To make matters worse, the combat resulted in the deaths of a number of UN peacekeepers and US soldiers, leading to the eventual failure of the Somalia mission. The legacy of this failure cannot be overstated when evaluating the West's interest in Rwanda.

The lack of Western public demand for action in Rwanda can also be attributed to low media coverage. CNN broadcast the only US television news story on the Rwandese

¹³ US credibility was threatened when the *USS Harlan County* was prevented from docking at Port-au-Prince and delivering UN peacekeeping forces on 11 October 1993 by a group of Haitian "thugs". The incident delayed the deployment of the UN Mission in Haiti and led to a UN-authorized, US-led mission to Haiti.

political situation prior to Habyarimana's assassination on 6 April.¹⁴ Following this event, news coverage remained very low in the UK, France, and the US, and "virtually ceased" as the genocide intensified.¹⁵ Most of the reports that did make it to press characterised the genocide as tribal violence or civil conflict.

Media coverage was limited due to a number of factors. First, there were very few reporters in Africa, and those who were sent had a difficult time gaining safe access to Rwanda.¹⁶ As one reporter commented, "Those who carry out the massacre of civilians have no qualms about killing journalists. . .".¹⁷ Not only was Rwanda dangerous for reporters, but its poor infrastructure also made travelling in search of stories logistically very difficult.¹⁸ Second, Rwanda was competing with another African story; namely the election of Nelson Mandela in South Africa. In contrast to the 2,500 reporters covering the South African elections, the number of reporters in Rwanda never rose above fifteen during the genocide.¹⁹ Finally, there were many other stories competing for the public's attention, the foremost in the US being the murder trial of O.J. Simpson. For these reasons, the real bulk of the news coverage on Rwanda did not begin until the genocide was over. When it did begin, it often presented a convoluted picture of the crisis, focusing on the plight of the Hutu refugees and the appalling conditions of the refugee camps rather than the reality of the earlier genocide.²⁰ Interestingly, with the possible

¹⁴ Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, "Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage," *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke eds., (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 211-2.

¹⁵ Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons Learned from the Rwanda Experience. Study 2, Early Warning and Conflict Management*, (London: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Steering Committee, 1996), 46-7.

¹⁶ According to Arthur Klinghoffer, when the presidential aeroplane was destroyed, only two foreign journalists were in the country. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*, (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, Inc., 1998), 3.

¹⁷ Livingston and Eachus, 223.

¹⁸ Susan L. Carruthers, *The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, (Houndmills, MacMillan Press, Ltd., 2000), 225.

¹⁹ Adelman and Suhrke, *Early Warning and Conflict Management*, 46-7.

²⁰ Carruthers, 224-229.

exception of the French media, when the press did report on the genocide, it often advocated a cautious response from Western states. For instance, *The New York Times*, though it recognised the genocidal actions of the Hutus, praised President Clinton's decision to avoid involving US troops in a military intervention.²¹

The Clinton administration, cognisant of the bipartisan congressional opposition to its policy of "assertive multilateralism", the lack of support for a Rwandan intervention among its top military advisors, and the nearness of the mid-term 1994 congressional elections, was determined to scale back its involvement in humanitarian situations that risked US lives and dollars—especially for areas it deemed outside US national interests.²² In a speech to the General Assembly shortly after the deaths of the American soldiers in Somalia, President Clinton expressed US reluctance to participate in future peace operations and warned the UN that if the "American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no".²³ To formalise this stance, the Clinton administration published Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) on 3 May 1994, a policy meant to serve as a guide for US participation in future UN operations by requiring fairly specific conditions to be met prior to US involvement or support. The requirements of PDD 25 were applied to the deployment of UNAMIR II, resulting in a delayed deployment that had adverse consequences for the Rwandan population.

²¹ See Editorials in *The New York Times*, April 10, 1994, IV, p. 18; May 18, 1994, p. A22; and July 30, 1994, p. 18, cited in Klinghoffer, 98.

²² Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr., *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests*, (London: Praeger, 2002), 151 and J. William Snyder, Jr., "'Command' versus 'Operational Control': A Critical Review of PDD-25", 1995, page 2. www.ibiblio.org/jwsnyder/wisdom/pdd25.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.

²³ Cited in James W. Houck, "The Command and Control of United States Forces in the Era of 'Peace Enforcement'", *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, 4.

Credibility. Though not specifically stated as a reason for action in the Security Council resolutions, the desire to maintain credibility was a definite motive in the decision to expand UNAMIR's mission. "Plausible deniability" regarding the scope of the killing evaporated as the RPF claimed large amounts of territory from the FAR and exposed the reality of the genocide against the Tutsis. Perhaps more importantly, the RPF allowed news reporters and humanitarian organisations into areas that had been previously off-limits so that they could transmit first-hand reports about the atrocities to a largely ignorant foreign public.

The West's attempts to ignore the systematic nature of the killing or to re-classify the problem as cyclical tribal violence were no longer credible. As information became increasingly available, Western States faced pressure from various international sources to act. Regular reports throughout April and May from the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, called for urgent measures. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, himself an African, lobbied hard for a tougher response and even insinuated Western discrimination as the cause for its inactivity.²⁴ Similarly, the OAU's president, Salim Ahmed Salim condemned the Security Council's decision to reduce UNAMIR, saying that it was the result of Western double standards.²⁵ Adding to the pressure to act was the OAU's agreement to organise an African response to the genocide if UN Member States could be persuaded to equip the African forces. Faced with this option of being able to respond without sending Western forces, Western decision-makers were hard-pressed to authorise an expanded UNAMIR mission.

²⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, (New York: Random House, 1999), 141.

²⁵ Klinghoffer, 49.

Official Objectives.

Population Protection. Consistent with the Security Council's emphasis on humanitarian motives, UNAMIR II's stated objectives were primarily humanitarian in nature. UNAMIR II was mandated to accomplish the following objectives: "To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas", and "To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations".²⁶ The manner in which these two protection missions were worded was instructive of the West's discomfort with the population protection mission and its prioritisation of self-interests. In this obvious case of genocide and government collapse, UNAMIR II was not tasked with providing security to the endangered population but with contributing to it. By limiting the mandate to security contribution, the Security Council carefully crafted a mission that could be accomplished by the mere presence of peacekeepers and judged a success regardless of the outcome. In contrast, UNAMIR II was mandated to "provide security" to those (usually westerners) who were engaged in the humanitarian relief operation.

Regional Stability. In addition to the humanitarian objective, the Security Council sought to prevent the conflict from spreading to other states in the region. This was the purpose of Section B of Resolution 918 which imposed a weapons embargo on Rwanda. The regional stabilisation objective behind this action was succinctly stated by the Omani representative to the UN who called the embargo "an important step in the right direction to contain the conflict and to halt its proliferation to other areas".²⁷ The use of "safe areas" was also suggested as a means to achieving the objective of preserving regional

²⁶ S/RES/918 (1994), 17 May 1994, OP 3a and b.

²⁷ S/PV.3377, 16 May 1994.

stability. By keeping the displaced Rwandans within the borders of their own country, the Security Council could minimise the negative effects of the genocide on neighbouring states. Boutros-Ghali, when making his recommendation for the UNAMIR II force, argued that “protected sites” should be established near the borders to assist those who were already in the areas, but he also warned that they should not be set up as a substitute for operations in the interior of the country.²⁸ He said that the “detailed operational plans” would take into account the need “to deliver assistance to the distressed in their existing locations” so as to avoid a destabilising refugee exodus.²⁹

5.2.2 *Opération Turquoise*

Official Motives.

Humanitarian Concern. When France first communicated its offer to lead a multinational force to Rwanda, it primarily cited humanitarian motives for doing so. In the first paragraph of the French letter to the Secretary-General, the French Permanent Ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, described the humanitarian situation in Rwanda as “an ongoing disaster” in which “massacres of civilians are continuing on a large scale”.³⁰ He mentioned the thousands of additional lives that would be lost as a result of the delayed deployment of UNAMIR II. Speaking after the Security Council passed Resolution 929 authorising the French-led intervention, Ambassador Mérimée said that his country was motivated by the “unprecedented massacres, of such magnitude that one no longer hesitates to describe them as genocide”, the displacement of civilians, and the precarious environment faced by all non-combatants. “France,” he said, “has deemed it as its duty ... to protect these defenceless civilians and save these numerous endangered

²⁸ S/1994/565, 13 May 1994, Paragraph 12.

²⁹ Ibid., Paragraph 10.

³⁰ S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.

lives”.³¹ Though strongly denouncing the genocide, French officials never named their Hutu clients as the perpetrators. Instead, they often referred to “*genocides*”, implying a second Tutsi-orchestrated massacre.

French decision-makers also cited humanitarian motives for setting up the Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) in July 1994.³² The French declared that the spread of RPF/FAR fighting had caused tens of thousands of civilians to flee the fighting and join the hundreds of thousands of people who were already displaced in the region of Butare. Ambassador Mérimée suggested that if not addressed immediately, the “situation in humanitarian terms will quickly become uncontrollable” in the southwest part of the country. Moreover, he warned of the “danger of the physical elimination of the minorities in the area” if something was not done to control the situation. According to the French, the creation of the SHZ was a necessary “last resort” in order to protect the population and create conditions conducive to humanitarian assistance. In the absence of a cease-fire, the SHZ was the only possible alternative the French could implement. Without the zone, the French said that they would be forced to withdraw from the country.

Regional Stability. In addition to their stated humanitarian motives for intervening, as well as for creating the SHZ, the French cited the need to contain the effects of the crisis geographically in order to prevent regional instability. According to the French letter offering to lead an intervention force, the delayed deployment of UNAMIR II was likely to cause “a geographical expansion of the area affected by the tragedy”.³³ Moreover, speaking of the enormous displacement of civilians that would probably occur as the

³¹ S/PV.3392, 22 June 1994.

³² S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.

Tutsi RPF advanced, Ambassador MÉRIMÉE stated that “there is reason to fear that all those persons will seek refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, aggravating a situation whose precariousness you are already well aware of”.³⁴

Unofficial Motives.

Domestic Politics. Domestically, as reports of the atrocities were made known to the French public, the government came under increased pressure to stop the violence. The French public found it unthinkable that France would do nothing in the midst of the growing crisis in a region where it had been so highly involved and where it possibly shared some responsibility for the tragedy. According to this line of thinking, the French decision was motivated by guilt over its past involvement and inaction.³⁵ This “motive” is often referred to as the “atonement explanation” for the intervention.³⁶

Public outcry was particularly effective in light of the political situation in France in May and June of 1994. At that time, the President of the country was François Mitterrand from the Socialist Party. Though Mitterrand would remain president until 1995, the Conservatives had recently achieved a majority in the parliamentary elections, leaving the RPR party leader, Edouard Balladur, as the Prime Minister. To complicate loyalties further, both Jacques Chirac, the RPR party Secretary-General, and Balladur were candidates for the next presidency. This competitive political environment muddled the decision-making process considerably. For instance, on 14 June, Mitterrand announced that the French would intervene in Rwanda at a cabinet meeting but asked that the decision be kept secret. The next day, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, a Chirac

³³ S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.

³⁴ S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.

³⁵ See Bruce D. Jones, “Intervention without Borders”: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1995, Vol. 24, No. 2, 231.

supporter, announced the decision to the public in an effort to soften the image of the conservatives and boost the credibility of Chirac.³⁷ In the words of Prunier, "Rwanda and its chopped up babies now looked as if they could give good political mileage in terms of public opinion ratings".³⁸

Regional Influence. According to Prunier, the conflict in Rwanda aroused French fears of an Anglo-Saxon usurpation of French influence in Francophone Africa. Prunier cited the 13 June speech delivered by South Africa's president, Nelson Mandela, in which Mandela spoke of the need for an intervention in Rwanda to address the humanitarian crisis. According to Prunier, the French viewed the speech as an example of "another representative of the 'Anglo-Saxon world' who was openly saying that he was about to intervene in French speaking Rwanda".³⁹

Mandela's speech was not the only 'Anglo-Saxon' threat against the *Francophonie*. The RPF consisted primarily of Tutsi refugees that had lived most of their lives in Anglo-Saxon Uganda. As such, most of the RPF spoke English and had only a basic knowledge of the French language. In contrast, the Hutu government had long-standing ties with the French government, strengthened by a French 1990 intervention in which French assistance had helped put down an RPF invasion. The French military had trained and equipped the FAR at the request of Habyarimana, and apparently continued to import arms into Rwanda long after the initiation of the genocide and the imposition of the

³⁶ Adelman and Suhrke, *Early Warning and Conflict Management*, 55.

³⁷ Ibid., 282.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Prunier, Gerard. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 281.

weapons embargo.⁴⁰ Moreover, President Mitterand apparently had a very close relationship with Habyarimana, as did his son Jean-Christophe, who ran the Africa Office at the Elysée.⁴¹

The timing of the French decision to intervene supports the contention that France was heavily motivated by its desire to preserve its regional influence. Rather than intervene when the massacres were at their most intense, the French intervened only after the RPF began conquering large amounts of territory. By June 1994, the RPF was defeating FAR forces so quickly that it seemed probable that it would conquer the whole country. On 13 June, the interim Hutu government was driven from its headquarters in Gitarama, and the FAR was in full retreat.⁴² Consequently, Mitterand's 14 June decision to intervene was widely seen as France's attempt to shore up the FAR forces and stabilise the situation for the resumption of the Arusha power-sharing government. The Arusha agreement was important for the French because it left the Franco-friendly Hutu majority with a considerable degree of power in the new government. Throughout the conflict, the French and Rwandan representatives to the UN repeatedly urged both parties to return to the framework laid out in the Arusha agreement.

Furthermore, reflections on the strategy used by the French to intervene add to the suspicion that the preservation of its regional influence was France's primary motive for involving itself in Rwanda. Initially, the French plan had the forces entering Rwanda in the Hutu stronghold of Gisenyi. This was changed due to the negative publicity the French were likely to receive. Not only would the Hutu *genocidaires* celebrate the arrival

⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Genocide*, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Vol. 7, No. 4, May 1995. Also see Klinghoffer, 57.

⁴¹ Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 100.

⁴² Klinghoffer, 55.

of the French, but also there would be no Tutsi survivors to rescue because they had already been killed. Instead, swayed by Prunier's logic, they agreed to enter the country from the south. When the French plan was finalised on 20 June 1994, French representatives had yet to make contact with RPF representatives. Needless to say, such an "oversight" did not generate confidence in the neutrality of *Opération Turquoise* as a humanitarian intervention.⁴³

Additionally, the manner in which the French communicated their plans to Rwandese belligerents made French impartiality suspect. Though the French did not consult members of the RPF until days before the intervention, they had been in constant contact with the leaders of the "interim government" in Rwanda since the conflict erupted. In late April 1994, the French government received in Paris (at the French Presidency and at the Office of the Prime Minister) Rwanda's interim foreign minister Jerome Bicomumpaka, and the leader of the extremist Anti-Tutsi party, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza.⁴⁴ When questioned about these meetings, French officials claimed that the visits were unofficial and that they had met with the members of the interim government in order to help remedy the crisis. According to French officials, ignoring the "interim government", regardless of how undesirable they were, would have reduced French influence and, subsequently, the possibility of bringing about a cease-fire.⁴⁵

Finally, prior to their intervention, the French evacuated approximately 400 Rwandans to France, "virtually all of them closely linked to Habyarimana".⁴⁶ Habyarimana's wife and

⁴³ According to Prunier, a meeting with the RPF was finally arranged with French Foreign Minister Juppé and the French Defence Ministry on 22 June 1994, the same day the Security Council approved the French intervention in Resolution 929. See *Ibid.*, 289.

⁴⁴ Des Forges, 658.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 658-9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 613.

family were also evacuated, and she was given US\$40,000 upon her arrival in France.⁴⁷ In contrast, the five children of the murdered Tutsi Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, were denied political asylum in France.⁴⁸

Historic Military Ties. Motives within the French military itself were also questionable. Because of the close relations and past operations between the French and FAR militaries, many French soldiers were upset over “the enemy” RPF victories against their “allies” and talked of “breaking the RPF backs”.⁴⁹ When RPF representatives were brought to the French Defence Ministry, Prunier related that considerable efforts were made to avoid a confrontation between them and members of “extremist” elements of the French military.⁵⁰ More significantly, many French soldiers who had deployed with *Opération Turquoise* reported that they had been misled as to the reason for the operation. After witnessing the effects of Hutu atrocities against the Tutsis, several French soldiers expressed their consternation at being led to believe that they were going to rescue Hutus from the hands of Tutsis.⁵¹

Official Objectives.

Population Protection. The French decision-makers were very clear about their humanitarian objective for *Opération Turquoise*. After the Security Council had approved the French-led intervention, Ambassador Mérimée stated the following:

The goal of the French is exclusively humanitarian.... It will not be the mission of our soldiers in Rwanda to interpose themselves between the warring parties, still less to influence in any way the military and political situation. Our objective

⁴⁷ Ibid., 659.

⁴⁸ Klinghoffer, 80.

⁴⁹ Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 285.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 289.

⁵¹ Raymond Bonner, “As French Aid the Tutsi, Backlash Grows,” *New York Times*, July 2, 1994, Quoted in Des Forges, 681.

is simple: to rescue endangered civilians and put an end to the massacres, and to do so in an impartial manner.⁵²

To quell suspicion further as to its reasons for seeking a Chapter VII mandate, Ambassador Mérimée added that the French objective “naturally excludes any interference in the development of the balance of military forces between the parties involved in the conflict”.⁵³ In an effort to reassure its wary Security Council members, the Security Council authorised the French-led multinational force to carry out only those objectives which had been previously approved for UNAMIR II, and specifically stated that the operation was to be “impartial” and “neutral” and was “not to constitute an interposition force between the parties”.⁵⁴ Foreign Minister Alain Juppé succinctly stated that the purpose of the intervention was to “stop the massacres and to protect the populations threatened with extermination”.⁵⁵ In other words, *Turquoise* forces were in Rwanda solely to protect non-combatants while the combatants would be left to settle the dispute amongst themselves. Unlike UNAMIR II, *Opération Turquoise* was granted Chapter VII authorisation to use “all necessary means” to accomplish these tasks.

Similarly, the French stated that the objective of the SHZ was to delineate an area large enough to stabilise the masses of threatened people and “facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid”.⁵⁶ By including both the “hundreds of thousands fleeing” (the Hutus) and the endangered “minorities” threatened with “elimination” (the Tutsis) in their letter to the Security Council, the French implied that the SHZ would protect all non-combatants, whether the threat was from Hutu militias or RPF soldiers seeking revenge. Put succinctly by Juppé, the objective of the SHZ was to “ensure that the people [were]

⁵² S/PV .3392, 22 June 1994.

⁵³ S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.

⁵⁴ S/RES/929, 22 June 1994.

⁵⁵ Cited in DesForges, 668.

⁵⁶ S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.

safe from any threat from any side”.⁵⁷ As the French letter also stated, creating a truly secure zone required ensuring “that no activities threatening the security of the population in question were carried out within or from the zone.” In order to accomplish this objective, *Opération Turquoise* troops would have to secure the borders of the SHZ from the RPF as well as from the large number of interim government officials, implicated ex-soldiers, and genocidal militias who had taken part in the killings and then fled amongst the population.

Significantly, the objective of ensuring the security of the zone was qualified by the French as including only those actions “within their mandate”.⁵⁸ Since they had requested and been authorised in Security Council Resolution 929 to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and use “all necessary means” to achieve their humanitarian objectives, this mandate was far from a limitation. On the contrary, the French had the authority to use whatever force was necessary to “contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda . . .”.⁵⁹

Regional Stabilisation. *Opération Turquoise* also had the secondary objective of improving regional stability by providing a safe environment for vulnerable non-combatants and, thus, reducing their need to flee into neighbouring states. Prior to the intervention, French officials made repeated references to the instability that would be caused throughout the region by a massive refugee influx unless “steps were taken to remedy the situation”.⁶⁰ By reducing the number of refugees, the French-led coalition would not only help stabilise the region, but would also allow NGOs and humanitarian

⁵⁷ Cited in DesForges, 683.

⁵⁸ S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.

⁵⁹ S/RES/925 1994, 8 June 1994.

organisations in the area to deal more effectively with the huge numbers of refugees they already had.

5.3 MEANS AND METHODS

Examining the means and the methods used by the *Opération Turquoise* and UNAMIR II forces helps clarify the ambiguous nature of diplomatic language and face-saving rhetoric. Moreover, it provides insight into the actual priorities and intentions of the decision-makers. UNAMIR II and *Opération Turquoise* both claimed as their primary objectives the protection of endangered Hutus and Tutsis. Yet, the inadequacy of their force structures, strategies, and rules of engagement reveal that they prioritised their own protection and the protection of their self-interests over the protection of the endangered populations.

5.3.1 *Opération Turquoise*

Troops and Equipment. When determining what forces would be needed to launch *Opération Turquoise*, French planners were influenced by events in Somalia and Bosnia.⁶¹ Though the mission was to be a humanitarian one, it would be taking place in an environment of active civil war in which one side disapproved of the intervention. Furthermore, because the *Turquoise* forces would be intervening to stop ethnic killings, they realised that confrontation with one or both of the combatant parties was a distinct possibility. The French claimed that these factors, and not some ulterior political motive, determined the heavy force structure for *Turquoise*. It consisted of 3,060 people, including 508 foreign troops from seven different nationalities.⁶² Additionally, within

⁶⁰ S/1994/798, 6 July 1994, "Letter dated 1 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General".

⁶¹ Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 289.

⁶² S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994, 2.

this number were approximately 300 French Special Forces soldiers, "more than had been deployed in any previous French operation".⁶³ The French forces also contained officers and troops who had been assigned in Rwanda before and who had experience dealing with Rwandans, and with Rwandan Government military forces.⁶⁴ Among its other capabilities, the French deployed ten helicopters, four Mirage reconnaissance jets, four Mirage ground attack jets, four Jaguar fighter-bombers, two heavy mortar sections, a twelve-vehicle light armoured car squadron, and various transport and refuelling aircraft.⁶⁵ For all of the firepower the French brought to Rwanda, they did not bring a sufficient number of vehicles capable of evacuating people—a shortfall that would cost the lives of a number of Tutsis.⁶⁶

Strategy. The French-led coalition employed inconsistent measures in their attempt to avoid dangerous confrontations with hostile elements. In an effort to avoid turning their former Hutu allies against them, they minimised their confrontations with the Hutu extremists which frequently meant enabling them to continue their deadly practices against the Tutsis, even after the French-led coalition had established itself in the country. Prior to the SHZ being created, *Turquoise* forces only sometimes dismantled Hutu roadblocks and checkpoints which were being used to stop and identify Tutsis for slaughter. Similarly, *Turquoise* forces were inconsistent in their efforts to disarm the *genocidaires* resulting in the continuation of the ethnic killings in the country.⁶⁷ An example of less direct, though still severe, negligence was the coalition's refusal to shut

⁶³ *Agence France Presse*, "Le ministre de la Défense constate la difficulté de l'opération Turquoise," BQA No. 14245, 30/6/94, p.31, Quoted in Des Forges, 673.

⁶⁴ Des Forges, 673.

⁶⁵ S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994, 3.

⁶⁶ Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 289.

⁶⁷ Des Forges, 675-78.

down the extremist Hutu “hate radio” station, even though they knew that it was inciting most of the violence against the Tutsi and the panic among the Hutu.

Furthermore, when *Turquoise* forces moved into a particular area, they utilised the governing structure that was already in place—even though it was made up of the same officials who had sanctioned the genocide. Initially, the French did not even arrest known *genocidaires*, though this changed moderately as public opposition to French methods grew stronger. When confronted about their tactics, French military and government officials generally claimed to be restricted either by their mandate, or the resources at their disposal.

The French protection strategy within the SHZ consisted primarily of dispersed foot patrols operating around the clock. It was hoped that the obvious French presence within the zone would deter future crimes from being committed and eventually restore a modicum of stability to the area. Because the French had been allies of the Hutus for so many years and because most of the Rwandans spoke French, *Turquoise* forces were able to operate within a relatively non-hostile environment. This environment allowed them to adopt “relaxed” patrolling tactics to include putting aside their flak vests and helmets and operating without heavy armament. They explained these actions as a method of calming the atmosphere within the SHZ.⁶⁸ Though the French operated in a permissive environment, many of the Tutsi within the zone continued to be in great danger. Since the French did not have the logistical capacity to patrol in the rural areas, they remained in the villages and cities. By setting up the zone, *Turquoise* forces were largely able to

⁶⁸ John Borton, Emery Brusset, and Alistair Hallam, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Study 3, Humanitarian Aid and Effects*, (London: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Steering Committee, 1996), 56.

avoid confrontations with the RPF. They refused RPF entry into the zone, but regularly allowed armed ex-FAR soldiers and known *genocidaires* inside.

Rules of Engagement. Opération Turquoise was authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter to use all necessary means to accomplish its mission. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of confusion among coalition members as to which ROE governed their behaviour in specific circumstances. There seemed to be no consistently applied ROE concerning arrests of known *genocidaires* or disarmament of individuals. In his testimony before the French National Assembly, François Léotard, French Minister of Defence in 1994, stated that the orders governing *Opération Turquoise* “prohibited French soldiers from making hostile military contact with the RPF”.⁶⁹ Instead, the *Turquoise* soldiers were to obey the following directive:

Adopt an attitude of strict neutrality to the different parties to the conflict. Insist on the idea that the French army has come to stop the massacres and not to fight the RPF or to support the FAR so that the actions undertaken not be interpreted as aiding the government troops.⁷⁰

To carry out this order, special efforts were made to reduce the chance of confrontation between the *Turquoise* forces and the RPF, despite the numerous situations in which local Hutu officials tried to force a confrontation.

Unfortunately, the directive for impartiality was seemingly contradicted by other French leaders who gave misleading accounts of Rwanda’s operational environment to their troops. The French National Assembly report showed that the orders issued to coalition forces never referred to a genocide but, instead, described the systematic killing as the extermination of “several hundred thousand persons of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups”. The phraseology of this statement implied that there had been equivalent massacres

among the ethnic groups. The orders also recounted numerous RPF atrocities such as summary executions and ethnic cleansing.⁷¹ As mentioned earlier, such skewed accounts prejudiced the expectations of the *Turquoise* troops, many of whom stated that they had initially thought the Hutus were the victims.⁷² Statements made by a high-ranking French military commander also sent mixed signals as to the ROE. On one occasion, Colonel Thibault stated that "no quarter" would be given to RPF forces should they engage the *Turquoise* forces.⁷³ On another occasion, General Lafourcade, commander of *Opération Turquoise*, announced that members of the interim government would be allowed to seek refuge in the SHZ. This statement was quickly countermanded by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who stated that members of the interim government who fled to the SHZ would be interned.⁷⁴

5.3.2 UNAMIR II

Troops and Equipment. As previously mentioned, Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994 authorised UNAMIR II a maximum of 5,500 troops. By 1 August, the Secretary-General reported that "even though two and a half months have elapsed since the adoption of resolution 918 (1994), UNAMIR is as far from attaining the authorized troop strength as it was at the time of the adoption of the resolution".⁷⁵ Over 4,420 troops had been offered by various African Member States, but only 1,300 had the necessary equipment. The rest were dependent on the willingness of other Member States to donate the equipment. Some of the equipment had been pledged, but distribution was slow, the equipment was

⁶⁹ Assemblée Nationale, Tome III, *Auditions*, Volume I, p. 109 quoted in Des Forges, 672.

⁷⁰ Assemblée Nationale, Tome II, Annexes, p. 389 quoted in Des Forges, 672.

⁷¹ Assemblée Nationale, Tome II, Annexes, p. 386-7 quoted in Des Forges, 673.

⁷² Bonner, "As French Aid the Tutsi, Backlash Grows," *New York Times*, July 2, 1994. Quoted in Des Forges, 681. See also Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, "Rwanda. Les assassins racontent leurs massacres", *Le Figaro*, 29 June 1994, cited in Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 292.

⁷³ SWB/Radio France Internationale (4 July 1994) and *Le Figaro* (6 July 1994) quoted in Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 294. Also see Prunier note 27, 294.

⁷⁴ *Le Figaro* (16-17 July 1994) quoted in Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 296

often in poor condition, and the leasing process set up by some Member States delayed the delivery by many weeks.⁷⁶

In light of the approaching withdrawal of *Opération Turquoise* on 21 August, Boutros-Ghali expressed alarm in his 3 August report. He was concerned that, without the necessary UNAMIR II troops and equipment in place upon the French departure, there would be another wave of refugees from southwest Rwanda. In an effort to bolster the IDPs' security, the newly victorious Rwandese Government agreed not to take immediate control of the area provided that UNAMIR would "ensure its stability". Boutros-Ghali stated that it was imperative to deploy three battalions to this sector or else "go into the zone with depleted strength and threadbare equipment".⁷⁷ On 10 August, a depleted and threadbare UNAMIR II began its deployment. UNAMIR II troops were forced to begin their mission as best they could with 500 troops and scant equipment (much of which was left behind by *Turquoise*). The total complement of troops did not reach Rwanda until after 7 October.⁷⁸

Strategy. As a Chapter VI force that was reliant mainly on its presence to protect the population, UNAMIR II's primary activities consisted of patrolling, observing, and monitoring. From August to October 1994, the force was not at full strength. Therefore, rather than try to cover a large area by spreading their forces thinly, the interveners opted to decrease their vulnerability by concentrating their forces in the 91 different IDP

⁷⁵ S/1994/923, 3 August 1994.

⁷⁶ Ibid..

⁷⁷ Ibid..

⁷⁸ S/1994/1344, 25 November 1994.

camps⁷⁹ located in the former SHZ. When they did patrol, they reduced their vulnerability further by restricting their actions to daylight hours, wearing body armour and helmets, and driving armoured personnel carriers.⁸⁰ Moreover, they made very little effort to identify and separate criminal elements within the camps or to ensure that the camps were free of weaponry. As a result of UNAMIR II's concentration on these relatively safe tasks, the camps grew increasingly dangerous for the civilian IDPs, the humanitarian workers, and the UNAMIR II troops.

By late 1994, additional Hutu extremists had infiltrated the camps from outside the country. The extremists smuggled in weapons and strengthened their control of the displaced populations through violence and intimidation. In response, UNAMIR II increased their number of patrols, added a boat patrol operating on Lake Kivu, and began night patrols using night vision gear.⁸¹ In spite of these efforts, UNAMIR II forces came under increasing attack throughout February and March 1995.⁸²

In a December 1994 effort to increase the security of the area and make it possible for the IDPs to return to their homes voluntarily, UNAMIR II screened out disruptive members from two camps. Forty-four people were detained and handed over to Rwandese authorities.⁸³ Additionally, large amounts of weapons, grenades, machetes, and spears were confiscated. The success of this mission led to a follow-on operation known as *Opération Retour*, which was an interagency operation designed to facilitate the voluntary resettlement of IDPs to their home regions by providing them with security and basic

⁷⁹ E/CN.4/1995/50Add.4, 16 February 1995, "Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons: Internally Displaced Persons", *Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution, 1993/95*.

⁸⁰ Borton et. al., *Humanitarian Aid and Effects*, 66, Endnote 14.

⁸¹ S/1995/107, 6 February 1995, Paragraphs 24 and 25.

⁸² S/1995/297, 9 April 1995, Paragraphs 20-22.

assistance.⁸⁴ While these strategies met with some success, they made very little difference to the overall security of the displaced population within the camps, which still numbered approximately 350,000 in February 1995.⁸⁵

Rules of Engagement. Revealing its unwillingness to engage in a dangerous and costly peace enforcement operation on behalf of the Rwandan population, the Security Council authorised UNAMIR II under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In so doing, the Council emphasised UNAMIR's reliance on the peacekeeping norms of consent, impartiality, and use of force in self-defence. As a compromise to those who felt the authority to use force in defence of the Rwandan people should be more explicitly communicated, the Security Council added the following provision to the resolution:

*Recognizes that the Mission may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.*⁸⁶

In essence, the Security Council was broadening the definition of "self-defence" to include defence of the mandate. While this was an important clarification, the Council's use of the "self-defence" terminology and Chapter VI designation limited UNAMIR II's use of force to responsive, defensive reactions rather than more aggressive, offensive actions.

5.4 RESULTS

Opération Turquoise and UNAMIR II achieved humanitarian results that were consistent with a prioritisation of their self-interests over the safety of the endangered population.

⁸³ S/1995/107, 6 February 1995, Paragraph 26.

⁸⁴ Ibid., Paragraph 27.

⁸⁵ Ibid., Paragraph 37.

The West's failure to provide adequate protection within the SHZ, whether under the supervision of the French-led coalition or UNAMIR II, was the result of the inadequate resources and improper strategies dedicated to that mission. Though thousands of people benefited to some degree from the interventions, and though lives were saved by the efforts, the displaced Rwandans were protected only as long their safety coincided with the self-interested pursuits of the interveners. Those pursuits, in contrast to the protection mission, were successful in securing some of the unofficial aims for which Western states involved themselves.

5.4.1 *Opération Turquoise*

Population Protection. As previously explained, Security Council Resolution 929 tasked *Opération Turquoise* with the primary mission of contributing to the protection of the endangered population. The French after-action report issued to the Security Council determined that the mission was a success "given the delicate circumstances in which it was conducted".⁸⁷ Regarding population protection, the French report optimistically claimed that *Turquoise* "put an end to the massacres in Rwanda and ensured the protection of the population in the safe humanitarian zone as well as the transition to UNAMIR II under satisfactory circumstances".⁸⁸ Needless to say, all of these claims are highly disputable.

As for ending the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the killing had largely abated by the time *Opération Turquoise* deployed, largely because the bulk of Tutsis had already been killed, and those that had not were under the protection of the advancing RPF. Reports vary as to the actual number of lives saved by the French-led operation.

⁸⁶ S/RES/918 17 May 1994.

⁸⁷ S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994.

According to the French National Assembly report, the French saved 8,000 to 10,000 Tutsis in the first week when they rescued one of the last remaining Tutsi concentrations at Nyarushishi. Additionally, they rescued approximately 1,100 at Bisesero and another 6,000 at Gikongoro for a maximum number of 17,000 Tutsis protected.⁸⁹ One can only speculate how many Hutus may have been spared from RPF reprisals or extremist Hutu killings because of the *Turquoise* presence. A French military estimate puts the figure as high as 80,000 to 100,000,⁹⁰ but Prunier claims this figure is exaggerated for propaganda purposes. He claims that his estimate of 10-13,000 lives saved by the *Turquoise* forces is an optimistic one because it assumes that "all the Tutsi in the Nyarushishi camp as well as those picked up by French forces at smaller locations otherwise would all have been killed—which is unlikely given the speed of the advancing RPF units..."⁹¹

Even within the SHZ, the mission's population protection results were debatable. What was not debatable was the operation's failure to "ensure that no activities threatening the security of the population ... were carried out within the zone" as was set forth in the French letter justifying the creation of the SHZ.⁹² As for protecting Tutsis, *Turquoise* forces did remove the militia checkpoints from within the zone increasing freedom of movement,⁹³ but, as the report from the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda concluded, "there is evidence that the killing of Tutsi continued in the safe zone during the intervention in areas away from the *Turquoise* forces".⁹⁴ Prunier reached a

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Assemblée Nationale, Tome I, Rapport, p. 310 quoted in Des Forges, 689.

⁹⁰ Borton et. al., *Humanitarian Aid and Effects*, 66,55.

⁹¹ Gérard Prunier, "Opération Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Political Dead End," *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke eds., (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 303.

⁹² S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.

⁹³ Borton et. al., *Humanitarian Aid and Effects*, 54.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 55.

similar conclusion and summed up the effectiveness of *Turquoise* in the following manner:

The only people *Opération Turquoise* could really help were those who were in the least danger.... For the many lost in the bush, nothing much could be done.... With insufficient numbers and transport capacities, they often had to stand by in medium-sized towns while the killing went on unabated in the hills a few kilometers away.⁹⁵

As for the French claim that Hutus in the SHZ were protected from RPF reprisals, no proof of an RPF reprisal genocide has ever been substantiated, and treatment of Hutus within RPF-controlled zones was generally tolerable. The SHZ did, however, provide a haven for the genocidal government and its extremist militias. In the end, this tactic exacerbated the vulnerability of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the immediate term, as well as Hutu IDPs and refugees located in militia-controlled camps for years to come. In the end, the French-led operation arrested very few of those who were responsible for the genocide and clearly assisted some of them to escape across the borders. Thus, the SHZ was not secure for innocent Hutus, targeted Tutsis, or for the new Rwandese government. In fact, many of these *genocidaires*, after intimidating the Hutus within the SHZ, fled Rwanda and continue to be a major source of insecurity in the region today.

Finally, the French policy to refuse entry in the SHZ to RPF forces and to admit ex-FAR forces and *genocidaires* could be interpreted as a violation of Security Council Resolution 925 which expressly declared that "the Mission [was] not to have the role of a buffer force between the two parties".⁹⁶ According to Mats Berdal, "the very suggestion that the operation was in some sense 'impartial' must appear bizarre to observers on the ground at the time, and obscene to those who experienced at close quarter the murderous efficiency with which the bands of interahamwe continued to work within the French-controlled

⁹⁵ Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 292-3.

⁹⁶ S/RES/925 (1994), 8 June 1994.

zone".⁹⁷ French actions also could be interpreted as a violation of the French assurance that *Turquoise* actions would exclude "any interference in the development of the balance of military forces between the parties involved in the conflict".⁹⁸

Opération Turquoise was more successful at its task of creating conditions for the distribution of humanitarian aid. In terms of its contribution to humanitarian assistance, the French after-action report cited the following accomplishments for *Turquoise*:

- Delivery of 686 tons of government humanitarian aid,
- Distribution of 6,000 cubic metres of drinking water in Goma,
- Delivery of 250 tons of supplies on behalf of NGOs,
- 7,811 days of hospitalization for the population,
- 10,190 medical consultations,
- 708 surgical procedures,
- 75,793 health-care procedures,
- 8,000 corpses collected by the Force,
- 20,500 interments by air force engineers,
- Evacuation of 3,500 individuals, including 1,000 orphans and 600 nuns from Rwanda, where their lives were threatened.⁹⁹

The French report rightly stated that no humanitarian agency "had been able to conduct significant activities in the area held by the former Rwandese Government".¹⁰⁰ It is true that *Opération Turquoise's* administration of the zone encouraged humanitarian agencies to enter it and provide humanitarian assistance to the zone's population; however, several humanitarian agencies refused to conduct their work alongside the French because of disagreements with French methods or motivations.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, had the SHZ not been created and the RPF been allowed to conquer the entire country, there is no reason to think that humanitarian agencies would not have had the same access to the endangered population.

⁹⁷ Mats Berdal, "Lessons not Learned: The Use of Force in Peace Operations in the 1990s", Adequate Debag and Chandra Lecher Siam eds. *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century*, Special Issue of *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 2000, Frank Cass Journal, 68-9. [55-74]

⁹⁸ S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.

⁹⁹ S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Regional Stabilisation. In its second objective of reducing the regional instability that resulted from increased refugee flows, the French-led mission was marginally successful in the short-term. The creation of the SHZ initially offered an alternative to crossing the border for over a million fleeing Hutus. This was certainly beneficial, both for the IDPs and for the humanitarian organisations tasked with assisting them. As the UNHCR and various humanitarian organisations in the border regions were already completely overwhelmed by the speed and mass of the refugee exodus, the in-country sanctuary helped them considerably. In the longer term, the French decision to allow the *genocidaires* into the area and to eventually escape across the borders increased regional instability. Not only did the much less capable UNAMIR II force have to deal with the security problems created by this decision, but the entire Great Lakes region suffered as a result.

Other Results. Although *Opération Turquoise* was only marginally successful at protecting some of the endangered Rwandans and only temporarily successful at bolstering regional stability, it was successful in several other areas. First, the deployment of the French-led force preserved French domestic support for the government. Even though the French motives were questioned and French tactics were criticised by the French press, the French government sufficiently satisfied the French public's demand for an intervention. Furthermore, the French intervention, regardless of its effectiveness, gave the government grounds for defending its actions. The criticism was no longer over French inaction but French methods, and the French government was more than capable of providing a plausible explanation for its actions. Second, *Opération*

¹⁰¹ Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda*, (Paris: OECD, 1996), 99.

Turquoise bolstered French credibility and minimised the damage to its regional influence. It demonstrated to the *Francophonie* that France was a dependable ally against Anglo-Saxon challengers and sent a signal to these challengers that France would protect its interests. In terms of international credibility, the intervention allowed France to take the moral high ground regarding international inaction in the face of genocide. Even though its motives and methods were suspect, it was still the only state willing to fill the gap caused by the international community's unwillingness to support UNAMIR with troops and equipment and French representatives defended their actions strongly.¹⁰² More importantly, all of these benefits came at a minimal cost to the interveners. Because *Opération Turquoise* deployed as an interim force, it did not have to resolve the situation or commit to its eventual resolution. Unlike most interventions, it had a definite termination date from the very beginning of its operation. It also had the legitimacy of the UN behind it, and the authority to use whatever force was necessary to deal with unforeseen problems. Lastly, the force was able to minimise its chance of confrontation with hostile forces by limiting its operations to a clearly defined area that was off-limits to the RPF.

5.4.2 UNAMIR II

Population Protection. UNAMIR II was successful in its effort to protect populations only in the sense that it played a contributing role. The circumstances within Rwanda changed considerably between the commissioning of UNAMIR II and its actual deployment. The war ended a month before the forces arrived and a measure of stability had returned to much of the country. With the RPF victory, the Tutsis who had been

¹⁰² See Jean-David Levitte's reply to the UN's report on Rwanda, "The Situation Concerning Rwanda", 14 April 2000, http://www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/declarations_at_un/frame_ang_cs_chronologique.htm, Accessed 18 July 2003.

living within the camps went home, leaving UNAMIR II forces with only concentrations of Hutus to protect.

IDPs under the protection of the UNAMIR II forces faced dangers from internal and external sources. Although IDP camps were already occupied by Hutu extremists when UNAMIR II took them over, the interveners were unable or unwilling to confront these criminal elements and remove them from among the innocent IDP population. In spite of their efforts, UNAMIR II forces were also unable to prevent the further infiltration of these hostile elements into the camps. Consequently, IDPs suffered intimidation, robbery, violence, and murder at the hands of the Hutu extremists. Moreover, the failure of UNAMIR II to create a secure environment for the innocent Hutus negatively affected the voluntary return of the IDPs. Those who wanted to return home were often intimidated or killed by extremists who were attempting to maintain control over the IDP population. Finally, the inability of UNAMIR II to rid the camps of these Hutu extremists also affected the distribution of humanitarian aid. Not only did the hostile elements threaten and intimidate the humanitarian aid workers, they stole food from the IDPs and used it as a tool to control them further.

In addition to these internal dangers, the IDPs were endangered by forces outside the camp. RPA forces, in response to attacks and raids from within the camps, occasionally reacted in a non-discriminate manner wounding or killing innocent people.¹⁰³ UNAMIR II was virtually powerless to do anything to prevent these actions beyond merely observing and reporting them. The coalition's weakness and the population's continued vulnerability were dramatically demonstrated by the atrocity surrounding the forcible

¹⁰³ S/1995/107, 6 Feb 1995, para 38.

closure of the Kibeho camp by the RPA in April 1995. Many non-combatants were killed near positions patrolled by UNAMIR's Zambian battalion as a result of being caught in between Hutu extremists and over-reactive RPA soldiers.¹⁰⁴

For all its inadequacies, UNAMIR II was successful in some of its functions. As a result of UNAMIR II's contribution to *Operation Retour* discussed earlier, UNAMIR II forces helped resettle 25,000 IDPs by February¹⁰⁵ and up to 40,000 by the beginning of April.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, this was a relatively insignificant number compared to the estimated 250,000 IDPs who still inhabited the camps.¹⁰⁷

Regional Stabilisation. UNAMIR II's biggest contribution to regional stabilisation resulted from its smooth take-over from *Opération Turquoise*. The transition, along with the decision to keep RPA forces out of the camps, prevented another massive exodus of refugees. Although an additional 350,000 Hutus fled into neighbouring states after the departure of the French forces, the other 450,000 remained within Rwanda. UNAMIR II's presence throughout the camps also contributed to regional stability by temporarily staying the hand of the new Rwandan government from forcibly closing the camps much sooner. Had UNAMIR II not deployed, it is highly unlikely that the new Rwandan government would have waited as long as it did to forcibly close the camps or that it would have devoted as much effort to closing them humanely. Though the Kibeho camp closure was tragic, seven other IDP camps were closed during the same period without incident. Without the watchful gaze of UNAMIR II to report the efforts, there probably

¹⁰⁴ See S/1995/411, 23 May 1995, "Letter dated 19 May 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the report, dated 18 May 1995, of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry which reviewed events at Kibeho in April 1995".

¹⁰⁵ S/1995/107, 6 Feb 1995, Paragraph 39.

¹⁰⁶ S/1995/297, 9 April 1995.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

would have been more such incidents. Finally, the UN deployment may have prevented a counterattack from ex-government and ex-FAR forces. According to J. Matthew Vaccaro, UNAMIR II's

wide deployment served to deter and mitigate tensions as the new government tried to rehabilitate the country and develop the infrastructure for a stable civil society If UNAMIR II had not been present, it is likely that the forces of the old regime ... would have counterattacked.¹⁰⁸

Other Results. Although UNAMIR II was largely unsuccessful in accomplishing its stated objectives, its mere deployment had several important benefits for Western states. First, it salvaged the credibility of the West, and the UN more generally. The international community was forthcoming in admitting that the deployment was too little, too late. Nevertheless, the fact that the Security Council did eventually act prevented its critics from dismissing its relevance as a world body altogether. Secondly, UNAMIR II salvaged Western states' domestic credibility. In response to those who demanded action on the population's behalf, decision-makers could take credit for supporting the UN force and declare that the UN force was its representative. To those who were opposed to an intervention in Rwanda or disagreed with the manner in which it was being conducted, Western decision-makers could disavow any responsibility for the UN's shortcomings.

CONCLUSION

The Western response to the Rwandan crisis revealed the hollowness of its humanitarian rhetoric and the prioritisation of its self-interests over the protection of the endangered population. In spite of the humanitarian rhetoric espoused by the West, the methods they

¹⁰⁸ J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda", in William Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 399.

utilised were inconsistent with the humanitarian objective. While the interventions resulted in a number of humanitarian benefits, Rwandans were only protected as long as their protection coincided with the West's self-interests. As the Western efforts demonstrated, however, determining how best to safeguard self-interest amidst the confusion of such complex rivalries and horrific atrocities was a difficult and complex task. When the massacres first began, the West prioritised the safety of its inhabitants, first by its rapid evacuation of ex-patriots, and then by its reduction of the UNAMIR force, even though doing so was certain to cause the deaths of thousands of people. In spite of the West's constant humanitarian rhetoric, it refused to intervene until the bulk of the bloodletting was over. When Western states finally succumbed to the domestic and international pressure to deploy an augmented UNAMIR force, it took months for the necessary personnel and equipment to be supplied. In the meantime, the French-led coalition intervened with ample means and strategies to safeguard its self-interests, but not to protect the population.

As this chapter has shown, both *Opération Turquoise* and UNAMIR II avoided those tasks which were likely to increase the danger to their troops or otherwise jeopardise their self-interests—even if their actions would have decreased the vulnerability of the endangered population. The French were able to withdraw at the end of sixty days, effectively leaving the dangers associated with the IDP camps to an inadequate UNAMIR II force. UNAMIR II, unable to create enough security within the camps to convince the IDPs that it was safe to return home, had no choice but to stand and watch as the new Rwandan government forcibly closed the camps.

CHAPTER 6 KOSOVO

INTRODUCTION

The use of “population protection” as a justification for interventions did not end with the failure of safe areas in the early post-Cold War period—nor did Western attempts to pursue their own self-interests through them. Though the specific methods changed, Western states used humanitarian rhetoric as a justification to intervene in several crises in the latter half of the 1990s. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) involved the entire nineteen-member Western alliance and was perhaps the most publicised example of an intervention justified primarily on the grounds of civilian protection. Timothy Garton Ash considered the protection action in Kosovo to be the first ‘humanitarian conflict’ in history.¹ Adam Roberts noted that the conflict was “colloquially called a ‘humanitarian war’”.² Yet, in spite of these designations, NATO’s “protection” effort in Kosovo was perhaps the most obvious demonstration of the West’s willingness to protect populations only when doing so coincided with the pursuit of its self-interests. While NATO’s efforts ultimately resulted in the protection of endangered Kosovar Albanians, their methods demonstrated that national and alliance self-interests consistently took precedence over the humanitarian plight.³

¹ Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Round Table: the global order in the twenty-first century, *Prospect*, August/September 1999, Issue 44, 50-8

² Adam Roberts, “‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo”, *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 3, Autumn 1999, 102.

³ For simplicity’s sake, this chapter uses the term “Kosovars” only in reference to Kosovar Albanians. Similarly, the terms “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and “Serbia” are frequently used interchangeably to refer to the source of the Kosovars’ oppression.

A study of NATO's action in Kosovo is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. Among these is the fact that "Operation Allied Force", as the action was dubbed by NATO, was the alliance's first unilateral military engagement in its fifty-year history. In addition to the controversy created over its humanitarian objectives, the alliance effort gave rise to ongoing scrutiny as a case study of alliance politics and behaviour. Furthermore, its questionable legality under international law and possible precedent-setting implications have remained subjects of great debate, as have the lessons and conclusions drawn from NATO's exclusive use of airpower. While this chapter touches on many of these points, its primary purpose is to demonstrate that, in spite of their humanitarian rhetoric, Western interveners in Kosovo prioritised the pursuit of self-interested objectives over protecting the population and only did the latter as long as, and to the extent that, it benefited the Alliance to do so.

6.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTION

The trouble in the Serbian province of Kosovo began in earnest in 1989 when Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status of the province and brought it under the control of the government in Belgrade.⁴ Milosevic then instituted a series of highly repressive policies against the Kosovar Albanians, prompting them to form a parallel society, complete with an elected parliament and president. In spite of the Kosovars' military inadequacy, they joined the secessionist Yugoslav republics and voted for independence in a secret referendum in September 1991. Though the West refused to recognise Kosovo's independence, the shadow government, led by President

⁴ Numerous authors have written on the path to intervention in a detailed fashion. For instance, see Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) and the Independent International Commission on Kosovo's *Kosovo Report*, www.kosovocommission.org. Accessed 18 July 2003.

Ibrahim Rugova, instituted a non-violent strategy for gaining international legitimacy for Kosovo's position.

The futility of this non-violent approach became evident to many Kosovars after the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in 1995. The status of Kosovo was not officially discussed during negotiations and, according to US Special Envoy Richard Holbrook, was only broached once to Milosevic in an unofficial setting. As a result of the West's inattention to the Kosovo situation, armed liberation movements like that of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rose to popularity among the Kosovar population.

Between 1995 and 1998, the KLA and similar groups launched a campaign of violence against the Yugoslav army (JNA) forces, special police (MUP), and Serb sympathisers. The JNA and the MUP responded using brutal and often indiscriminate force against the civilian population. These tactics not only aroused concern within the West, but they also convinced more Kosovars to join the KLA. In response to the growing violence, the Contact Group states (France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States), in conjunction with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) began meeting with and exhorting Yugoslav and Kosovar leaders to negotiate an end to the bloodshed in 1997. Throughout negotiations, the Contact Group held two objectives constant: respect for the current Yugoslav territorial boundaries (i.e. no Kosovar independence) and substantial autonomy for the Kosovar province. In spite of these efforts, by 1998, the conflict had produced over 200,000 IDPs.⁵

⁵ Lawrence Freedman, "Victims and victors: reflections on the Kosovo War", *Review of International Studies* (2000), Vol. 26, 351.

As a result of the Contact Group's March 1998 recommendations, the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1160 on 31 March 1998, imposing an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in condemnation of the Serb's excessive force against civilians as well as the KLA's acts of terrorism. Though the resolution was passed under Chapter VII, it did not specify that the conflict was a threat to international peace and security, nor did it justify a military response in any way. Furthermore, it reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and expressed its support for an "enhanced status of Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration".⁶ According to SCR 1160, the embargo could be rescinded after five conditions had been met. The Yugoslavs had to begin a "substantive dialogue" with Kosovars on political status issues, withdraw their special police units and cease action against the civilian population, allow access to humanitarian organisations and Contact Group representatives, accept an OSCE mission, and facilitate a mission from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁷ These conditions became the foundation for subsequent international requirements.

In spite of SCR 1160, the cycle of KLA terrorist action and Serbian excessive force against civilians continued to intensify throughout the summer of 1998. Consequently, NATO's decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), approved the development of plans for an intervention force. As tragedies within Kosovo received greater media attention and refugees fled the province, NAC leaders were finally persuaded that the potential repercussions from the conflict were serious enough to warrant a NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, even without Security Council

⁶ S/RES/1160, 31 March 1998, Para 5.

⁷ Ibid., Para 16.

authorisation. Though members of the Security Council would not agree to pass a resolution authorising force, they did pass SCR 1199 on 23 September 1998 in which they reiterated the directives of SCR 1160 and demanded that both sides implement a cease-fire. Unlike Resolution 1160, 1199 declared that the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region.

Three days after the passage of SCR 1199, Yugoslav forces attacked the village of Gornje Obrinje with typical excess in response to KLA attacks.⁸ Twenty-one civilians were killed including women, children, and elderly men.⁹ Following this attack, NATO readied itself for a response by approving an activation order for airstrikes. With NATO attacks imminent within 96 hours, Richard Holbrook was sent to Belgrade where he persuaded Milosevic to agree to reduce the Serbian military and special police presence to pre-war levels, and to accept the presence of an OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) as well as a NATO aerial verification mission.¹⁰ Significantly, the KLA was not party to the Holbrook-Milosevic agreement, nor was there any enforcement mechanism specified should Milosevic renege on the agreement.¹¹ In support of the Holbrook-Milosevic agreement, the Security Council passed SCR 1203 on 24 October 1998 calling on the Kosovar Albanians to respect all previous resolutions and cease its terrorist attacks.

⁸ Judah, *Kosovo*, 179-80.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 180.

¹⁰ For the agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission, see S/1998/978, dated 20 Oct 1998. For the agreement on the NATO aerial verification mission, see S/1998/991, dated 23 Oct 1998.

¹¹ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 57.

Though the agreement initially appeared to hold, fighting soon erupted again and Yugoslav forces moved back into the province.¹² The KVM could do nothing but watch.¹³ Eventually, Serb forces launched a brutal attack on the village of Racak where a concentration of KLA fighters was believed to be hiding. When KVM chief William Walker arrived on scene the next morning, he found forty-five Kosovars dead, including two women and a twelve-year-old boy. Walker issued a statement that he would not "hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility".¹⁴

Following this incident, the Contact Group persuaded delegations from the Yugoslav government and the Kosovar Albanians to meet at Rambouillet, France, to try and defuse the crisis with a peace plan that would ensure the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and increased autonomy for the Kosovars. Under intense pressure from Western diplomats and after a two-week delay requested by the Kosovar delegation so that they could seek a consensus at home, the Kosovars signed the agreement on 18 March 1999. The Yugoslav delegation refused. Holbrook made one final attempt to persuade Milosevic to reconsider. According to Holbrook, Milosevic responded, "No more engagement, no more negotiations, I understand that, you will bomb us. You are a great and powerful country, there is nothing we can do about it".¹⁵ Operation Allied Force began in earnest thirty-four hours after Holbrook left.

¹² According to Daalder and O'Hanlon, the re-integration of Yugoslav forces marked the beginning of Operation Horseshoe, the Yugoslavian plan to eliminate the KLA and ethnically cleanse Kosovo. *Ibid.*, 58 and 292, note 139.

¹³ See William Walker's testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Cited in Sabrina P. Ramet, "The USA: To War in Europe Again", in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?*, (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 171.

¹⁴ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 64.

¹⁵ BBC *Newsnight*, 20 August 1999, cited in Judah, *Kosovo*, 227.

6.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES

Western leaders were motivated to intervene in Kosovo by a number of factors. Chief among their official motives was the desire to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe within Europe. As will be shown in this section, Western leaders and NATO officials repeatedly emphasised the humanitarian nature of the campaign, and some NATO member states focused on this motive entirely. Additionally, they cited the need to prevent the negative effects that the crisis could have on the West, such as instability in a vital Western region and the loss of alliance credibility if NATO chose not act in its own sphere of influence. Flowing from these official motives, NATO declared that the objectives of the intervention were to halt the violence against the Kosovars, enhance regional stability in the area, and demonstrate NATO's opposition to the brutal tactics of the Yugoslav government. In addition to these official motives and objectives, there were several factors that, while not included in official statements or policy documents, nevertheless affected the decision to intervene and the strategies selected by Western leaders. These motivating factors included the need to maintain the support of the Western public, the desire to overcome a sense of shame over previous Western inaction, and the certainty that military success was achievable.

6.2.1 Official Motives

Humanitarian Concern. The humanitarian motive was the primary justification presented by Western decision-makers for the intervention in Kosovo. Speaking on behalf of NATO member states, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana said that it was NATO's "moral duty to look after Milosevic's victims".¹⁶ The European Council simply

¹⁶ Javier Solana, "Article by the Secretary-General on the Humanitarian Situation", published 21 May 1999, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/articles/a990521a.htm>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

stated that the campaign was necessary to “put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo”.¹⁷ When the NAC finally formalised its motives on 12 April 1999, it stated that the “unrestrained assault by Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary forces...on Kosovar civilians....” and the “hundreds of thousands of people” expelled from their homes “made necessary and justify the military action by NATO”.¹⁸

At the state level, US president Bill Clinton consistently utilised the language of humanitarianism to justify combat action in Kosovo. In his address to the US public on 24 March 1999, Clinton cited the “need to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive” as the first of several reasons justifying airstrikes.¹⁹ After giving a brief history of the crisis, Clinton went on to describe in very graphic terms the humanitarian tragedy that was taking place and stated that “ending this tragedy is a moral imperative”.²⁰

Similarly, British officials relied heavily on humanitarian rhetoric to justify military action in Kosovo. Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking to the House of Commons the day prior to the initiation of airstrikes, stated, “We must act to save thousands of innocent men, women and children from imminent humanitarian catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by brutal dictatorship”.²¹ A month later, speaking to the

¹⁷ “Statement by the European Council (EU), March 24, 1999”, Reproduced in Philip E. Auerswald and David P. Auerswald (eds.), *The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History Through Documents*, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 724-5.

¹⁸ NATO, “The situation in and around Kosovo: Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 12th April 1999”, Press Release M-NAC-1(99)51, Brussels, 12 April 1999 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm>. Accessed 18 July 2003. Hereafter referred to as M-NAC-1(91)51.

¹⁹ President William J. Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation”, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 24 March 1999.

http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990324_clinton_nation.html Accessed 18 July 2003.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the House of Commons, Tuesday 23 March 1999, <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990323/debtext/90323-09.htm>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

Economic Club of Chicago, Blair described Operation Allied Force as “a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values”.²² He cited “ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, [and] mass murder” as examples of the humanitarian catastrophe which made a NATO response imperative. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Robin Cook, told the House of Commons on the second day of bombing that “not to have acted, when we knew the atrocities that were being committed, would have made us complicit in their repression”.²³

The French and German governments also justified the intervention on humanitarian grounds. French President Jacques Chirac announced that his government had agreed to participate in the operation as a result of the Serbian authorities’ treatment of Kosovar Albanians. He specifically cited the “floods of refugees, destruction of villages, murders and massacres” to support his claim and concluded that such treatment was “intolerable”.²⁴ German Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder used similar language in his address to the German people on the first night of the bombing. He said that NATO “wants to stop further serious, systematic human rights violations and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo”.²⁵

Italy, with its pacifist leanings and centre-left coalition government, led by ex-communist Premier Massimo D’Alema, focused almost entirely on the humanitarian justification for NATO action. Initially, a majority of the Italian population was against the NATO

²² Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community”, Speech by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, Thursday 22 April 1999. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1013618397478>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

²³ Robin Cook, House of Commons debate on Kosovo, 25 March 1999, Hansard, col 538, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990325/debtext/90325-10_snew0. Accessed 18 July 2003.

²⁴ “Statement by French President Chirac, March 24, 1999”, in Auerswald and Auerswald, *The Kosovo Conflict*, 722-3.

action.²⁶ Only after the government launched the humanitarian effort known as the *Arcobaleno* [Rainbow] mission to help displaced Kosovar Albanians on 29 March, coupled with the media's coverage of the humanitarian catastrophe and refugee exodus, did a majority of Italians respond in favour of the war effort. Thus, the Italian government repeatedly emphasised the humanitarian basis for their support and relied on extensive media coverage of *Arcobaleno* to maintain domestic support.

Regional and International Stability. The humanitarian motive was often conjoined with concern about the crisis' effect on regional and international stability. A mass refugee exodus, as serious as it would be in humanitarian terms, could have been potentially devastating for NATO member states in terms of regional and alliance stability. Thus the NAC linked its humanitarian concerns with the more self-interested concern of stability.²⁷

Many government leaders included this danger to regional stability in their own justifications. Harking back to the origins of World War I, some leaders feared that Serbian actions in Kosovo could produce a refugee situation in Europe which would destabilise not only the Balkans, but also NATO and Europe. In his address to the nation on the first night of the air war, President Clinton cited his second justification for action as the need to "prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results".²⁸ He specifically emphasised the effect that Albanian refugees would have on the countries "struggling

²⁵ "Statement by German Chancellor Schroeder, March 24, 1999" in Ibid, 723-4.

²⁶ At the beginning of NATO's bombing campaign, 49.5 percent of the population felt the attacks were unjustified to only 25 percent who felt them justified. By the end of April, 43 percent felt the attacks justified to 33 percent unjustified. Ipsos findings reported in *Il Corriere della Sera* quoted in Umberto Morelli, "Italy: The Reluctant Ally", in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?*, (London: Pearson Education Limited for Reuters, 2001), 75.

with their own economic and political challenges—countries that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees...”. Clinton summed up his speech with the following warning:

Let a fire burn here in this area, and the flames will spread. Eventually, key U.S. allies could be drawn into a wider conflict, a war we would be forced to confront later—only at far greater risk and greater cost.²⁹

Prime Minister Tony Blair was also concerned about the effects of the humanitarian crisis on the stability of the region. After emphasising the humanitarian justification for action in his speech to the House of Commons the night before the bombing began, Blair’s justification turned to more self-interested motives. He said,

We act also because we know from bitter experience throughout this century, most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans inevitably spills over into the whole of it, and affects the rest of Europe too. If Kosovo was left to the mercy of Serbian repression, there is not merely a risk but a probability of re-igniting unrest in Albania; Macedonia de-stabilised; almost certain knock-on effects in Bosnia; and further tension between Greece and Turkey. There are strategic interests for the whole of Europe at stake. We cannot contemplate, on the doorstep of the EU, a disintegration into chaos and disorder.³⁰

President Jacques Chirac expressed his self-interested concern more simply: “What is at stake today is peace on our soil, peace in Europe—which we are part of too—and human rights”.³¹

NATO also sought to minimise the destabilising effects such a campaign would have on NATO-Russian stability. The NAC document emphasised NATO’s desire to “work constructively with Russia” to reach “a political solution to the crisis”.³² Because Russia was a traditional ally of the Orthodox Serbs, NATO action in the Balkans had the

²⁷ M-NAC-1(99)51, #2.

²⁸ Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation”, 24 March 1999.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Tony Blair, 23 March 1999.

³¹ “Statement by French President Chirac, March 24, 1999”, in Auerswald and Auerswald, *The Kosovo Conflict*, 722-3.

potential of inciting a much larger conflagration. At the beginning of the conflict, Russian president Boris Yeltsin threatened, "This means war in Europe, possibly even more".³³ Consequently, NATO was eager to include Russian representatives as members of the six-nation Contact Group from the start of the negotiations with Milosevic until the conclusion of the Military Technical Agreement that ended the NATO bombing campaign.

Finally, the motive of preventing regional instability in Europe was strengthened by its potential to jeopardise Western financial prosperity. The Clinton administration made it clear that preserving markets was a significant motive in its actions. Defense Secretary William Cohen said that the administration's strategy was to "discourage violence and instability, which destroys lives and markets".³⁴ Clinton himself, the day before the airstrikes commenced, commented that "if we're going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be key.... That's what this Kosovo thing is all about".³⁵

Alliance Credibility. Western decision-makers were also heavily motivated to intervene in Kosovo out of a concern for the credibility of the NATO alliance. According to the NAC press release of 12 April, Kosovo represented a "fundamental challenge" to NATO's values and NATO member states committed themselves "to overcoming this challenge".³⁶

³² M-NAC-1(99)51 #8.

³³ "Russian condemns Nato at UN", BBC News web site at <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk>, 25 March 1999, cited in Tim Youngs, Mark Oakes, Paul Bowers, and Mick Hillyard, *Kosovo: Operation "Allied Force"*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Paper 99/48, (London: House of Commons Library, 1999), 10.

³⁴ Cited in Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "Making the World Safe for Business", 2 April 1999, <http://www.greenparty.org.uk/international/international/81/kosovo/safer.htm>. Accessed 20 July 2003

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ M-NAC-1(99)51 #1.

In some ways, Kosovo presented an opportunity for NATO to demonstrate its continued relevance and credibility in the new millennium. The alliance had been under increasing pressure to prove its relevance in a world where its *raison d'être* had seemingly ceased to exist after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Faced with a host of "new threats", the Clinton administration desired to redefine NATO's Strategic Concept to address "out of area" crises and post-Cold War hazards in an effort to make the alliance more credible in the post-Cold War environment.³⁷ The plan was to adopt the new Strategic Concept at NATO's fiftieth anniversary celebration in April 1999. James Kurth has suggested that the conflict in Kosovo provided the perfect test-bed for convincing reluctant allies of the need for the proposed change.³⁸ Kurth's contention is supported by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's statements at a press conference on 25 March 1999 when she said that NATO

has to change its mission. I do think that the NATO alliance has great relevancy to the 21st century and the end of the 20th in dealing with what we now see as major threats. Clearly, Kosovo fits.... I believe that it is an appropriate thing for NATO to be doing.³⁹

Whether or not this was a pre-meditated calculation or a coincidence is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is clear that NATO credibility was certainly an issue of concern that factored into the alliance's decision to launch and persevere in Operation Allied Force. Kosovo represented not only a humanitarian crisis that threatened the stability of the region and the alliance, but a NATO-guaranteed cease-fire that was openly flouted by Milosevic. If NATO chose not to act while Serb forces expelled the Kosovar population, the alliance's warning would be seen as an empty threat, and this

³⁷ James Kurth, "First War of the Global Era: Kosovo and the U.S. Grand Strategy", in Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen (eds.), *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 74-5.

³⁸ Kurth, 75-6.

³⁹ "Remarks by Secretary of State Albright, March 25, 1999", in Auerswald's *The Kosovo Conflict*, 741.

perception could have ultimately diminished the security of its members. President Clinton appealed to the importance of maintaining NATO credibility:

We pledged that we, the United States and the other 18 nations of NATO, would stick by them [the Kosovar Albanians] if they did the right thing. Imagine what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these people were massacred on NATO's doorstep. That would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which our security has rested for 50 years now.⁴⁰

Foreign Secretary Robin Cook made a similar statement to the House of Commons when he asked, "What possible credibility would NATO have next time that our security was challenged...?"⁴¹ Similarly, in NATO's one-year evaluation of the Kosovo crisis, NATO Secretary-General George Robinson relied heavily on NATO credibility as justification for action. According to his report, "If NATO had failed to respond to the policy of ethnic cleansing, it would have betrayed its values and cast permanent doubt on the credibility of its institutions".⁴²

Not only was NATO concerned about its credibility as an organisation, but NATO member states were also concerned with their standing in the alliance as reliable partners. Once NATO began contemplating action and it was clear that the US, the UK, France, and Germany were in agreement, other members, such as Italy and Greece, who were not so convinced of the cause or the wisdom of such a decision, were pressured to go along.⁴³ Furthermore, once NATO began the campaign, the desire of states to avoid becoming the first member to break with the majority and halt the campaign held the alliance together through a much longer period than was originally expected.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Clinton, "Statement by the President to the Nation", 24 March 1999.

⁴¹ Robin Cook, House of Commons debate on Kosovo, 25 March 1999.

⁴² Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, *Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge*, NATO, Brussels, 21 March 2000, page 22, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/report-en.pdf> Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁴³ See Georgios Kostakos, "The Southern Flank: Italy, Greece, and Turkey", in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*, 166-70. (166-80) Also "Roberts, 'Humanitarian War', 104.

⁴⁴ Roberts, 'Humanitarian War', 104.

6.2.2 Unofficial Motives

Domestic Support. As the media reported Serbian atrocities against Kosovar civilians, it became increasingly difficult for state decision-makers to justify Western inaction. Although the Western public was not demanding intervention on behalf of the Kosovars in March 1999, there was a general recognition among Western leaders that highly-publicised reports of massacres within Europe required some sort of response if they were to quell the emergence of domestic outrage. For instance, after the Serb massacre of Kosovars in the village of Gornji Obrinje on 30 September 1998, NATO threatened Yugoslavia with airstrikes, which eventually produced the Milosevic-Holbrook agreement. Holbrook admitted that the media report of the massacre had a definite effect on key US decision-makers and advisors:

The [*New York Times*] sat in the middle of the oak table in the middle of the situation room, like a silent witness of what was going on. It was one of those rare times where a photograph just . . . The terrible photograph of that dead person in that village was kind of a reminder, a reality, and it had a very real effect on the dialogue.⁴⁵

A similar reaction occurred after the Serb massacre near the village of Racak in January 1999. With the KVM immediately on site declaring it a crime against humanity, the story was widely reported in the media. European and American leaders who were reticent about launching military strikes were suddenly galvanised into action. The resultant response was the ultimatum at Rambouillet. Most Western leaders worried that if they did not act, more massacres would occur that would, in turn, result in public criticism and doubt.

⁴⁵ Interview with Richard Holbrook for PBS *Frontline*. Accessed 18 July 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

Concern over domestic support also led Western decision-makers to be cautious in their approach to intervention. While they all agreed that the humanitarian abuse was tragic and had the potential to be catastrophic, they were not convinced that their publics would support going to war in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe which *might* have the potential to affect their national interests. When considering their options for action, Western leaders usually emphasised minimalist methods that were proportionate to the level of support they thought they could muster from their publics.

Shame. Adam Roberts concluded that one of the main underlying explanations for NATO's action in Kosovo was "a sense of shame that, in the first four years of atrocious wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-95), they had failed, individually and collectively, to devise coherent policies and to engage in decisive actions".⁴⁶ Using shame as a tool to garner public support, President Clinton reminded the public of the thousands of lives lost and the prolongation of World War II which resulted from America's delayed entry in that war.⁴⁷ Additionally, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, one of the more determined advocates for using force in Kosovo, recommended the use of decisive action based partially on her previous experience with Bosnia. According to an interview she gave to the media, she told her colleagues in the Contact Group that "we learned a lot of lessons in Bosnia, where we waited too long to do something—that, as foreign ministers, we would be judged very harshly if we allowed something like this to happen again...".⁴⁸ The French, who had suffered 72 fatalities as a result of the previous ineffective action in Bosnia, as well as negative publicity from their actions in Rwanda, were also motivated

⁴⁶ Roberts, 102.

⁴⁷ Clinton, "Statement by the President to the Nation", 24 March 1999.

⁴⁸ Interview with Madeline Albright for PBS *Frontline*, Accessed 18 July 2003.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html>.

by past failures and mistakes.⁴⁹ Finally, the tragic results of Western inaction in Rwanda and Clinton's subsequent promise to Rwandese victims that the US would "increase our vigilance and strengthen our stand against those who would commit such atrocities in the future—here or elsewhere" may also have contributed to his resolve for strong action.⁵⁰

High Probability of Success. Another important factor that motivated the West to intervene was the thought that it could succeed in its objectives quickly and at a tolerable cost to itself. First of all, NATO leaders had been given reasonable assurance that Russia would limit its disapproval of the action to verbal denunciations. According to Richard Holbrook, Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, told a meeting of foreign ministers and OSCE representatives, "If you take it [the use of force against Yugoslavia] to the UN, we'll veto it. If you don't we'll just denounce you".⁵¹

Western leaders were also confident in their knowledge of the adversary. They had been dealing with Milosevic throughout the 1990s because of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. Prior to the Dayton Peace Agreement, many Western leaders and special representatives had met with him numerous times. On several occasions NATO military leaders had been involved in direct negotiations with him as they sought his influence in dealing with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. In fact, the military commander of NATO's forces in Europe, US Army General Wesley Clark, and other senior military figures had personally met with him on several occasions. They had seen Milosevic's reactions and concluded that unless pressure was applied in combination with the threat

⁴⁹ Simon Duke, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, and Matthias Karádi, "The major European allies: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom", in Schnabel and Thakur (eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention*, 128–148.

⁵⁰ William Jefferson Clinton, "Text of President Clinton's address to genocide survivors at the airport in Kigali, Rwanda, on March 25, 1998, as provided by the White House", <http://www.rudyfoto.com/ClintonApology.html>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁵¹ Cited in Judah, *Kosovo*, 183.

and willingness to use force, he would resist. However, the conclusion they drew from his reactions to NATO's bombing campaign in Bosnia, and from his concession in October 1998 in response to NATO's threat to launch airstrikes, was that he would concede either at the last minute or else shortly after the bombing started.⁵² Consequently, most decision-makers expected Milosevic to agree to the Rambouillet demands at the last minute. When he did not, their incredulity led them to send Holbrook for one last meeting with him. When he still refused, many expected that a short demonstration of NATO resolve in the form of airstrikes would bring him back to the negotiating table.

These assessments led many key decision-makers to conclude that if military action was required, it could be accomplished through the use of airpower at a tolerable cost to themselves. Airpower meant that the probability of casualties would be low. Additionally, as it would be quick, the chance of alliance fragmentation and erosion of popular support would also be significantly minimised. NATO's miscalculation of the amount of force and time that would be required to bring Milosevic to the table significantly affected the manner in which NATO conducted the war.

6.2.3 Official Objectives

The official objectives of the Kosovo operation varied depending on the source of information and the timing of the statement. For instance, the day after the bombing began, NATO Secretary-General, Dr. Javier Solana, said that the objectives were to "halt

⁵² Based on Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon's "extensive interviews in Washington, in key allied capitals, and at NATO headquarters". *Winning Ugly*, 91.

the violence and to stop further catastrophe".⁵³ When pressed on these objectives by the media, he went on to explain that NATO's objectives were the same objectives the international community had stated on many occasions, "a political agreement that would allow peace and stability in that region of Europe".⁵⁴

NATO's "strategic objectives", according to the Department of Defense After-Action Report, were taken from President Clinton's speech on 24 March 1999. These objectives were to:

(1) demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to Belgrade's aggression in the Balkans, (2) deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing, and (3) damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military operations.⁵⁵

These objectives have been referred to as the three "Ds" (demonstrate, deter, damage). Notably absent from the list was "defeat." Nowhere did the alliance seek to defeat Milosevic *per se*. In fact, General Klaus Naumann, NATO's Military Committee chairman during Kosovo, summed up NATO's objective as an "operation" (as opposed to a "war") "to bring [Milosevic] back to the negotiation table...not to enforce our will on him".⁵⁶

While these strategic objectives were verbalised on more than one occasion in a variety of forms, NATO did not release a formal statement outlining its objectives until the NAC document of 12 April 1999. At that time, the humanitarian situation had changed

⁵³ NATO, Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark, NATO HQ, 15.00 hours, Transcript 25 March 1999, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ US Department of Defense, "Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report", Executive Summary, 30 January 2000, xvii. (Hereafter DoD "After Action Report"). <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

drastically in Kosovo as JNA troops and special police forces had initiated a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing and hundreds of thousands of refugees had already fled into the region.

Faced with this new predicament, NATO released a more formal set of objectives than those set forth earlier. The NAC document stated that, in order for NATO to cease its bombing campaign, Milosevic had to

- ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
- ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
- agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
- agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
- provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.⁵⁷

This new set of objectives took as their starting place the humanitarian tragedy that the previous three weeks of bombing had failed to deter. The five objectives were also very similar to the requirements set out in UN Security Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998. All five objectives reflected NATO's intention to protect the population, preserve regional stability, and bolster alliance credibility. As published, the third objective was somewhat misleading in its official form. NATO did not merely want an international military force in Kosovo, it demanded that the military force be led by NATO.

⁵⁶ General Klaus Naumann, Interview with PBS *Frontline*, "How was it fought?" Accessed 18 July 2003. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/fighting/fighting.html>.

⁵⁷ M-NAC-1(99)51, Paragraph 4.

6.3 MEANS AND METHODS

The means and methods adopted by NATO in Operation Allied Force revealed a great deal about the priority of its objectives. In spite of NATO's stated emphasis on population protection, the strategy it designed, the force structure it employed, and the rules of engagement it instituted reflected a greater concern about the potential effects of the humanitarian crisis on Western self-interests. NATO leaders knew that its decision to launch Operation Allied Force could well be answered by the JNA with an ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovar civilians, yet they refused to employ the resources that could have provided the greatest measure of protection (such as ground forces and aircraft specializing in close air support) because of the danger inherent in their missions. The forces NATO did employ were constrained by highly restrictive rules that limited their effectiveness in protecting endangered non-combatants.

6.3.1 Troops and Equipment

For all the humanitarian rhetoric, the force structure of Operation Allied Force was primarily designed to prevent allied casualties and limit collateral damage. Because most heads of state believed that a short demonstration bombing was all that would be necessary to convince Milosevic to agree to NATO's terms, Operation Allied Force began the air campaign with only 350 aircraft supplied from thirteen nations.⁵⁸ According to Daalder and O'Hanlon, that was about the number of aircraft used in Operation Desert Fox, the four-day bombing effort against Iraq in 1998.⁵⁹ At the end of the bombing campaign, the alliance had almost tripled that number, with over 1000

⁵⁸ Daalder and O'Hanlon, 117.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 103.

aircraft from 14 countries available for tasking—the US supplying 740 aircraft and thirteen allies contributing another 300.⁶⁰

At the beginning of the campaign, when optimism for a quick result ran high, almost ninety percent of all bombs dropped were precision-guided munitions (PGMs). A large number of these were “stand-off” weapons which could be fired miles away from their targets and guided to their aim points. The precision of these weapons made them highly effective but, even more importantly, they minimised the danger to coalition combatants. Of these, cruise missiles, such as the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) were extremely valuable, partly because of their semi-precise Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) guidance capability. GPS-guided weapons were able to strike their targets regardless of adverse weather or cloud cover, a capability that laser-guided weapons did not possess. During the first phase of the bombing campaign alone, 160 cruise missiles were launched from the air and sea. Over 300 cruise missiles would be used before the campaign’s end.⁶¹ Other GPS-guided munitions such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which was delivered by the B-2 Stealth Bomber, and the US Navy’s Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) were also used effectively against fixed objects.⁶² As valuable as these stand-off weapons were in protecting pilots and hitting fixed sites, they were ineffective against mobile targets, such as the fielded forces who were committing atrocities against the Kosovar civilians. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were also used extensively for the first time to do reconnaissance, target identification, and battle damage assessment. Moreover, by the war’s end, plans were underway to use UAVs to laser

⁶⁰ DoD “*After Action Report*”, 78, and Daalder and O’Hanlon, 117.

⁶¹ Daalder and O’Hanlon, 103 and William M. Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: ‘The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History’”, in Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen (eds.), *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 21.

designate targets.⁶³ The use of these weapons and weapons platforms gives some indication as to NATO's prioritisation of its pilots' safety and the pursuit of self-interested objectives over the lives of endangered non-combatants.

When considering Operation Allied Force, the aircraft and munitions that were *not* employed are as important to the analysis as those that were. The most obvious military capability missing in Kosovo was a ground combat force. Undoubtedly, ground forces would have been the most effective means of protecting endangered populations against fielded forces. In spite of this, the alliance decided against their use from the beginning of the campaign because ground operations significantly increased the potential for a long, casualty-producing war that was certain to result in a highly critical public response.

Also notably absent for the first two weeks of the campaign was the deployment of A-10 aircraft, known for their prowess at providing close air support (CAS) to ground troops against tanks and artillery, and ideal for the population protection mission. They were not used against JNA fielded forces until 6 April 1999 and then only in a limited fashion.⁶⁴ When questioned about the A-10's absence early in the war, US Vice Admiral Fry, Joint Staff Director of Operations, replied that the air defence environment was too dangerous for the A-10s, signifying once again the priority concern for NATO

⁶² DoD "After Action Report", xxiii and Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 144.

⁶³ Andrew Krepinevich, "The Lessons of Kosovo", Backgrounder, 13 October 1999, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.19991013.The_Lessons_of_Kos/B.19991013.The_Lessons_of_Kos.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁶⁴ Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999, 41 and Jamie McIntyre, "A10 antitank planes used for first time in Yugoslavia, Pentagon says", 7 April 1999, *CNN*, www.cnn.com/us/9904/07/us.kosovo.military. Accessed 18 July 2000.

combatants over foreign civilians.⁶⁵ When A-10s were employed, they garnered more negative attention for their use of depleted uranium rounds than for the positive effect they had on the protection mission.

Attack helicopters, considered ideal for protection missions, were also conspicuous in their absence. While many NATO countries possessed ground attack helicopters, none volunteered them for use in Kosovo because of their vulnerability to the JNA's potent air defence capability. The ill-fated deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania revealed much about the West's priority objectives. Although the twenty-four US Army Apache helicopters were reputed to be extremely valuable assets for use against ground forces, their deployment to Albania took an unexpected three weeks,⁶⁶ after which their use was furthered delayed so that the pilots could complete their in-theatre training. Two helicopters crashed on training missions within two weeks of each other resulting in the deaths of two pilots (the only allied fatalities of the war). Finally, once the helicopters were in place and the pilots had been trained for the mission, there emerged considerable disagreement among US officials over their use.⁶⁷ Throughout these delays, Kosovar civilians continued to suffer at the hands of Yugoslav forces. When Operation Allied Force ended in July 1999, Task Force Hawk had yet to fly a combat mission in Kosovo, largely because the air threat was deemed too great for the aircraft.⁶⁸ General Wesley Clark, nevertheless, concluded that Task Force Hawk was an important factor in Milosevic's decision to concede because it presented a visible signal that a ground

⁶⁵ Department of Defense News Briefing, Vice Adm. Scott A. Fry, Joint Staff Director of Operations, Rear Adm. Thomas R. Wilson, Joint Staff Director of Intelligence, 30 March 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar1999/t03301999_t0330kos.html Accessed 18 July 2000.

⁶⁶ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Modern Combat*, (Oxford: Public Affairs Ltd, 2001), 279-80.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 279-81, 305-7, 322-23, 333-4.

⁶⁸ Luttwak, 41 and Daalder and O'Hanlon, 126.

invasion was increasingly likely.⁶⁹ According to General Clark, "The Apaches were always more than Apaches. I *liked* having the tanks the artillery, and the radar all there. That *was* the ground threat".⁷⁰ While Task Force Hawk may have represented a ground threat in the eyes of NATO, it must have seemed a rather hollow one to the hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians who were driven from their homes and terrorised by the Yugoslav forces. NATO's force structure clearly was not designed with population protection as the priority objective.

6.3.2 Strategy

From the beginning of NATO's planning effort, the allies disagreed over the best way to engage the JNA militarily. One thing that most decision-makers did agree on, however, was the impossibility of getting all the NATO member states to concede to the use of ground forces. The Clinton administration was initially opposed to a ground option because it did not think that Congress or the US public would support such an action in the Balkans. Ground wars conjured up images of long, drawn out conflicts with high casualty rates—both of which would probably incite an intensely negative public reaction. Thus, Clinton assured the nation on the first night of the campaign, "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war".⁷¹ Similarly, when US Secretary of Defense Cohen was asked if he could categorically state that ground troops would not be used, Cohen replied that "what we have indicated to the Congress and to the country is that this is an air operation, campaign [sic]".⁷²

⁶⁹ Clark, *Modern War*, 410.

⁷⁰ Cited in James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 195.

⁷¹ Clinton, "Statement by the President to the Nation", 24 March 1999.

⁷² William Cohen, Department of Defense News Briefing, 24 March 1999, http://www.dod.mil/news/Mar1999/t03241999_t0324sd.html, Accessed 18 July 2003.

The US was not the only NATO member to reject a strategy requiring ground troops, though it was the most influential. With the exception of the UK (and even it had serious reservations), the alliance was firmly set against the idea of using ground troops to force an agreement. Germany had historical baggage to overcome as well as a Social-Democrat/Green Party coalition government that was generally opposed to military action. On 19 May, German Chancellor Schroeder announced that German troops would not fight in Kosovo and threatened to veto the idea in NATO.⁷³ The Greeks, who had even opposed NATO airstrikes, were totally averse to the thought of using ground forces against their Orthodox Serb brothers. While not a NATO member, Russia's opinion also affected the NATO decision. On 9 April, President Yeltsin threatened a Russian military response if NATO launched a ground war.⁷⁴ Thus, for much of the planning and conduct of Operation Allied Force, the UK was the only member state that consistently advocated the use of a ground component as part of its strategy in the Balkans.

In contrast to the political leaders, NATO's military leaders argued strongly for a ground option before the bombing began. NATO's head of the Military Committee, German General Klaus Naumann warned politicians that they were asking the impossible from the air.⁷⁵ Both General Clark and Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Michael Short, NATO's Joint Forces Air Component Commander for Operation Allied Force, expressed their doubts that an air-only strategy could accomplish the humanitarian objectives. In spite of these warnings, the maintenance of alliance unity overrode military necessity. Consequently, when the FRY intensified its campaign against the Kosovars, there was

⁷³ Sabrina P. Ramet and Phil Lyon, "Germany: The Federal Republic, Loyal to NATO", in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?*, (London: Pearson Education Limited for Reuters, 2001), 93.

⁷⁴ Youngs et. al., Operation "Allied Force", FCO Research Paper 99/48.

⁷⁵ Gen Klaus Naumann, Interview with PBS *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/naumann.html>.

nothing the alliance could effectively do on a tactical level. Only as winter approached and Milosevic continued to defy NATO's aerial bombardment did the alliance, led by the UK, seriously consider using ground troops. By this time, the humanitarian displacement had already occurred on a massive scale.

Airpower, on the other hand, was relatively safe, quick, and precise. Even so, there were disagreements among the allies about the type of air strategy that should be used. US military planners sought to conduct a "classic air campaign" along the Gulf War model. They envisioned a strategic campaign aimed at crippling key targets in Kosovo and Belgrade, selected with the aim of inflicting maximum pressure on the FRY government and forcing them to capitulate.⁷⁶ If the campaign succeeded quickly, the need for tactical protection of civilians would be minimised. Some NATO member states were uncomfortable with this intense approach and sought a more incrementalist effort aimed not at the FRY's defeat, but at signalling NATO's resolve, bringing Milosevic back to the negotiating table, and targeting the fielded forces in Kosovo if necessary.

The resultant air campaign was a mixture of both plans with the US-proposed strategic option only to be used in the unlikely event that the demonstration bombing did not work. The campaign was divided into five-phases designed to gradually intensify the pressure on Milosevic in response to the level of his resistance.⁷⁷ Phase 1 was chiefly intended to be a signal to Milosevic in which NATO would demonstrate its resolve by destroying the FRY's Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). During this phase, NATO aircraft would only be allowed to operate north of the 44th parallel (Belgrade and Novi

⁷⁶ Lieutenant General Michael Short, Interview with PBS *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁷⁷ Phases 0 and 4 were deployment and redeployment respectively.

Sad) in attacks against the IADS. Phase 2 would target fielded forces within Kosovo, and Phase 3, if necessary, would engage strategic targets north of the 44th parallel.⁷⁸

When Phase 1 began on 24 March 1999, NATO leaders and heads of state were quick to emphasise the military nature of the targets in order to quell any domestic opposition. Secretary-General Solana described the objectives of the attacks as being “carefully chosen military targets” and General Clark reiterated the “military” focus of the attacks five different times in his prepared statement.⁷⁹ Tony Blair also emphasised that the attacks targeted the “military capability of the Serb dictatorship” as did other state leaders.⁸⁰ Yet for all of the speeches and justifications, Phase 1 was largely designed to demonstrate resolve and preserve alliance credibility. It was supposed to demonstrate to Milosevic that the NATO threat was credible; it would signal NATO’s resolve to the international community and to the Western public; and it would reveal the level of domestic support within individual member states.⁸¹ Thus, when the campaign began only 51 targets had been approved for 2 or 3 days of demonstration bombing,⁸²

Because the JNA did not use radar to engage NATO aircraft with surface-to-air missiles, the alliance pilots were unable to detect and destroy their IADs and achieve aerial supremacy. Consequently, when the alliance moved into Phase 2 on 27 March, the aircraft were forced to remain at high altitudes and the targets were largely limited to

⁷⁸ United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, “Joint statement on the ‘Kosovo After Action Review’” presented by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, October 14, 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/b10141999_bt478-99.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁷⁹ NATO, Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark, NATO HQ, 15.00 hours, Transcript 25 March 1999, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁸⁰ Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair in the House of Commons, Tuesday, 23 March 1999.

⁸¹ General Wesley Clark, *Frontline*.

⁸² *Ibid.*

infrastructure and fixed targets inside Kosovo rather than the mobile forces that were terrorising the population.

When it became clear that Phase 2 was not having any significant effect and the humanitarian situation was growing increasingly horrific (and more widely reported), some political leaders did not feel comfortable moving to Phase 3, for domestic political reasons. As a compromise, they moved to "Phase 2 Plus" on 30 March which authorised NATO's Secretary-General to approve specific targets north of the 44th parallel as long as he informally consulted with political leaders on particularly sensitive targets, and as long as General Clark continued to solicit input from other military leaders.

Within "Phase 2 Plus", NATO attacked dual-use civilian infrastructure such as bridges, rail networks, radio and television transmitters, telephone relays, oil refineries, and specific "leadership" targets such as one of Milosevic's homes.⁸³ According to Lt Gen Short, these initial strategic attacks on Belgrade were just starting to bring pressure to bear on Milosevic when Short was ordered to divert the air effort back to Kosovo due to increased political pressure to "do something" to help the Kosovar Albanians.⁸⁴ Military officials argued for three weeks that tactical targets could be attacked in parallel with strategic targets before the political leadership finally agreed.⁸⁵

In the end, it was not the humanitarian catastrophe, or the advice of the military leadership, or any other factor that prompted the change in strategy; rather, it was the growing realisation among NATO leaders that they might lose the war. At the NATO Summit on 25-26 April, NATO heads of state issued a strongly-worded statement

⁸³ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 117.

⁸⁴ Lt Gen Michael Short, *Frontline*.

expressing their united commitment to accomplishing their objectives in Kosovo. After the summit, military commanders were given much more latitude to attack a wide range of targets north of the 44th parallel, but, by this time, much of the humanitarian tragedy had already taken place.

6.3.3 Rules of Engagement

The troops and equipment that NATO did employ in Operation Allied Force were governed by highly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE in Kosovo were primarily the result of compromise decisions designed to coerce Milosevic while preserving alliance unity, maintaining political cohesion, bolstering public opinion, increasing support within the international community, and reducing the risk to Allied military personnel and foreign non-combatants. Protecting vulnerable populations was a secondary consideration. Fighting within the construct of the NATO alliance imposed a number of "rules" or procedural restrictions on allied planning in addition to the ROE that governed target selection and target engagement.

Alliance Procedures. As a result of the West's decision to fight within the structure of NATO, several procedural rules restricted the manner in which the operation was planned and conducted, often to the detriment of the endangered population. First, all nineteen members had an equal standing and an equal voice in the decisions that were made, regardless of the size of the country or the proportion of resources they dedicated to the fight. Technically, any single member of the alliance had the authority to veto a particular action. Because NATO was an alliance composed of democracies, each with its own concerns and unique circumstances, maintaining consensus, while vital, was extremely difficult to accomplish. During Operation Allied Force, compromise was key

⁸⁵ Short, *Frontline*.

to maintaining alliance unity. If one country was opposed to a particular target being struck, it could veto it outright. Alternatively, it could refuse the use of its own resources, or other resources based on its soil, while still agreeing to let the attack continue by other means. In most cases, Secretary-General Solana was authorised to approve specific targets, but for those targets that were particularly sensitive, such as those in heavily-populated areas, he had to seek specific approval from the governments involved.

These rules were often frustrating for the military commanders who were trying to conduct a sustained air campaign, especially when the reticent member state brought little or nothing militarily to the fight. General Clark recounted that many times he had to go to Solana and ask for his assistance in dealing with a resistant ally over a particularly important target. Lt Gen Short was so frustrated by these procedural rules that after Operation Allied Force ended, he publicly advocated doing away with the veto and letting the country with the most at stake have the most influence.⁸⁶ In the end, NATO member states found enough common ground, and held it long enough, to force Milosevic to agree to their terms, but the resultant compromises were frequently achieved at the population's expense.

Target Selection. The manner in which targets were chosen and approved was highly complex and restrictive because of the desire among planners to avoid excessive collateral damage and, with it, the loss of public support and alliance unity. Consequently, military planners and intelligence experts from several agencies evaluated

⁸⁶ Lt Gen Michael Short, *Frontline*.

targets according to a number of criteria. US Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre described the questions that were considered before selecting a particular target:

Is this a legitimate target [under international law]? How does it relate to our military goals? What role does it play in our opponent's system of operations and how will it affect him if it is destroyed? Can we constrain our intended damage to this target only? What is the likelihood of unintended damage and how can we minimize unintended damage by changing the time of day or the physical direction of the attack?⁸⁷

In addition to the target, the type of munition to be employed, the precise point where it was to strike, and the specific type of aircraft to deliver it were all thoroughly considered prior to each attack. According to General Clark, the allies devised a system in which targets were classified according to their likelihood to produce collateral damage. The potential damage was then compared to the anticipated benefit of destroying the target. Targets that had "high political symbolism", such as the television station in Belgrade, had to be worked "through the nations, step by step".⁸⁸

Once a target was selected, it had to clear numerous legal hurdles before being bombed. At each level of the chain of command, targets were legally reviewed, both within NATO and individual member states. For example, in the US, certain targets had to have the personal approval of both the President and the Secretary of Defense. Before getting that approval, the targets faced a final legal review from their two separate sets of legal advisers.⁸⁹

Target Engagement. The manner in which bombs could be dropped was also tightly restricted. In some cases, the restrictions served to minimise collateral damage; in others,

⁸⁷ Statement of the Hon. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 22 July 1999, cited in Arkin, 7.

⁸⁸ General Wesley Clark, Interview with PBS *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/clark.html>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁸⁹ DoD "After Action Report", 24.

they were meant to reduce the risk to allied pilots. According to Lt Gen Short, pilots had to visibly identify every "target every time we were going to strike a tank or an artillery piece".⁹⁰ This requirement was especially restrictive due to the region's frequent adverse weather and cloud cover. Many aircraft returned to base without dropping their bombs. Alliance leaders were so concerned about bombing errors, that pilots were authorised to radio Lt Gen Short directly to ask his permission to engage a target.

Even with this requirement, pilots occasionally made mistakes and bombed incorrect targets. This was partly due to the altitude restrictions that were imposed in order to minimise pilots' vulnerability to anti-aircraft artillery, shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles, and small arms fire. Initially, NATO military leaders decided that pilots could not fly below 15,000 feet. While this altitude was ideal for PGMs aimed at fixed targets, it had a negative effect on the pilots' ability to identify and engage fielded forces. The 15,000-foot restriction made it very difficult for pilots to properly identify and distinguish paramilitary forces from refugees, and military vehicles from farm equipment. While pilot safety was increased as a result of the altitude restriction, bombing accuracy, and, hence, civilian protection was decreased. In fact, as a result of the much-publicised accidental bombing of a refugee convoy on 14 April, Lt Gen Short changed the ROE to allow observer aircraft to go as low as 5,000 feet, and striking aircraft as low as 8,000 feet, in order to positively identify a target.⁹¹ Regardless of this change, the ROE revealed NATO's general prioritisation of alliance unity, credibility, and safety over the effective protection of civilian lives.

6.4 RESULTS

⁹⁰ Lt Gen Michael Short, cited in Arkin, 15.

⁹¹ Short, *Frontline*.

According to NATO officials and military commanders, Operation Allied Force was a successful operation. Speaking as NATO's Secretary-General in his October 2000 assessment of Operation Allied Force, George Robertson proclaimed, "The risks were high – NATO faced many problems – and the price was high. But as the Alliance promised at the time, Serb forces are out, KFOR is in, and the refugees are home".⁹² Robertson's optimistic outlook was reinforced by the Pentagon's official "after-action" assessment which called the operation "an overwhelming success". According to the report, "NATO accomplished its mission and achieved its strategic, operational, and tactical goals in the face of an extremely complex set of challenges".⁹³

Rather than take these bold declarations at face value, this section evaluates these claims in light of the official objectives that were discussed in Section 2. The purpose is not to evaluate the success of the overall operation, but merely to demonstrate that NATO's commitment to population protection was secondary to its pursuit of more traditional self-interests.

6.4.1 Population Protection

The humanitarian plight of the Kosovars and the threat of an even greater crisis to come, consistently took precedence as the primary justification for NATO's action in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the grave human rights abuses and indiscriminate attacks against Kosovar civilians that led to NATO's initiation of airstrikes paled in comparison to the humanitarian tragedy that unfolded after the bombing commenced. Far from deterring an

⁹² Robertson, "Introduction" in *Kosovo: One year on*, 5.

⁹³ DoD "After Action Report", xvii.

intensification of the humanitarian predicament, NATO's inability to stop the crisis actually led some analysts to accuse it of provoking the crisis.

Secretary-General Robertson's glib statement that "as the Alliance promised at the time, ... the refugees are home" ignores the fact that over a million Kosovar Albanians were forced from their homes as a result of NATO's inadequate protection. Various organisations documented evidence of systematic killings, torture, rape, and forced expulsions committed against the Kosovars during the bombing. In the end, over 863,000 Kosovar Albanians either fled or were forcibly expelled from Kosovo by FRY forces.⁹⁴ In addition to those who actually left the country, UNHCR estimated 590,000 had been internally displaced by May 1999. In total, 90% of all Kosovar Albanians living in the region prior to March 1999 were displaced from their homes. NATO simply did not have an effective strategy for stopping the crisis or preventing the forced expulsions. Instead, it focused on the much safer task of assisting the Kosovars once they fled to other countries. NATO members built refugee camps and provided humanitarian aid in neighbouring countries. NATO aircraft delivered over 4.5 million tons of food, over 1,900 tons of shelter, and 57 tons of medical supplies.⁹⁵ Additionally, alliance members took thousands of Kosovar refugees into their own countries to demonstrate their commitment to humanitarian concerns, to lessen the burden on nearby states, and to decrease the instability the refugees could pose to the region.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ UNHCR Figures cited in OSCE, *Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told*, Chapter 14 "Forced Expulsion", <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part1/ch14.htm>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁹⁵ United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Combined Prepared Statements of General Wesley K. Clark, Admiral James Ellis, Jr., and Lt General Michael Short, 21 October 1999. http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/1999/991021wc.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

Despite the success of this humanitarian assistance, Western leaders did not deploy the type of tactical protection forces that could have rendered much of this assistance unnecessary. The few tactical protection resources they did have in theatre often could not be used because of the risks to allied pilots, domestic support, and alliance unity. Knowing this, and based on the tragic events that occurred in Kosovo between March and June 1999, NATO's success must be evaluated in a different light.

In the short term, NATO's phased approach failed to accomplish any of Clinton's "3 D" strategy. It did not degrade the FRY's "capacity to continue repression of the civilian population" or deter "further military actions against its own people". It certainly did not "deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians" or "seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo". In fact, NATO air planners never anticipated that the air campaign would be able to stop the ethnic cleansing in the short-term. According to American Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan,

"no Air Force officer ever believed that air power could stop directly the door-to-door infantry thuggery that was driving the Kosovars from their homes. Nor could air power directly stop the slaughter and war crimes that were taking place in isolated villages".⁹⁷

Had JNA forces and Serb paramilitaries been intent on killing the Kosovars instead of forcing them out of the region, NATO would have been powerless to stop it, and the humanitarian catastrophe would have been exponentially worse. Only because this did not happen could NATO claim the achievement of its objective to create "conditions to reverse ethnic cleansing". By the end of June 1999, after the FRY forces had withdrawn and the NATO-led security force was in place, practically all 1.3 million Kosovars returned to their homes and villages.⁹⁸ In many cases, Kosovars returned to burned-out

⁹⁷ General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff, USAF, Remarks at the Air Force Association National Convention, 14 Sept 1999, cited in Arkin, 27.

⁹⁸ Lord Robertson, *Kosovo One Year On*, 16.

or demolished homes. With the extreme Balkan winter approaching, KFOR helped complete UNMIK's winterisation plan so that no deaths were reported from lack of food or shelter.

But even these post-war successes could not reverse the deaths, injuries, rapes, and psychological damage suffered at the hands of Serb security forces while "the most precise and lowest-collateral-damage air campaign ever conducted"⁹⁹ raged above their heads. When it came to Clinton's objective of deploying a NATO-led security force that would protect "all the people . . . Serbs and Albanians alike", NATO was clearly unsuccessful.¹⁰⁰ While the post-Allied Force security force known as KFOR deployed fairly rapidly, it was unable to protect the Serbs living in Kosovo. Once the air war ended and the refugees returned, a major campaign of reverse ethnic cleansing ensued. In spite of KFOR's presence and protection efforts, the Serb population in Pristina, estimated at 20,000 in 1998, had fallen to an estimated 700 to 800 by September 1999.¹⁰¹

6.4.2 Regional and International Stability

The potential instability which threatened to engulf the Balkan region and draw NATO members into the conflict on opposing sides was successfully prevented by NATO's actions. By compelling Milosevic to withdraw all FRY forces from Kosovo and replacing them with a NATO-led security force, NATO enabled masses of refugees to return home where they ceased to pose economic hardships and security threats to the

⁹⁹ DoD "After Action Report", xvii.

¹⁰⁰ President William J. Clinton, "Clinton Announces the End of the War in Kosovo, 10 June 1999, <http://www.australianpolitics.com/usa/clinton/speeches/990610kosovo.shtml>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

¹⁰¹ UNHCR/OSCE, "Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Nov. 1999-Jan. 2000" (14 Feb. 2000), http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/min_rep_04_eng.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2003.

host nations. KFOR's continued UN-backed presence in Kosovo remains a stabilising force in the region and a check on future outbreaks of violence.

The terms by which NATO ended the bombing also contributed to international stability. Yugoslavia maintained its *de-jure* sovereignty over Kosovo, and the Kosovars gained unprecedented autonomy from Serbian control. Such an arrangement re-emphasised the international community's determination to preserve existing borders in an effort to reduce the instability caused by secessionist movements and intra-state wars.

Finally, NATO managed to conduct the campaign without completely destroying its relations with Russia. Though NATO-Russian relations were strained throughout the conflict, NATO's inclusion of Russia at practically all stages of the negotiations, and Russian President Yeltsin's decision to withhold support for Milosevic in the face of severe public criticism were instrumental factors in convincing Milosevic to sue for peace. In the final settlement, the Russians could claim credit for helping to negotiate the end of the war and for ensuring an equitable peace through its military contribution to KFOR.¹⁰²

6.4.3 Alliance Credibility

NATO's unity and resolute action also bolstered the alliance's credibility. The alliance threatened action against a leader bent on defying the international community and then delivered on its threat. According to the NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, "If NATO had failed to respond to the policy of ethnic cleansing, it would have betrayed its values and cast permanent doubt on the credibility of its institutions".¹⁰³ By forcefully

¹⁰² DoD "After-Action Report", xvii.

¹⁰³ Lord Robertson, *Kosovo One Year On*, 22.

responding to Milosevic, NATO showed its willingness to act outside of the Security Council if the specific conditions warranted. As a result, abusive governments would be far less willing to rely on divisions among UN Security Council members or within NATO to protect them from an intervention.

The alliance maintained enough unity throughout Operation Allied Force to compel Milosevic to agree to its terms. This was a significant feat since most member states believed from the outset that the bombing would not be necessary for an extended period of time. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, General Clark, Admiral Ellis, and Lt Gen Short submitted a joint statement saying that the "enduring achievement of the Alliance was maintaining unity and resolve throughout the 78-day air campaign".¹⁰⁴ Had individual member states known beforehand how much time and intensity would be involved in the bombing campaign, they may have chosen a different path altogether.

Alliance credibility was also bolstered by the degree of unity that NATO members were able to demonstrate in Operation Allied Force. The preservation of unity was largely the result of the manner in which the alliance fought the campaign. Each member of the alliance had an equal say in target selection and the particular methods of engagement. Moreover, the use of precision-guided weaponry, in conjunction with the restrictive rules of engagement levied on the pilots, resulted in zero allied combat fatalities and relatively few instances of collateral damage. The fact that there were no allied combat deaths eased the pressure applied to member states by their domestic publics. And, with the notable exception of some highly reported bombing mistakes (the Chinese embassy, the

¹⁰⁴ Clark, Ellis, and Short, Combined Statement, 21 October 1999.

Serbian passenger train, and the refugee column), NATO was remarkably successful in confining the damage of its strikes to the intended targets.

6.4.4 Other Results

Operation Allied Force also resulted in the realization of several unofficial aims which significantly benefited various Western self-interests. First of all, Allied Force preserved domestic support. By launching the intervention prior to the development of a full-scale humanitarian disaster, Western leaders were partially able to shape domestic opinion rather than merely react to it. Moreover, the air-only strategy appealed to the public's desire that some action be taken on the Kosovars' behalf, but not at the price of large numbers of Western casualties. NATO's reliance on precision-guided weapons further increased the public's tolerance of the campaign. NATO's preventive effort in Kosovo also went some way to absolving the shame over past inaction. As other chapters have shown, Western leaders had been heavily criticised for slow or non-existent responses to humanitarian crises throughout the 1990s. The comparatively quick reaction in Kosovo gave Western decision-makers a defensible response to their critics, regardless of the predominately self-interested motives that drove the intervention.

CONCLUSION

Concern for the plight of Kosovar Albanians was undoubtedly a major factor in NATO's decision to use force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Operation Allied Force. Government and military leaders across the alliance constantly emphasised the humanitarian crisis as justification for NATO's actions and, in the end, NATO accomplished many humanitarian goals. Nevertheless, NATO's minimalist, self-

protective actions demonstrated that the plight of the Kosovars was not in itself the priority reason for NATO's engagement. Instead, Operation Allied Force was primarily designed to identify and combat the potential effects of the humanitarian crisis on the alliance and on individual member states. As NATO's methods in Kosovo illustrated, this objective proved to be very difficult. Kosovo's geographic location within the heart of NATO's sphere of influence made the humanitarian tragedy particularly troubling to NATO member states. Ethnically-motivated atrocities against civilians on NATO's doorstep was a blight on NATO's reputation and credibility. Likewise, the exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees generated instability because of their potential effect on regional stability and Western economic and political well-being.

The objectives and military strategy that resulted from these insecurities reflected the secondary importance of the humanitarian cause. Even a year after the conflict, NATO emphasised that it did not fight a war, but rather conducted a "careful operation to disrupt the Yugoslav campaign of violence in Kosovo...".¹⁰⁵ Operation Allied Force began as a demonstration of resolve and only approached "war" when it appeared that Milosevic's gamble might destroy the credibility of the alliance. Throughout the campaign, every effort was made to hold the alliance together at the expense of the Kosovar population. Military objectives were vague and easily achievable. The military strategy was not designed to stop ethnic cleansing, but merely to degrade or deter FRY capabilities. Ground troops were withheld because the risk of casualties was deemed too high and public opinion too difficult to sustain. An air war, in which military planners were authorised to seize and maintain the initiative, could not be conducted because of fears of destroying alliance unity. Instead, a phased air campaign, loaded with targeting

¹⁰⁵ Lord Robertson, *Kosovo One Year On*, 22.

restrictions, was employed to “bring him [Milosevic] back to the negotiation table”.¹⁰⁶

Pilots were not allowed to attack below certain altitudes nor were key aircraft utilised because of the risks from Serb air defences. Throughout the campaign, the lives of combatants were prioritised above the lives of the victims they were sent to protect.

NATO officials and key decision-makers have defended NATO actions on the grounds that maintaining alliance cohesion was the only way to end the humanitarian tragedy. They argue that high numbers of allied casualties or the intense bombing of downtown Belgrade would have reduced domestic support for the action in numerous member states, thereby threatening alliance unity and jeopardising the entire humanitarian mission. In short, they would say that alliance unity and the compromises required to maintain it, formed NATO’s essential centre of gravity. While these arguments may be true, they strengthen the premise of this thesis rather than weaken it. The centre of gravity—the issue that drove Western action, was not endangered populations, but self-interests. NATO was more concerned about the effects of the humanitarian tragedy on itself than about the plight of the endangered Kosovar population. Had the FRY forces decided to kill the Kosovar Albanians rather than expel them, “alliance unity” would have been of little benefit either to the NATO member states or the Kosovar Albanians.

¹⁰⁶ Gen Klaus Naumann, PBS *Frontline*.

CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The preceding case studies demonstrated that the West's primary purpose for launching protection interventions in the 1990s was to safeguard its own self-interests against the multiple, uncertain hazards generated by the humanitarian crises. They also showed that in spite of the tremendous suffering experienced by the endangered populations, Western interveners did not employ proportionately robust methods to protect them. Instead, the Western states sought to reduce the potential hazards to themselves through the use of minimalist strategies that prioritised the safety of their own personnel over the safety of those they were supposed to protect, and often withdrew or terminated the operations, even though the populations were still vulnerable.

While the West's prioritisation of its self-interests accounts for the dismal protection results it achieved in the 1990s, this explanation is such an oversimplification of the West's behaviour that it is largely unhelpful in understanding the complexities of the protection interventions. Self-interest alone does not take into account the tension that surrounded the West's determination of how self interests could best be protected from the uncertain hazards generated from the humanitarian crises of the 1990s. This ongoing tension was revealed by the way in which the West's official humanitarian justifications and objectives failed to correspond with either the methods they used to conduct the operations or the results they accepted as sufficient. By highlighting this inconsistency between the interveners' motives and means, the case studies exposed the need for an alternative framework that could explain how the West's seemingly haphazard and

ineffective responses to the humanitarian crises were, in fact, calculated attempts at safeguarding their self-interests.

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a more thorough explanation for Western actions using a framework adapted from risk theory. It argues that, in spite of the differences in time, force structure, and location, Western interveners displayed a number of common characteristics in the manner in which they approached and dealt with each humanitarian crisis. Rather than view the similarities of these interventions as the result of an incomplete transition to solidarism, or excuse them as purely exceptional cases within the pluralist framework, or even explain them away as mission unfamiliarity or technical inability, this chapter maintains that they were the result of the Western states' common risk perspective. More specifically, it argues that Western states were acting as risk societies, each focused on the reduction, prevention, or avoidance of the ill-defined hazards generated by the humanitarian crises. Western states intervened to manage the risks to their self-interests from the anticipated effects of the population crises, not to safeguard the populations from the abusive practices of intrastate combatants. As risk societies, Western states engaged in population protection only as long as, and to the extent that, it managed more risk than it generated.

In order to demonstrate the applicability of the risk society contention, section one of this chapter demonstrates that Western states identified the potential hazards associated with the humanitarian crises in accordance with a risk perspective. Section two reveals that the West's strategies for dealing with these risks were actually managerial strategies designed to prevent or reduce the risks to a tolerable level rather than to eliminate them altogether. Finally, section three illustrates how Western states experienced the negative

consequences consistent with the predictions of risk theory. These three sections are further broken down into the five key risk characteristics described in Chapter 2. Each case study is then analysed individually in light of these characteristics.

7.1 RISK IDENTIFICATION

Due to the uncertainty associated with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, and the uncertainty of the post-Cold War security environment more generally, Western leaders relied heavily on the interpretations of experts in making their risk assessments of the humanitarian crises. Moreover, rather than focusing on the urgency of the endangered population's plight, these assessments were focused on determining whether or not the humanitarian crises posed a risk in the form of future hazards to Western self-interests. The natural ambiguity of such measurements in the midst of an already uncertain environment lent itself to persistent equivocation among Western publics and a lack of resolve among their leaders.

7.1.1 Uncertainty and the Role of Experts

For Western states in the post-Cold War security environment, humanitarian catastrophes resulting from intrastate conflicts were mired in a great deal of uncertainty. Unlike the rivalries of the Cold War era, these conflicts defied simplistic black and white categorisations. While the Western states had little doubt that populations in distant lands were suffering from the effects of intrastate warfare, the circumstances surrounding the humanitarian crises generated confusion. Westerners had a difficult time comprehending the cultural characteristics of the belligerents, the nature and cause of the intrastate warfare, the objectives of the rival faction leaders, and the source of the humanitarian

atrocities. Even more uncertain were the negative effects that these crises could have on the interests of Western states, and whether action or inaction would best serve their self-interests. Western decision-makers questioned the effect an intervention would have on their credibility, the degree of domestic and international support it would receive, the viability of a military operation and the danger associated with it, and the effect their actions would have on regional and international stability. Interests such as credibility, reputation, and stability were ambiguous pursuits under the most favourable conditions. In humanitarian crises involving foreign populations, they were especially difficult to assess.

In response to these looming uncertainties, "experts" in the form of government intelligence officials, political advisors, academics, officials and field workers from humanitarian NGOs and IGOs, and international lawyers abounded. They competed with one another in marketing their risk assessments, framing the crises in a way that supported their conclusions in order to win a following among the public. The abundance of contradictory expert advice and competing possibilities added to the uncertainty and, hence, the anxiety of Western states. The resultant government indecision opened the door to greater sub-political influence over Western policy.

In addition to the abundance of experts, media personnel were on hand to document the crises, each from a particular angle and specific agenda. Different reporters investigated the same scenario and reported the facts from a particular "frame" or bias, publicising the views of those experts who were most likely to generate audience interest. Thus, the media played the important role of bringing together experts, decision-makers, and the public. Additionally, as a result of the media's focus on the graphic footage of the crises,

the public was often moved to empathise with the suffering populations to such an extent that it demanded action from Western governments on behalf of the endangered populations.

As information abounded from 24-hour news channels, the Internet, and increased communication across the planet, the Western public was far less likely than it had once been to view government and military leaders as the sole repositories of truth. Instead, people made their own assessments based on the information that was available and urged corresponding action from their governments. Faced with this strong sub-political movement and public doubt, Western decision-makers were often unable to set forth a particular interpretation or implement a course of action, and expect it to be supported by the public. Even the Western military establishments recognised the influence of public opinion and the value of using the public to sway decision-makers. Military leaders at odds with politicians no longer reserved their opinions for their political superiors or their retirement memoirs, but expressed them openly to the public or "leaked" them to the media.

As a natural consequence of this wealth of conflicting information and analyses, uncertainty abounded. Conflicting expertise meant that the public had to choose which expert assessment to believe. The very existence of such a choice brought with it the potential of choosing incorrectly, thereby increasing public anxiety.

Uncertainty over the degree of risk generated by the humanitarian crises led to a weak Western commitment to the population protection mission. The public's humanitarian zeal was quickly mellowed and its altruistic resolve easily fractured when confronted by

Western soldiers returning home in body bags. Christopher Coker wrote about this fickle public response in his book *Humane Warfare*.

Public support for a campaign cannot be taken for granted even if it meets – at the beginning – with broad public support. When it does not, even a single incident can have devastating consequences. Public opinion will not tolerate casualties.... It is the public today that tends to desert....¹

Though the debatable risks flowing from humanitarian crises generated enough insecurity among the Western public and its decision-makers to warrant action of some sort, they did not generate the resolution necessary for the intervener to persevere when the level of personal sacrifice grew disproportionately high. Hence, the uncertainty that surrounded the humanitarian tragedies was one of the primary reasons that post-Cold War Western interveners were unwilling to risk Western lives, even those of voluntary combatants, on behalf of foreign non-combatants.

To illustrate more specifically how uncertainty factored into the actions of the interveners, the following four sections give examples from the case studies of conflicting expertise and debatable risk assessments. In each case, the weak national commitments and casualty-averse behaviour which resulted from the uncertainty are also documented.

Northern Iraq. The humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq was steeped in uncertainty. Because the news media was on hand to document the plight of the vulnerable Kurds on the border with Turkey, there was little uncertainty regarding the Kurds' humanitarian plight, although estimates of Kurdish deaths per day did vary significantly. Instead, the uncertainty regarded the degree of risk that such a humanitarian crisis posed to the West. Initially, the US and the UK governments thought military intervention on behalf of the

¹ Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 57.

Kurds presented a greater risk to themselves than did non-intervention. Military re-engagement in Iraq threatened to amplify the criticism that the Gulf War left the job "half done" and was, therefore, an empty victory. Experts also disagreed as to the cause of the Kurdish humanitarian disaster. Humanitarian organisations and political pundits blamed George Bush and John Major for encouraging the Kurdish and Shi'a revolts and then abandoning them to Iraqi slaughter. Though the governments' experts stated that this was not the case, and though Bush and Major personally rejected the accusation, their "official" government explanations did not effectively counter the rival expertise.

Uncertainty also existed over the potential outcome of the intervention and the efforts necessary to succeed. One group of experts who judged that an intervention would lead to a Vietnam-like quagmire or an anti-Western backlash in the Soviet Union urged restraint and non-intervention. Another group highlighted the negative effects Western inaction would have on Western moral and political credibility and advocated intervention.

Faced with these disputable risks to allied security, the "Provide Comfort" coalition was unwilling to accept high casualties in its effort to protect the Kurds. It utilised a host of techniques designed primarily for its own force protection. In fact, the idea to create the safe haven was conceived primarily as an attempt to protect allied forces. The no-fly zone (NFZ) patrolled by coalition aircraft and the large numbers of troops and massive firepower deployed into northern Iraq benefited the endangered Kurds only as long as coalition forces and Western self-interests were also in danger. As the case studies showed, the NFZ operated with highly restrictive ROE that allowed the aircraft to use force only in self-defence; the rapid reaction force was withdrawn though the Kurds

remained in danger; and the coalition security forces withdrew even though they were being replaced by a group of ill-trained, hastily-formed, and poorly-armed UN Guards.

Bosnia. The intervention on behalf of endangered Bosnians followed the pattern initiated in Iraq, but the complicated three-way fight for control of Bosnian territory meant that the degree of uncertainty was even higher. Experts disagreed on basic issues such as the nature of the conflict and the particular risk it would generate to the West. Some argued that the ethnic conflict would spread rapidly into the rest of Europe, while others maintained that Bosnia's geographical position meant that it was already fairly contained.

There was also widespread disagreement over where to place the blame for the crisis. Some maintained that the conflict was the result of historical grievances that had been recently aggravated by the actions of all combatants. According to these experts, outsiders could not solve the conflict and Western states would do well to minimise their involvement until the fighting lessened. Others argued that the Serbs were the chief antagonists in the conflict and subsequently pushed for tough international action on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims. About the only point on which there was widespread agreement was that non-combatants were suffering as a result of the conflict, though even then it was often difficult to distinguish who were non-combatants and who were not.

As a result of this high degree of uncertainty, the UN Security Council, led by Western nations, exhibited a weak commitment to the protection of the Bosnian civilians and was generally unwilling to jeopardise the lives of intervening soldiers on their behalf. Most Western decision-makers felt that their populations would not support large numbers of casualties in defence of the Bosnian Muslims, especially when the uncertainties regarding

the effects on their self-interests remained so pervasive. Consequently, throughout the UNPROFOR operation, UN forces remained very small in number and weak in mandate, even when Member States became increasingly aware that the civilians were being intentionally targeted by combatants. UNPROFOR, by virtue of its Chapter VI peacekeeping mandate, avoided tasks that were deemed likely to put its forces in jeopardy of becoming casualties. Even with this casualty-averse mandate, most Western states hesitated or refused to volunteer military personnel. When the Security Council did expand the mandate to address protection efforts more specifically, it emphasised self-defensive measures and the protection of humanitarian aid and aid workers—not the protection of the targeted population.

Rwanda. The uncertainty that characterised the crisis in Rwanda was the result of a combination of factors. First of all, as Rwanda did not play a significant role in the West's post-Cold War calculations, the link between Rwandese violence and Western self-interest was difficult to make. Moreover, France, the Western state with the most recent involvement in Rwanda, was generally pre-disposed to its Hutu ally's interpretation of events. Rwanda's Hutu representative on the Security Council repeatedly assured the Council that the crisis in Rwanda was nothing more than a renewal of the civil war and not a Hutu-engineered genocide. Hutu and French assessments differed from the "expert" reports of UN peacekeepers, investigative commissions, and humanitarian NGOs who assessed the conflict as a genocide and advocated intervention. Consequently, uncertainty existed as to the identity of the perpetrators and the nature of the massacres, both of which justified the West's emphasis on the relatively safe task of negotiating a cease-fire rather than on the more intrusive and dangerous objective of protecting the civilian population.

Secondly, there was an intentional effort on the part of some Western states to preserve a degree of uncertainty. Though UNAMIR forces and humanitarian experts had been reporting the systematic and one-sided massacres for weeks, Member States led by the US and UK did not want to conclude that the situation was a genocide because of the obligation it might impose upon them to act. Having just withdrawn from another African country in which the results had gone horribly wrong, the US and Western states were resistant to the idea of launching another such operation.

As a result of the high degree of uncertainty in the aforementioned areas, the West was only marginally committed to the protection of Rwandan non-combatants, but was wholly committed to the prevention of friendly casualties. From the outset of UNAMIR's involvement in Rwanda, the West showed itself to be particularly casualty averse. The limited, Security Council-formulated mandate made it clear that Western states were not willing to accept casualties on behalf of the mission in Rwanda. This point was starkly demonstrated by the rapid deployment of Western troops to evacuate ex-patriots contrasted with the slow, tentative augmentation of combat troops to UNAMIR II. The overwhelming firepower of *Opération Turquoise* was only deployed by the French after the bulk of the killing had occurred, and was designed primarily to protect their own forces from possible engagement with Tutsi RPF forces. The absence from *Turquoise* of the necessary equipment to find, rescue, and transport endangered Tutsis revealed the coalition's priorities. Furthermore, one of the primary benefits of creating the Secure Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) was that it reduced the likelihood that French troops would face dangerous confrontations with the Tutsi forces.

Kosovo. In Kosovo, uncertainty characterised every aspect of the situation. Among other issues, experts disagreed as to the severity and the source of the civilian atrocities, making it difficult to know which side was to blame. Some viewed Serb forces as the indisputable source of the crisis and accused them of trying to cover up heavy-handed military responses against non-combatants. Others branded the KLA fighters as terrorists and accused them of provoking the Serb attacks and then disguising dead KLA combatants as innocent civilians in order to manipulate public opinion. Even the "facts" of the Raçak massacre, which were so influential in NATO's decision to threaten military force, were disputed among the UN-designated experts of the Kosovo Verification Mission. Experts also disagreed over the threat posed to Kosovar civilians by NATO aerial attacks, as well as the risk to European security and NATO unity should NATO choose not to act. Finally, experts disagreed over the amount of effort and the level of force it would take to induce Milosevic to agree to NATO's demands.

Faced with so much uncertainty over the risk generated by the situation in Kosovo, NATO member states were particularly concerned that public support would diminish as soon as NATO forces were killed. Consequently, NATO adopted a strategy that reflected its weak commitment to protecting the Kosovar population. Despite widespread agreement that ground forces were the most appropriate means of preventing atrocities against non-combatants, NATO member states rejected the strategy because it risked allied casualties. Instead, NATO relied solely on an air campaign governed by very restrictive rules of engagement that were designed primarily to reduce the pilots' susceptibility to Serb air defences. Reducing the risk to its troops even further, NATO made extensive use of unmanned reconnaissance vehicles and cruise missiles throughout the conflict.

7.1.2 Focused on Future Hazards

In each of the four examples of population protection discussed in this thesis, a humanitarian crisis was either underway or was sufficiently probable when the West decided to act. Despite the urgency of the humanitarian crisis, the West did not employ a sufficiently robust strategy to eliminate the cause of the crisis or to protect the population in the midst of it. Instead, the Western strategy concentrated on the future "ill effects" that the humanitarian crises posed to the West. In spite of the uncertainty that characterised the conflicts, and even though Western states could not be sure of the hazards to themselves that might emerge at some point in the future, they determined that the potential damage from not acting was serious enough to warrant some degree of preventive action. In this sense, the protection interventions of the 1990s were applications of the Precautionary Principle in foreign policy.

Northern Iraq. When the Shi'ite revolt in southern Iraq and the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq began to suffer the effects of a strong Iraqi counterattack, the West prioritised the avoidance of future ill-effects to itself over any immediate positive effects the intervention might have for the non-combatants. A Western-led intervention in support of the rebellions could have challenged the accepted norms of international order. Additionally, a victorious Kurd or Shi'a rebellion could have led to the partition of the Iraqi state, thus threatening the balance of power in a vital, oil-rich region, and arousing the anger of other key states in the region. Based on these potential hazards to the West's future interests, Western leaders decided that inaction was the most appropriate method for avoiding results that would negatively effect their self-interests.

This calculation changed, however, when the Kurds massed on the mountains bordering Turkey. Turkey's importance as a NATO ally in a critical region of the world gave weight to Turkish insistence that the Kurds posed a serious threat to its security and reinforced its demand that the Kurds be assisted within the Iraqi borders. The Turkish demand corresponded with the West's domestic public calling for action on behalf of the Kurds. Suddenly the immediate humanitarian crisis generated future risks to NATO unity, regional stability, and domestic support. Though none of these consequences were certain, Western states considered them to be likely enough, and of sufficient magnitude, to warrant preventive action in the face of the uncertainty.

Bosnia. In the face of an immediate and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, Western states did not intervene decisively in the conflict until the humanitarian situation looked poised to generate significant future risks to themselves. The potential flood of Bosnian refugees into neighbouring European states caused European leaders to fear future economic hardship and broader European instability. Additionally, the ethnic partition of Bosnia had the potential of setting a dangerous precedent for the future of post-Cold War international and European order. Finally, as international involvement in Bosnia grew, the future credibility of the UN, EU, and NATO, as well as that of individual Western states, was at stake if the Bosnian conflict was not contained. Regardless of the interveners' humanitarian justifications, the reality of these future-focused, self-interested priorities repeatedly revealed themselves through preventable humanitarian catastrophes and devastating losses of civilian lives.

Rwanda. In Rwanda, the immediate humanitarian catastrophe was indisputable. Whether or not Western leaders were originally aware of the genocidal nature of the

killings is largely irrelevant since they clearly knew that tens of thousands of non-combatants were being killed. Prior to the killing and during the period when the immediate humanitarian need was the greatest, Western states refused to intervene, thus demonstrating that it was not the immediate humanitarian need that created the eventual impetus for an expanded UN force. Had it not been for the probable loss of future credibility and the relatively low requirement for Western troops in the UN intervention, Western states may have followed the example of Belgium and withdrawn its support for the UN mission altogether. By agreeing to the expansion of the UN mandate in Rwanda without having to contribute troops, Western governments were able to minimise future criticism of their humanitarian neglect without jeopardising the lives of their combatants.

The timing of the French-led intervention force revealed that France's primary motivation was not concern for the Rwandese non-combatants. It was only after the bulk of the bloodletting had ended and the Anglophone Tutsi RPF had established itself as the superior military force that France offered to lead a protection intervention. As the case study clearly showed, the future loss of French influence in a Francophone state was the primary motivation behind the French decision, and not the desire to protect endangered non-combatants.

Kosovo. The primary objective of NATO's operation in Kosovo was to prevent the potential hazards to NATO credibility and European stability that were likely to follow from a large-scale humanitarian disaster. In this case, NATO had ample opportunity to prevent the large-scale crisis from ever happening. However, rather than responding with sufficient resources and resolve to safeguard the population, NATO did not act until Milosevic challenged NATO's credibility at Rambouillet. When it did act, NATO

devised a strategy that was wholly inappropriate for a population protection mission, but quite sufficient for a bombing demonstration designed to showcase NATO credibility. Furthermore, although the Kosovar Albanians suffered terrible abuses and were ethnically-cleansed from Kosovo, NATO did not intensify its strategic air attacks or seriously consider the use of ground forces until it appeared that Milosevic might outlast NATO unity. Thus, it was the future risk to NATO's existence posed by Milosevic's defiant actions and not the immediate harm to the Kosovar Albanians that drove the Western action in Kosovo.

7.2 MANAGING RISK

Having identified the potential effects of the humanitarian crises as risks, and facing a host of competing risks completely unassociated with the humanitarian crises, the West utilised risk-based strategies to confront them. On the one hand, Western decision-makers determined that attempts to eliminate the sub-survival risks generated by humanitarian crises would exact a disproportionately high cost compared to the hazards they posed. On the other hand, something had to be done regarding these crises because of the damage they could inflict on Western self-interests. In a sense, decision-makers found themselves in a risk trap. Doing either too much or too little could have generated unacceptable risks to their self-interests. In an effort to extricate themselves from this trap, Western states sought merely to manage their risks.

To respond effectively to the host of risks they faced, decision-makers had to revise their risk assessments continuously to take into account newly emerging risks and then assign resources accordingly. Instead of trying to eliminate each risk, interveners merely sought

to reduce them to tolerable levels while expending the minimal amount of resources and preserving the maximum amount of flexibility possible. Unfortunately for the endangered populations, non-combatant protection was rarely the West's priority risk, and when it was, it did not remain so very long. The West was primarily concerned about the effects of the humanitarian crises on itself, such as the demand for action from its domestic public, or the regional instability caused by the subsequent refugee flows. By implementing a proper risk management strategy, decision-makers were able to confront the uncertain risks while preserving a degree of flexibility to deal with new or changing hazards. Thus, the West employed managerial strategies that were minimalist in their scope and preventive in their approach.

While there were many methods used by decision-makers to manage the risks caused by the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, the bulk of these methods can be grouped into one of three categories notable for their minimalist and preventive focus. Surveillance, containment, and distribution strategies allowed decision-makers to commit the smallest number of resources to the end goal of isolating, limiting, or preventing the hazards associated with a given crisis.

7.2.1 Surveillance

Surveillance had several advantages as a management strategy that made it highly desirable in population protection missions. By gathering additional information using surveillance techniques, risk managers were able to reduce the uncertainty that surrounded the potential hazards. Based on the information collected, planners were able to dedicate resources in a more proportionate manner. Additionally, surveillance was a relatively safe option as it could often be accomplished using "unmanned" technology

such as satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Even when piloted aircraft were used to gather the information, the missions could usually be conducted safely. Intelligence-gathering aircraft could operate high above anti-aircraft artillery fire, fly escorted with armed aircraft, or fly from international or allied airspace where they were relatively safe from attack. Unarmed human monitors, such as UN Military Observers or human rights monitors from the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, were also a useful source of surveillance. They were often able to gain access to specific areas and talk to inhabitants by maintaining an unthreatening, neutral posture. Surveillance was also beneficial because it was an inexpensive deterrent to undesirable behaviour. When combatants knew their actions were being closely watched, they were less likely to commit acts that they knew would be reported. Finally, surveillance operations were desirable to Western states because they satisfied public expectations that "something be done" to improve the humanitarian situation without committing large amounts of resources. For these reasons, surveillance was nearly always the first risk management strategy to be implemented and the last to be stopped in the protection missions of the 1990s.

Northern Iraq. The Western interveners in Iraq employed surveillance techniques to minimise and prevent the risks generated by the displaced Kurdish people. Initially, the US sent Special Forces into the region along the Turkish border to gather information regarding the scope of the Kurdish displacement and the disposition of the Iraqi troops. Furthermore, they used surveillance aircraft for gathering information about the Iraqi military's capability in the area prior to the launch of Operation Provide Comfort. As the intervening forces moved into the country, the NFZ was established to provide protection to the coalition through early warning and aerial bombardment if necessary. Though the

NFZ provided little in the way of protection to the indigenous population once the coalition forces withdrew, it continued to conduct aerial surveillance and, in so doing, acted as a relatively safe, long-term deterrent.

Bosnia. In Bosnia, Western states reasoned that active observation would deter the combatants from breaking their agreements or committing additional atrocities. Rather than send in heavily-armed troops, the interveners relied on unarmed UN Monitors to document and report violations of the various cease-fire agreements. Even those sent to “protect” the populations within the safe areas were more suitably equipped for a surveillance mission. In fact, the primary benefit of these lightly-armed peacekeepers was in providing a physical presence on the ground. Even when the peacekeepers’ mandate was expanded to allow for more vigorous military action, UNPROFOR troops, limited by their inadequate capabilities, continued to emphasise their monitoring tasks.

The NATO-enforced NFZ that the UN eventually imposed over Bosnia was another attempt to gather information and “remind” the combatant parties that they were being observed. In addition to the reconnaissance aircraft involved in these missions, unmanned reconnaissance drones and military satellites were used throughout the international involvement in the region. These resources allowed the interveners to document and discover atrocities without having to put “boots on the ground” in places where they would have been in great danger.

Rwanda. Surveillance also played a key role in Rwanda, especially since neither the Security Council nor the French-led coalition forces were willing to commit the resources necessary to eliminate the danger to the endangered populations. In fact, the emphasis on

surveillance in Rwanda was present prior to the beginning of the genocide. UNAMIR's initial mandate was formulated to minimise the force's responsibilities. Consequently, it was primarily tasked with monitoring and investigating the parties' compliance with the peace plan. Once the killings began, UNAMIR was reduced to a skeleton force that was incapable of doing anything more than monitoring the ensuing violence and reporting it to the Security Council. Despite these reports, many weeks and lives were consumed while numerous groups and committees visited Rwanda in an attempt to provide the Security Council with more information regarding the scope of the killing so that it could determine whether or not there was a genocide in progress. Ironically, as uncertainty over the situation decreased and the genocide became more undeniable, Western states, fearful of their obligations under the Genocide Convention, became more hesitant instead of more determined to act against the atrocities. Not surprisingly, when UNAMIR II was finally deployed, it engaged primarily in monitoring and observation instead of fulfilling its more robust mandate.

Kosovo. Prior to the initiation of the bombing campaign in Kosovo and after its termination, surveillance was a key element of the West's strategy to manage its risks. Prior to the bombing, one of the chief demands made of Yugoslavia in Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199 was that it allow an OSCE monitoring mission into Kosovo with complete and unfettered access throughout the region. As NATO took a more active role in the conflict, it continued the emphasis on surveillance. It was with the threat of NATO airstrikes that Richard Holbrooke persuaded Milosevic to agree to a cease-fire and a partial withdrawal of forces, but it was with unarmed ground monitors and an air observation mission that Yugoslavia's compliance was to be verified. Neither the ground monitors nor the aerial surveillance mission had any enforcement capability, but they

were put in place as low-cost deterrents in an effort to keep the FRY from reneging on its agreement.

7.2.2 Containment

Another common method used by Western states to manage the risks associated with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s was containment. While containment is normally associated with geographical isolation, risk containment concerns any action or constraint that is designed to minimise the risk manager's exposure to risk. An effective containment strategy allows the risk manager to optimise his or her exposure to additional risk by employing only those resources that are in proportion to the specific hazards he or she faces.

In the cases of these four protection interventions, the Western forces were largely composed of combat troops, yet they were rarely sent to engage in combat because this was considered a disproportionate expenditure of resources for the degree of risk they went to manage. Even when they did engage in military activities, they often abandoned traditional combatant aims such as defeat of the opposing army, the acquisition of territory, the elimination of a regime, or the total submission of an opposing force. Instead, they utilised tactics that were designed to minimise military confrontation and evade the possibility of combat. Consequently, their ROE usually emphasised compliance with the traditional peacekeeping norms of using force only in self-defence and maintaining consent among belligerents in order to demonstrate their impartiality. They also focused on providing aid rather than the more dangerous task of providing protection to non-combatants. Even when Western interveners determined that a risk to themselves warranted the use of combat power, that power was only apportioned in the

quantity required to keep the risk at a containable level, rather than to eliminate any threat to non-combatants. In some cases these efforts to contain the risks were actually detrimental to the success of the population protection mission.

The West also contained risks geographically. It attempted to isolate or quarantine the risks within a particular geographical area where they could be managed more easily. Masses of endangered people fleeing across international borders generated a number of risks to Western states which internally displaced people did not. Refugees had the potential to destabilise the economies of the receiving countries which, in many cases, were already struggling to provide for their own inhabitants. Beyond this, refugee masses also generated risks to regional and international stability. The influx of large numbers of people from a particular identity group threatened to upset the tenuous ethnic balance in other countries. This was especially the case when the refugees belonged to an identity group that was already regarded as a security threat by the receiving states. Moreover, continuous media footage of refugees or displaced people posed a risk to the credibility of states that had long advocated human rights. All of these factors made the idea of containing the risk within geographical boundaries desirable. Consequently, the idea of creating manageable camps inside the countries of origin or acting prior to the displacement taking place met with the approval of intervening states.

Northern Iraq. The coalition sought to contain the risks generated by the Kurdish crisis in northern Iraq by carefully restricting the military objective it sought to accomplish. Employing a strategy intended to eradicate the Kurds' long-term security problem in northern Iraq could have generated greater risks to NATO unity and to regional stability. Therefore, the coalition merely sought to satisfy the public demand for humanitarian

action, relieve the Turkish security concerns on its border, and withdraw coalition forces as quickly as possible in order to preserve the post-Gulf War euphoria.

To accomplish these goals, the interveners contained the risks by reducing the likelihood of confrontation with Iraqi forces as much as possible. Though they intervened with a combat capable force, they emphasised their strictly humanitarian intentions and their acceptance of Iraqi sovereignty over the territory prior to crossing the Iraqi borders. Moreover, to reduce the chances of a confrontation with Iraqi forces, they publicised their plan to create a safe haven and demanded that Iraqi forces leave the area in advance. The coalition's chances of expending lives and resources were further reduced by the liaison office established inside Iraq to encourage ongoing dialogue between coalition and Iraqi officials, and to safeguard against dangerous misunderstandings. When the initial humanitarian crisis had ended and the risks to the West had been reduced, the coalition further reduced the possibility of engaging in combat with Iraqi forces by withdrawing their forces as early as possible.

The coalition also contained the risks geographically within Iraq. This was seen in its attempts to keep the Kurdish crisis within the borders of Iraq, first through air-dropping supplies into the mountains along the Turkish border, and then through the creation of the "safe haven" in Northern Iraq. This physical containment of the Kurds was designed as a means of containing its risks by satisfying the Western publics' demand to assist the Kurds, mollifying its Turkish ally, and limiting the possibility of confrontation between coalition troops and Iraqi forces. In effect, the coalition quarantined off an area within the Iraqi state so that the "disease" of instability would not spread to other geographic or political areas of Western interest.

Bosnia. In Bosnia, the population protection mission itself was very much a minimalist, containment action instead of a decisive, combat intervention to resolve the three-party dispute. Rather than intervene with a robust mandate and sufficient force to carry it out, the interveners operated under Chapter VI authority throughout much of the operation and relied on impartial, lightly-armed forces to conduct consent-based operations. Intervenors were not concerned with defeating a military force, but with minimising the risks to themselves that resulted from the conflict. Therefore, throughout most of the intervention, interveners minimised their risks by focusing only on those activities that were unlikely to generate new risks. These included the distribution of humanitarian aid, the protection of aid convoys, and the negotiation of cease-fires.

The West also sought to manage their risks through geographical containment measures. The UN-mandated arms embargo which was applied to Bosnia in the early phases of international involvement in the conflict was an attempt to isolate the ethnic unrest. By preventing the flow of additional weapons into the country, the Security Council hoped to limit the growth of the conflict and prevent it spreading to other European states with large minority populations. Furthermore, the creation of safe areas to protect displaced populations was another risk containment strategy. Though the safe areas were not designed, intended, or equipped to eradicate the risks to the endangered populations, they were favoured for their effectiveness in reducing the exodus of displaced Bosnians into other parts of Europe. Moreover, Western states hoped that the safe areas would have the dual benefit of preventing the Bosnian Serbs from consolidating their territory within Yugoslavia while satisfying the humanitarian demands of Western publics, all with a minimum deployment of combat forces.

Rwanda. In Rwanda, the unwillingness of most Western states to intervene at all meant that the French-led *Turquoise* forces were the first to implement a preventive, risk containment strategy. Because *Opération Turquoise* forces focused on managing the risks to themselves, they failed to conduct those tasks which would have significantly reduced the danger to the vulnerable population. In most cases, *Opération Turquoise* forces neither disarmed Hutu attackers nor detained those who were responsible for the genocide. The Safe Humanitarian Zone, in addition to its obvious geographical containment benefits, contained risks by reducing the possibility of confrontation between the intervention forces and the RPF.

In order to contain their risks geographically, the French-led intervention force utilised a safe haven strategy similar to the one employed by the coalition forces in Iraq. The French specifically justified the creation of the SHZ as a means to limit the spread of the crisis by minimising the number of people who fled the borders of Rwanda. Moreover, by limiting the territory conquered by the RPF and protecting former Hutu leaders, the SHZ furthered the French objective of containing the risk of losing influence in the country and among their allies in the region.

The follow-on UNAMIR II force was not tasked with eliminating the risks posed by the presence of militia-controlled camps in Rwanda, but rather with containing them. The UN force had neither the size nor the capability to protect the Hutu population from rogue Hutu elements inside the camps or the victorious Tutsi forces outside the camps. The West clearly was not interested in confronting the risks that came with securing the camps. Instead, it shifted its focus away from the perilous situation within Rwanda and

concentrated on the much safer task of dealing with the refugee crisis in the surrounding states. To the risk-conscious West, the task of providing humanitarian assistance to media-attractive refugees was preferable to the dangerous mission of disarming the Hutu camps and reintegrating the inhabitants into Rwanda.

Kosovo. In spite of its 38,000 air sorties, Operation Allied Force was an example of a minimalist, containment operation. As the case study showed, the primary objective of the intervention was not to protect the Kosovar Albanians or to bring about Kosovo's independence from Yugoslavia. Either of these results would have generated significant and unacceptable risks to NATO. Instead, NATO contained its risks by emphasising its respect for Yugoslavian sovereignty and Kosovar autonomy, as well as by constantly reiterating its minimalist, humanitarian aims. Even after it launched the air campaign, NATO member states sought to contain their risks by dedicating the least amount of resources possible. The "air only" strategy demonstrated NATO's minimalist designs, especially as NATO leaders expected to achieve their aims after a short demonstration bombing.

Though NATO did not create a geographically distinct safe area in Kosovo, it sought to contain the effects of the conflict by restricting the risk of ethnic unrest to a specific, manageable area. As the likelihood of a Yugoslav purge of Kosovar Albanians grew, NATO leaders initiated the bombing campaign in an attempt to prevent widespread ethnic cleansing which they feared would result in a massive flood of destabilising refugees into the heart of Europe and a diminution of alliance credibility and legitimacy. Although the bombing campaign failed to prevent extensive ethnic cleansing, NATO's ability to

persevere in the bombing campaign until the Kosovar refugees were allowed to return to Kosovo ultimately accomplished the same objectives.

7.2.3 Risk Distribution

In addition to surveillance and containment strategies, Western interveners dealt with risk by distributing it to others. Risk distribution took many forms in post-Cold War population protection interventions but was always used as a method of minimising the West's costs and vulnerabilities. First, interveners shared the risks by acting multilaterally. In spite of the numerous interventions justified on humanitarian grounds in the 1990s, there was not a single case of unilateral state action. Moreover, whether the action was authorised by the United Nations or by some other international organisation or regional security body, intervening states refused to act without some form of external multinational authority. Such authority granted a degree of legitimacy to their actions. Western states realised that a single state, acting unilaterally, invited international criticism and accusations of neo-colonialism, whereas a multinational force, operating under the authority of a multinational organisation, was able to defend itself more easily against such charges. Acting under the authority of a supra-national body also gave Western states a convenient scapegoat for unsuccessful or unpopular actions. During the interventions of the 1990's, states found membership in international organisations particularly useful because they could take individual credit for successful actions and blame the organisation for unsuccessful ones. Effective risk distribution also had a magnetic effect, drawing in additional participants as the risks were dispersed. The larger the coalition, the greater the international legitimacy afforded to the mission and the more it was able to deflect the international criticism.

Western interveners also distributed the risk associated with population protection efforts by utilising the capabilities of humanitarian NGOs and IGOs. Though the different approaches to population protection used by military forces and humanitarian organisations were the source of constant debate and conflict, most military forces and humanitarian organisations realised, sometimes grudgingly, that partnership was, at times, mutually beneficial. Rather than assume the full responsibility for every aspect of the endangered population's security, the military force relied on the knowledge of humanitarian NGOs to meet many of the populations' needs. With humanitarian organisations taking over much of the responsibility for the administration of the population and the distribution of goods, interveners were able to reduce the number of forces they deployed and the number of tasks they performed. At the same time, many NGOs needed the protection and the logistical capabilities afforded by the military presence.

Finally, interveners distributed risk through the use of private military companies (PMCs). PMCs were companies that contracted with intervening states to perform a wide range of military activities, many of which were considered too risky or legally questionable to be performed by the casualty-averse interveners. Western interveners hired PMCs to accomplish such tasks as training indigenous military forces, providing security for refugee camps, de-mining areas, delivering food, and supervising the withdrawal of opposition forces.

Northern Iraq. The interveners in northern Iraq used a variety of means to distribute the risks of the operation. The coalition consisted primarily of US, UK, and French forces, although ten other states also contributed various numbers of personnel and equipment to

the mission. In reality, most of these contributing states were not crucial to the operation's success, as any one of the three primary states probably could have conducted the mission alone had it chosen to do so. Working as an extended coalition, however, distributed the economic, political, and military costs among all the participants.

To distribute the risks even further, the Western interveners worked diligently to justify their efforts under Security Council Resolution 688, even though the Security Council had intentionally omitted authorisation for military intervention in the resolution. Previous efforts had been made by the interveners to secure a mandate for the intervention, but when it became clear that China would veto it, the coalition decided to make use of the existing resolution to the greatest extent possible. In addition to its pre-intervention risk distribution efforts, the coalition was eager to distribute the risks that went with providing ongoing protection to the Kurds. Consequently, they hastily transferred the mission to the UN and withdrew.

Bosnia. The effort to protect endangered populations in Bosnia was characterised by numerous levels of risk distribution. Because Western states were unwilling to intervene individually or as a Western community, they distributed the risks associated with intervention in the Balkans to the UN. Once UNPROFOR was mandated to act in Bosnia, the intervention became a broad multinational operation where risk could be distributed across the entire international community. Member States were able to take individual credit for assisting the endangered Bosnians when there were successes, and shift the blame to the organisation or other Member States when there were failures. The US and European states often blamed each other for setbacks in Bosnia. The US blamed Europe's refusal to support the "lift and strike" strategy for prolonging the conflict.

Similarly, the European states frequently blamed the US's lack of support for the Vance Owen Peace Plan and its refusal to deploy US ground forces in Bosnia for the stagnation of the conflict.² When there were operational setbacks or failures that aroused the criticism of Western publics, Western states blamed the UN for its inefficiency, and UN representatives blamed the Member States for their lack of commitment. The Secretary-General's Special Representative in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, blamed the Dutch Minister of Defence Joris Voorhoeve for insisting that airstrikes be called off as Srebrenica was being overrun when in reality, he had already refused the request prior to the Dutch Minister's phone call.³

The persistent US call to lift the arms embargo and allow the Bosnians to better defend themselves was largely a risk-distribution tactic. The US reasoned that it was more appropriate for an indigenous force fighting for its survival to bear the brunt of the combat risks than it was for foreign troops with little at stake. It was for this same reason that the US decided to employ private military companies to advise and train the Bosnian Muslim and Croat Federation forces. The US even distributed the costs of paying for the PMCs by convincing a coalition of Muslim states to pay for the training.

Rwanda. When the Security Council was unable to get Member States to contribute the necessary number of forces for its expanded mission in Rwanda, it distributed the risk by relying on a French-led coalition to protect the population on its behalf. The UN Security Council was eager to transfer the responsibility for protecting the Tutsis to any state or

² Dana H. Allin, *NATO's Balkan Interventions, Adelphi Paper 347*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2002), 24-30.

³ A/54/549, 15 November 1999, para 306. Also see Dutch rejoinder in Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, "Press Summary" of *Srebrenica: A Safe Area. Reconstruction, background, consequences, and analyses of the fall of the safe area*, #7, page 3.

coalition of states willing to do the job in hopes that such a move would shift the media attention away from its failure to act.

For their part, the French required Chapter VII authorisation from the Security Council. By intervening under Chapter VII authority, the intervening coalition was able to distribute the risks of using force back to the UN. The French, in particular, had hoped that having UN authority would deflect any accusations about its motives in Rwanda and add some credibility to its actions which, from the beginning, were intended to be temporary. Additionally, they felt it was important to intervene alongside a number of African states, even though the Africans brought few capabilities with them. By intervening alongside African troops, France hoped to deflect the risk of being charged with neo-colonialism. The French-led force further distributed the risk posed by the eventual closure of the militia-controlled IDP camps by turning it over to a UN force that was ill-prepared to assume command of the protection effort.

Kosovo. In the absence of formal UN authorisation for the mission in Kosovo, NATO member states repeatedly tried to redistribute the risks that came with the intervention by appealing to the Security Council's earlier determination that the situation in Kosovo presented a threat to peace and security. Without the UN to blame for operational failures or to provide international legitimacy for the intervention, NATO members relied more heavily on alliance unity as a medium for distributing the risk associated with action. As long as NATO members were unified in their approach, their intervention maintained a degree of defensible legitimacy, and member states could more easily counter the charge of neo-imperialism.

Fighting within the construct of NATO also spread the risks to those NATO member states that would not have contributed to the military effort otherwise and may have publicly disapproved of the tactics being used. By intervening as an alliance, all NATO member states had a stake in the NATO victory, a prospect which restrained dissent and disagreement from otherwise non-participatory states.

NATO's desire to distribute risk was also evident in its quest to transfer responsibility for Kosovo to the UN as soon as Yugoslavia agreed to meet NATO's terms. Post-war UN involvement was key to NATO's being able to distribute the risk associated with the long-term administration of Kosovo and the eventual resolution of its political status.

NATO further distributed risk by making extensive use of NGOs and PMCs in Kosovo. NGOs provided much of the expertise regarding humanitarian assistance, resettlement of populations, and temporary administration of refugee camps. In many cases, Western governments channelled funds directly to NGOs rather than operating through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) or UNHCR, so that they could exercise a degree of influence over the administration of their "nationalised" refugee camps.⁴ The Western alliance even employed a consortium of NGOs called the International Rescue Committee to conduct airdrops of food parcels to needy populations so that it could avoid exposing its pilots to dangers it considered disproportionate to the risks it faced.⁵ NGOs retained a critical role in the post-war administration of Kosovo as well.⁶

⁴ Michael Pugh, "Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31(2), (Sage Publications, 2000), 235.

⁵ Christopher Coker, *Globalisation*, 56.

⁶ Pugh, "Civil-Military Relations", 235.

In a further effort to distribute risk, NATO used PMCs to tackle particularly dangerous or politically unpalatable jobs such as defusing landmines and training resistance fighters. The US utilised PMCs throughout its involvement in Kosovo. Prior to the launch of Operation Allied Force, the US contracted out its role in the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission to a PMC called DynCorp.⁷ Once the operation had begun, MPRI, a PMC used extensively in Bosnia, was used to train KLA forces inside Albania for fighting in Kosovo.⁸ At the end of the operation, the US again utilised DynCorp to oversee the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from the region.⁹

7.3 CONSEQUENCES OF A RISK APPROACH

The manner in which the West identified and managed the risks associated with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s resulted in a number of new risks and challenged various “rules” of the international system. Both of these developments had negative effects on Western states.

7.3.1 Generation of New Risks

The West’s utilisation of minimalist and preventive strategies and techniques to reduce risks rather than eliminate them led to the emergence of negative side effects or “boomerang risks” which often proved more dangerous than those the interveners initially sought to avoid. These included increased risks to the interveners’ safety, credibility, unity, and future security, as well as risks to international and regional stability. One of the most common side effects resulted from the incompatibility between the risk

⁷ Coker, *Globalisation*, 55-6.

⁸ Wayne Madsen, “Mercenaries in Kosovo: The U.S. connection to the KLA.(includes related article comparing United States foreign policy in Central America and Kosovo)”, *The Progressive*, August 1999, http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m1295/8_6/55309049/print.jhtml. Accessed 18 July 2003.

assessments of the Western interveners and those of the endangered populations. The West perceived the potential hazards to its self-interests as sub-survival risks that required managing. Consequently, it employed the minimalist techniques described above. The indigenous combatants, however, were fighting for their survival. As Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal pointed out in 1993,

An ethnic group fighting for survival will be willing to pay almost any price and to suffer enormous losses. Having little at stake in the status quo, the ethnic group may also be willing to break any rule, convention or agreement if this will further its cause. For guerrilla movements, survival can provide a justification for almost anything.¹⁰

Oftentimes, these incongruous assessments created a great deal of friction between the interveners and the local populations and resulted in a more dangerous situation for the interveners. In a number of cases, Western interveners were intentionally targeted by combatants and occasionally by the people they went to protect.

Negative side effects in the form of new risks to the interveners' self-interests, also resulted from the West's decision to manage risks rather than eliminate them. A risk that is not finally resolved will either require a long-term commitment, which can often be costly and difficult for a democracy to sustain, or the acceptance that the unresolved risk may recur in a more dangerous form sometime in the future.

Northern Iraq. In Iraq, numerous boomerang risks occurred as a result of the minimalist, preventive strategy implemented by the interveners. Unlike the Western coalition, which was devoted to managing sub-survival risks to itself, the Kurds were fighting for their survival against a hostile Iraqi regime. After suffering at the hands of the Iraqis for many years, the Kurds were dissatisfied with the coalition's initial offer of

⁹ Ibid.

food, medicine, and temporary security. Their concerns were centred on their future survival under Saddam Hussein after the coalition had withdrawn. As a result, the Kurds were willing to jeopardise the lives of non-combatants in order to secure coalition guarantees for their security. For example, when the coalition threatened to leave Iraq without a guarantee in place, the Kurds countered with the promise to begin another mass evacuation to the Turkish border, even though they knew this would lead to the death or injury of a number of non-combatants. Kurdish leaders reasoned that endangering the lives of women and children might be necessary in order to keep the coalition engaged in their long-term security. The Kurdish warning exasperated the coalition leaders and jeopardised the coalition unity as key European members wanted to stay until an agreement was reached and the Americans were determined to withdraw.

The most obvious side effect of the West's decision to manage the crisis in northern Iraq was that the Kurdish security question remained largely unresolved when the intervention ended, and re-emerged as a troublesome issue at various times over the next twelve years. Because the US, the UK, and, for a time, France, continued to patrol the NFZ under the justification that it was an operation to safeguard the Kurds, the alliance faced difficult questions when Iraqi ground forces attacked Kurdish towns and villages or Turkish air and ground forces launched attacks into the area and coalition aircraft did nothing to prevent it. Although the NFZ was technically only intended to ban Iraqi aircraft from being used against the Kurds, this obvious "loophole" exposed the West's primary NFZ objective as an operation to contain Saddam Hussein.

¹⁰ Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts", *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, 138.

Finally, the coalition's minimalist approach towards the Kurdish predicament in 1991 also generated side effects that came to fruition in 2003 when the US- and UK-led effort against Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, sought Kurdish military assistance in northern Iraq. As a result of the Kurds' perception of the coalition's actions (and inaction) in 1991, the Kurds were far less willing to risk their lives for ambiguous promises from Western states in the 2003 operation. Though the Kurdish *peshmerga* forces eventually fought alongside coalition forces and defeated Iraqi troops in northern Iraq, the final resolution of the Kurdish security question in Iraq remains unanswered and, therefore, a potential source of future risks.

Bosnia. In Bosnia, the West also experienced negative side effects as a result of its managerial approach to the humanitarian crisis. Like in the intervention in Iraq, some side effects resulted from the conflicting perspectives held by the interveners and combatants over their assessments of the hazards. Western states emphasised minimalist, avoidance strategies that were proportional to the limited risks they sought to manage. In contrast, both the Bosniac and the Bosnian Serb forces viewed the conflict in terms of their survival and were, therefore far more willing than Western states to suffer and inflict casualties in their quest for victory. Consequently, UNPROFOR, which relied on the consent of the combatants to protect the population, was often unable to carry out its mission effectively, resulting in several humiliating and tragic events.

UNPROFOR's ineffectiveness was most vividly demonstrated by its failure to protect the non-combatants in Srebrenica and Zepa. Although the West employed the minimalist safe area strategy in an attempt to preserve its credibility at the lowest possible cost, it suffered a devastating blow to its credibility as a result of these dramatic failures. The

collapse of the safe areas and the subsequent deaths of thousands of Bosnian men and boys in the presence of Western peacekeepers exposed the West's self-interested priorities and half-hearted commitments in a way that would not quickly be forgotten, regardless of how many future "successes" it might achieve.

In a more tangible way, the Dutch government experienced boomerang effects from the collapse of Srebrenica seven years after the disaster occurred. After the official Dutch report on the Srebrenica tragedy revealed that the Dutch government was partially to blame for the area's collapse, the entire Dutch cabinet resigned. Prime Minister Wim Kok claimed that he was taking responsibility for the Dutch role in failing to protect Srebrenica's population.¹¹ The Dutch military, which prided itself in its expertise in humanitarian operations also suffered a serious blow to its credibility, and some individual Dutchbat soldiers still suffer from serious psychological problems as a result of their experiences in Srebrenica.¹²

Another negative side effect occurred as a result of the West's decision to bolster the protective capacity of the safe areas by allowing Bosniac military and paramilitary forces to operate within them. Rather than reducing the population's danger from external attack, the presence of the Bosniac fighters actually increased it by providing the Bosnian Serbs with a justification to attack. Moreover, these Bosniac fighters confronted UNPROFOR directly on several occasions. UNPROFOR's avoidance strategies angered the Bosnian forces and led to accusations of cowardice and even hostile engagements resulting in the deaths of several Bosnian and UN soldiers.

¹¹ "Dutch MPs debate cabinet resignation," BBC Online, 17 April 2002, Accessed 15 July 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1934000/1934661.stm.

Ultimately, the minimalist risk management approach of Western interveners in Bosnia did long-term damage to ethnic reconciliation in the region. The massacre, torture, and rape of thousands of people that resulted from the West's failure to protect the designated safe areas exacerbated ethnic tension and provided fresh justification for revenge and future hostilities. Consequently, Western troops currently tasked with maintaining stability in the region are likely to be deployed on Bosnian soil for years to come.

Rwanda. As a result of their inaction and ineffectiveness in responding to the genocide in Rwanda, the credibility of the UN and many Western Member States was seriously damaged, not only among Rwandans, but with whole international community. The UN's "Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda" exposed the West's culpability in stark terms. The report found that blame for the inaction rested, among others, on the Security Council and the Member States. Belgium specifically received a great deal of negative publicity for withdrawing its forces after ten of its soldiers were killed. The Belgian inquiry into the Rwanda debacle was critical of the Belgian general staff, Belgian political officials, and the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the UN and UNAMIR. The report concluded that they all shared "responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people".¹³ In numerous inquiries and after-action reports, including those from the UN, the Organisation of African Unity, and Human Rights Watch, the French were also heavily criticised for their inadequate response and were accused of assisting those who orchestrated the genocide. Though the French have strongly denied these accusations and defended *Opération Turquoise*, they have been unable to distance themselves entirely

¹² See "Dutch Report", Nos. 14 and 15.

¹³ Koenraad Van Brabant, "Security and Protection in Peacekeeping: A Critical Reading of the Belgian Inquiry into Events in Rwanda in 1994", *International Peacekeeping*, Spring 1999, Vol. 6, No. 1, (London: Frank Cass), 143-53

from the conclusions. Similarly, US credibility suffered as a result of its inaction in Rwanda and was specifically named in numerous reports as bearing a large share of the responsibility for allowing the genocide to continue unabated.

There were additional negative side effects that resulted from the minimalist manner in which UNAMIR II dealt with the Hutu-filled IDP camps within Rwanda. The West's assessment of the hazards generated by the IDP camps was at odds with the new Tutsi government's assessment. This incongruity eventually generated boomerang risks to the interveners' safety and the West's credibility. The new Tutsi government viewed the IDP camps to be threats to its security. It, therefore, favoured a strategy of threat elimination rather than risk management. Consequently, when the interveners proved unwilling to police the camps in a way that would lead to a resolution of the government's security threat, the Tutsi government acted forcefully to close the camps in a manner that was deemed barbaric by many observers. In addition to claiming the lives of innocent people and jeopardising the safety of the UN forces, these incidents harmed the credibility of the UN and the Western states, which once again demonstrated their unwillingness to act on the population's behalf.

As in Bosnia, the magnitude of the killings in Rwanda, which were facilitated by the West's self-interested approach, greatly decreased the likelihood of achieving regional reconciliation and normalisation in the near future. Moreover, the interveners' risk management techniques contributed to the refugee crisis and subsequent cholera epidemic in Zaire as well as to the long-term instability in the African Great Lakes region as a whole. As Hutu government officials, *genocidaires*, military leaders, and scores of Hutus were allowed to escape across the borders into surrounding states and massive refugee

camps, the already unstable economic, cultural, and ethnic balance of the region was thrown into turmoil. This has contributed to the series of bitter wars that have further devastated and destabilised the region. In fact, the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) can be partially attributed to the minimalist, risk management decisions made by the West concerning Rwanda. The ongoing crisis in the DRC has the potential to result in another genocidal outburst, which could once again force the West to face difficult risk decisions regarding intervention.

Kosovo. The most obvious side effect of the West's failure to resolve the status of Kosovo following Operation Allied Force was that, in order to ensure stability in the region, Western states were forced to deploy large numbers of soldiers to a dangerous environment and will have to sustain that commitment for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, as the bulk of Kosovar Albanians still desire to be independent from Yugoslavia, the difficult question of the province's status will eventually have to be answered. When the issue surfaces again, it will bring with it the renewed possibility of warfare and regional instability.

NATO suffered a number of other side effects as a result of its minimalist managerial actions in Kosovo. Ironically, NATO's efforts to preserve its relevance as a security organisation may have actually decreased the likelihood that it will wage war as an alliance in the future. Although NATO ultimately forced Milosevic to agree to its terms and could, therefore, claim a degree of success, the process of fighting as an alliance, especially for sub-survival risks, was far more difficult than NATO had imagined, resulting in a great deal of strain among its members. In spite of previous war-planning exercises and fifty years of refining its standard operating procedures, going to war as an

alliance in which nineteen countries had an equal voice proved to be an arduous task that many NATO states will probably try to avoid in the future.

As in the other Western interventions of the 1990s, the incongruity between the risk assessments of the interveners and the endangered population carried negative ramifications for the West. NATO employed methods consistent with their sub-survival assessment of the risks, while the Kosovars were fighting for their freedom and, in many cases, their physical survival. By refusing to deploy ground forces, NATO had to rely on the KLA to battle Yugoslav forces and protect populations on the ground in Kosovo. Consequently, NATO legitimised the KLA and many of its methods by default.

As a result of the Kosovars' survival perspective, they were far more willing to inflict and sustain casualties in their fight against Yugoslav forces than was NATO. Furthermore, they utilised tactics that were deemed barbarous by many within the West. When peaceful resistance proved to be ineffective in gaining international assistance, the KLA adopted a strategy designed to gain Western media attention by inciting Yugoslav forces to engage in retaliatory and indiscriminate attacks against innocent Kosovar civilians. In fact, the KLA often launched attacks on Yugoslav military and special police forces knowing that there would be reprisal killings against the Kosovar population and hoping that such atrocities would arouse the West into action. KLA fighters also engaged in terrorist tactics, brutally killed or terrorised suspected Yugoslav collaborators, and financed their efforts with illicit activities such as the sale of drugs. These tactics blurred the distinction between violator and victim, making it very difficult for NATO member states to maintain public support and alliance unity. Additionally, by relying on the KLA to fight the ground battle, NATO was faced with the difficult, post-conflict task of

converting some of the KLA into a reliable peacetime entity and integrating the rest back into society. These tasks, which are still ongoing, have proven to be extremely difficult and dangerous.

NATO's refusal to commit ground forces in Kosovo also exposed its low casualty threshold for sub-survival risks thereby inviting future exploitation and ultimately defeating the purposes of its own actions. For example, the preservation and enhancement of its credibility was a key motivation for NATO's intervention; however, NATO's refusal to consider using ground forces may have actually weakened it. Opponents such as those in Kosovo who operate outside of a state infrastructure and with a willingness to suffer casualties are relatively invulnerable to aerial bombardment. Hence, this casualty-averse strategy on the part of the West could actually encourage some states or rogue elements to defy the alliance's warnings and disregard NATO's technological superiority in the future. Similarly, it will reinforce the impression that an intervention can be deterred or spoiled simply by spilling NATO blood. Anti-Western groups such as extremist terrorist groups frequently cite the West's unwillingness to suffer casualties as being a key reason for their confidence of achieving victory over Western forces. In this sense, NATO's risk-averse managerial strategies may have actually increased the danger to NATO forces in the future.

Finally, NATO's struggle to manage risk through Operation Allied Force exposed numerous inadequacies in European military capabilities.¹⁴ Since this exposure, European members of NATO have been under great pressure to increase their defence budgets and upgrade their forces and equipment. European decision-makers have since

¹⁴ For an excellent article on the European "capabilities gap", see David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and The European Union", *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, 97-128.

had the difficult task of balancing these external pressures with the expectations of domestic publics who have often been opposed to any significant increases in defence spending in the post-Cold War environment.¹⁵

7.3.2 Alteration of Established Rules

The West's identification and subsequent management of risk during the 1990's challenged a number of previously accepted "rules" or international norms. Among others, issues such as state sovereignty and non-intervention, the rights of refugees, and the protection of IDPs have all been affected by the West's risk perspective. In a number of cases, interveners unintentionally set new precedents for acceptable international practice. Usually these changes resulted from the implementation of *ad hoc* measures designed by the interveners to manage a specific risk, with little or no forethought to its potential effect on the future of international relations. As a result of the confusion generated by the West's unorthodox managerial methods, international "ordering principles" are, in many ways, in a state of flux with some actors clinging to the old methods of conducting relations and others embracing the new. The existence of these multiple and ambiguous rule structures has generated tension and confusion among international actors.

Northern Iraq. The most direct challenge to international norms resulting from the coalition's intervention in Iraq involves the issue of state sovereignty. Though numerous analysts have concluded that the coalition action in northern Iraq on behalf of the Kurdish population complied with the existing norms of state sovereignty because of Iraq's special post-war status, the humanitarian justifications for Operation Provide Comfort created a

¹⁵ Ibid., 120-22.

public demand and set a precedent for future interventions justified on humanitarian principles. Regardless of the West's other motives, it justified its actions as a mission to protect an endangered population from the abusive treatment of its home state. Thus, the coalition action effectively narrowed the scope of what could legitimately be defined as a state's internal affairs. In fact, the resurgence of the "sovereignty with responsibility" movement mentioned in Chapter 2 can largely be traced to the coalition's actions in this intervention.

The risk management approach of Operation Provide Comfort also had a major effect on the manner in which the international community handled displaced people. Prior to the situation in northern Iraq, neighbouring states were expected to admit refugees and provide for their welfare. When Turkey's refusal to allow entry to the fleeing Kurds was supported by the West, it set a precedent for other states to refuse entry to future waves of refugees. Turkey's refusal, coupled with the extensive media coverage of the exposed Kurds, forced the coalition to consider new ways of dealing with endangered populations *in situ*. Delineating an area within the home state and declaring it "safe" was the chosen method. Variations of the Iraqi safe haven, such as safe areas, safe corridors, and humanitarian space were used throughout the 1990s and are still in limited use at the time of this writing.

Keeping endangered populations in their home states had a dramatic effect on the international community's ability to care for them. Though refugees had certain legal protections as well as a UN organisation created specifically to deal with their unique challenges and needs, internally displaced people (IDPs) did not. Moreover, *in situ* protection made gaining access to the populations very difficult for UN organisations and

humanitarian NGOs, as the operational environments within the home states were often far more dangerous for their workers than those in neighbouring states. In many ways, the unique problems associated with IDPs continue to cause grave concern for the international community.

Bosnia. The goal of Western states in the Security Council to protect endangered Bosnian populations within the confines of Bosnia reinforced and expanded the changes resulting from northern Iraq. The legitimacy of non-combatant protection afforded by Operation Provide Comfort gave the UN Security Council a useful precedent for a minimalist intervention in the Bosnian crisis. The difference with Bosnia was that the endangered population had not been explicitly denied access to refuge in foreign states. Rather than the safe areas being a response to a closed border as had been the case in Iraq, the safe areas in Bosnia were used as a proactive, preventive strategy to keep the Bosnians in place. In a very real sense, the safe area concept, as applied in Bosnia to the protection of the population, was a matter of convenience instead of necessity. Keeping the endangered population within Bosnia was advantageous to Bosnia's European neighbours who were already suffering politically and economically from the influx of Balkan refugees. It was also desirable for the Bosnian government and Western states because safe areas prevented a Bosnian Serb consolidation of territory without the deployment of large numbers of Western combat forces. The emphasis on *in situ* protection in Bosnia resulted in the expansion of UNHCR's activities to include the provision of assistance to IDPs. It also set a precedent for receiving states eager to reduce their responsibilities with regard to displaced people to demand alternative classifications for displaced people. As Michael Pugh observed in a June 2000 article, *in situ* protection eventually led to the toleration of

various alternatives to refugee status – employing such terms as ‘temporary protection’ or ‘humanitarian status’ – and to adopt the concept of ‘humanitarian protection’ in camps in (often poor) countries adjacent to conflicts as a substitute for asylum seeking and resettlement in wealthier countries.¹⁶

As these new rule structures and alternative classifications emerge, the endangered populations are the ones who suffer most from the confusion and inconsistency that follows.

The Bosnian safe areas also challenged the long-standing “rules” associated with peacekeeping missions. Though the UNPROFOR safe area mission began as a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission with the formal consent of the recognised Bosnian government, consent from all the parties to the dispute was variable at best. Moreover, UNPROFOR’s mission often meant that it was perceived by the combatants as being partial to one side of the conflict. This perception greatly increased UNPROFOR’s vulnerability, yet UNPROFOR did not have the means or the mandate to defend itself or the population under its charge adequately. The West eventually acknowledged that the unique difficulties surrounding intrastate conflicts limited the utility of traditional peacekeeping “rules”. Consequently, Western intervention forces that deployed after Bosnia generally demanded and were granted more robust military capabilities and mandates.

The West’s decision to manage risks rather than fight a war led to changes in the realm of international justice. Recognising the need to bring those responsible for the humanitarian tragedies to justice, the Security Council authorised the formation of the first international criminal tribunal for the purpose of trying suspected violators of international humanitarian law. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former

¹⁶ Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations”, 233.

Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 and was still in operation at the time of this writing. The ICTY provided a precedent for setting up a similar tribunal in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide in 1994 and gave impetus to the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002.

Rwanda. The minimalist risk management operations in Rwanda had a number of rule-altering effects. First, they exposed the inadequacy of the Genocide Convention. Rwanda clearly demonstrated that states could always find a reason not to act if it was in their interest to do so. In spite of their first-hand evidence, Western representatives on the Security Council, led by the US and UK, argued for weeks over the legal definition of the word “genocide” while Rwandans were being slaughtered. Western states were hesitant to apply it to the catastrophe in Rwanda for fear that such a description would obligate them to deploy military forces to the conflict. Ironically, the shame produced by Western inaction in this case may actually move Western states to take firmer action in future humanitarian crises. This was certainly the case in the EU’s decision to deploy a protection force to the DRC and may result in a similar US force being sent to Liberia, though this remains to be seen. In 1998, President Clinton promised Rwandans that the US was developing the means to recognise and respond to potential genocides before they happened, and the UN Secretary-General followed suit with his pleas to the UN General Assembly in 1999 and 2000 to reach a consensus for action in situations involving “gross and systematic violations of human rights”.¹⁷

Despite their actual self-interested motives and ineffectiveness in carrying out the protection mission, the UN and French humanitarian justifications for intervening in

Rwanda reinforced the legitimacy of protecting individuals from state-sponsored atrocities. Since that time, individual human beings have increasingly been viewed as legitimate objects of international concern. The failure of the West to protect the Rwandans during the genocide was a major catalyst in the human security and the "sovereignty with responsibility" movements of the 1990s.

Additionally, the crisis in Rwanda resulted in a reconsideration of the rules governing Security Council membership during exceptional circumstances. The Rwandese representative to the UN, a member of the genocidal Hutu regime, coincidentally held a seat on the Security Council during the operation. Since there were no provisions to remove a sitting member in exceptional circumstances, the Rwandese representative was able to keep his seat on the Council, maintain his access to the Council's private discussions, and vote on the relevant draft resolutions. As a result of this situation, the UN's independent inquiry into the Rwanda debacle recommended the following: "Further study should be given to the possibility to suspend participation of the representative of a Member State on the Security Council in exceptional circumstances such as the crisis in Rwanda".¹⁸ Though this recommendation has not been acted upon formally, it may yet lead to a change in the way a similar situation is handled in the future.

Kosovo. NATO's intervention in Kosovo challenged a number of international norms. Most dramatic was NATO's decision to intervene without UN authorisation. NATO's unauthorised actions challenged the prevailing understanding of state sovereignty even

¹⁷ Kofi A. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", Address to the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 20 Sept 1999, in *The Question of Intervention*, Statements of the Secretary-General, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1999), 39.

¹⁸ *UN Rwanda Report*, Recommendation #12, page 55.

more than previous operations because NATO intervened against the recognised state authority and without the tacit approval of all the permanent members of the Security Council. Yugoslavia filed charges with the International Court of Justice against NATO member states calling their actions illegal under international law. Though the ICJ ruled that it “manifestly” lacked jurisdiction in the cases of the US and Spain and lacked “*prima facie*” jurisdiction in the remaining cases, Yugoslavia’s legal challenge bolstered the arguments of those in favour of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and reinforced the US’s determination to assign comprehensive conditions to its support of the ICC.¹⁹

Perhaps more significantly, NATO’s unilateral actions in Kosovo seemed a precursor to the US-led coalition action against Iraq in 2003, which had neither UN nor NATO authorisation. Though the missions and justifications for military action were quite different in Kosovo and Iraq, the decision to act unilaterally in Iraq was probably made easier by having done so in Kosovo less than five years earlier. While the effects of this action in Kosovo on the long-term credibility and relevance of the UN remain to be seen, the West’s use of humanitarian justifications to act without Security Council authorisation could become a precedent for other states or coalitions to act without UN authorisation in the future.

In terms of the operation’s implementation, NATO’s air-only strategy challenged the conventional wisdom that airpower alone could not win a war. While many commentators have convincingly pointed out that there were other factors that led to Yugoslavia’s eventual compliance with the Military Technical Agreement regarding

¹⁹ See International Court of Justice, Press Communiqué 9/33, 2 June 1999, <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyus/iyusframe.htm> and Press Communiqué 2002/10, 22 March 2002, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-10_yugo_20020322.htm. Both Accessed 18 July 2003.

Kosovo, a host of others, such as the British military historian Robert Keegan, credited airpower with the victory.²⁰ To a great extent, Westerners saw Kosovo as proof that the use of ground troops often created unnecessary risks for interveners who possessed superior technology.

This belief reinforced the West's reliance on precision technology as well as its expectation that wars could be fought with zero friendly casualties—a standard that military planners and political decision-makers will find very difficult to meet in the future. Moreover, though the primary benefit of using precision technology was to reduce the vulnerability of NATO aircrews and keep public support high for the operation, the results of these highly technical strikes raised the standard for judging collateral damage to an impossibly high level. All of these developments—the reliance on precision technology, the expectation of a casualty-free war, and the exacting standards of operational effectiveness regarding collateral damage will inevitably limit the West's ability to wage war effectively in the future.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has answered the last of the three secondary questions posed at the beginning of this thesis by arguing that the actions of Western states in the protection interventions of the 1990s can best be explained using principles from risk theory. Using a framework of analysis drawn from this theory, it showed that these interventions were more than merely failed attempts at protecting populations due to the inexperience or inability of

²⁰ John Keegan, "Please Mr Blair, Never Take Such a Risk Again," *London Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 1999, Issue 1472.
http://www.dailylegaph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=%2Farchive%2F1999%2F06%2F06%2Fwkee06.html&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=411045. Accessed 15 July 2003.

Western states. On the contrary, they were logical responses to hazards viewed from the West's post-Cold War risk perspective. Using multiple examples from each of the case studies, this chapter demonstrated that, as Western states strove to safeguard their self-interests under the guise of population protectors, they were acting in accordance with the five key characteristics that identify a risk society. Far more than half-hearted attempts to protect populations, or *sui generis* responses that defied comparison, these interventions represented exercises in risk management.

Faced with the uncertain hazards of the new post-Cold War security environment, Western states utilised experts to culturally-construct and prioritise future risks arising from the humanitarian crises. Based on these risk assessments, they implemented preventive strategies using minimalist methods in an effort to manage rather than eliminate the risks they faced. Finally, because of their managerial approach to the hazards, Western states suffered deleterious side effects altered long-established norms, thereby increasing uncertainty and, with it, the potential for conflict in the new security environment.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter One, this thesis proposed to offer an explanation for why the West, given its abundant capabilities, intervened in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s in a way that failed to protect the populations. By breaking the primary question down into three secondary questions, analysing four protection interventions from the 1990s, and borrowing concepts from risk theory, this thesis has reached a number of conclusions. The answers to the first two secondary questions were exposed by the inconsistencies between the West's stated objectives for the protection interventions and the methods it used to achieve them. Such an incongruity between motives and means revealed that the West's priority objective was to safeguard its own self-interests rather than to protect the lives of endangered populations. This conclusion was further supported by the fact that the West had the military capability to protect populations if it had possessed the intent to do so. Unfortunately for the vulnerable non-combatants, population protection was neither the West's primary objective nor its standard for success. Instead, the West intervened to counter the negative effects generated by the humanitarian crises on issues such as Western credibility, alliance unity, domestic support, and geographic and political stability. As the case studies demonstrated, these effects were only marginally connected with the populations' protection. Consequently, populations were protected only as long as, and to the extent that, the West's self-interest coincided with the success of that protection.

While the primacy of Western self-interest is an important and necessary conclusion to draw, it does not further one's understanding of the complex and seemingly contradictory strategies used by the West in pursuit of their self-interests. Hence, self-interest is not a sufficient answer to the primary question of this thesis. The case studies revealed the need for an explanatory framework that could shed light on the manner in which the West sought to protect its self-interests in the uncertain post-Cold War security environment. Chapter 7 provided the framework, using the principles of risk theory to answer the last of the secondary questions of this thesis. It showed how Western states acted as risk societies, preserving their self-interests through the application of a risk management strategy designed to manage multiple, uncertain, and future hazards.

Chapter 7 demonstrated the applicability of the risk society framework to post-Cold War Western states by showing how the West identified the hazards associated with humanitarian crises from a risk perspective. Faced with the numerous uncertainties surrounding these crises, the West relied on a host of experts to assess the possible future dangers to itself associated with either action or inaction. Once the West had assessed and prioritised the risks, it implemented minimalist, preventive, and avoidance strategies to manage them in proportion to the severity of the hazard they posed. Finally, because the West managed its risks rather than eliminating them, it suffered from the negative side effects and destabilising rule alterations that are common to risk societies.

In summation, the answer to why the West intervened in humanitarian crises in a way that failed to protect populations in the 1990s is simply this: as a risk society, the West deemed the costs required to protect populations to be disproportionately high in comparison to the risks the endangered populations posed to the West.

This conclusion has a number of implications for the international community, the West, and the populations threatened by intrastate violence. The remainder of the chapter briefly examines some of these implications and recommends courses of action that could lead to more successful interventions, both for Western risk societies and those populations in need of their help.

8.1 IMPLICATIONS OF RISK SOCIETIES

It is useful to consider some of the implications that the West's transition to a risk society could have on a number of issues. This section briefly considers the applicability of the risk framework to Western actions after the 1990s. In addition, it examines some possible implications of risk societies on Western unity, endangered populations seeking protection, and future protection interventions.

8.1.1 Risk Applicability Beyond the 1990s

This thesis is not suggesting that the West will permanently remain a risk society or that the perspective and language of "risk" will forever eclipse the traditional threat-based perspective of the West. Far from representing a permanent transformation, risk societies could vanish tomorrow if a sufficient threat emerged that rendered risks inconsequential.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, some scholars argue that terrorism has become a threat of sufficient magnitude to transform the West back into a community of threat-based societies. Certainly in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and Washington D.C., Al Qaeda seemed to pose such a threat. Al

Qaeda demonstrated its intent and its capability to damage the West in dramatic fashion, and vowed to continue its attack. At that time, the organisation had a geographical base of operations and the support of a state government, both of which were vulnerable to the West's military capability. Afghanistan's Taliban government and Al Qaeda's cave network presented certain, identifiable targets that lent themselves to the West's traditional threat elimination strategy. Consequently, the West initially reacted to the terrorist hazard much more like a threat than a risk.

The West has already shown its inability to continue this approach due to the decentralised nature of terrorist activity. Terrorists generally employ tactics that utilise dispersed cells and informal networks which make threat-elimination strategies difficult to implement. One of the prime objectives of terrorism is to generate anxiety within the target state so that its inhabitants lose faith in the state's ability to protect them. Terrorists accomplish this by shrouding themselves and their actions in uncertainty. Consequently, effective terrorists are able to generate massive anxiety in the target population using only a few sporadic incidents. One or two carefully planned operations can significantly affect the degree of vulnerability a person or a population feels. Moreover, terrorists can wage an effective campaign without a large support structure or a defined base of operations.

The West's ability to target terrorists changed drastically once the Taliban government fell and the remnants of Al Qaeda scattered. Now the West is desperately trying to find and disrupt Al Qaeda attacks before they occur. In many ways, Western states are chasing probabilities, and there is a general recognition among them that the "war on terror" may never end. Rather than seeking to eliminate terrorism, the West is simply trying to reduce it to a tolerable level. Unlike its campaign in Afghanistan, success is

now measured by “non-events”.¹ Every day that is free from a terrorist attack is considered a success for the West’s managerial strategy. These ambiguous successes do not inspire confidence in the Western public. Western citizens arguably feel more anxious now than ever before because of the uncertainty that pervades their daily existence. Threat warnings or conditions are broadcast routinely, bridges are closed, and airports are patrolled by soldiers in tanks; yet these efforts do very little to help people feel secure as they wait for the next attack. For these reasons, terrorism is far more likely to entrench the West’s risk-focused approach than it is to reverse it.

Irrespective of the effects of terrorism on the West, other threats may eventually emerge that subordinate the risk perspective to a secondary position. History may well demonstrate that the early post-Cold War period in the West was an anomaly—a temporary period in which one adversary had yet to be replaced by another, leaving the West in an historically rare hyper-dominant position. Then again, it is possible that the predominance of the risk perspective will continue for many years to come. Whatever the outcome, it is useful to consider the implications of risk societies on Western unity, endangered populations, sovereignty, and protection interventions.

8.1.2 Western Unity

Western societies will remain risk societies as long as the priority hazards which confront them remain uncertain and pervasive. Western risk societies are not, however, necessarily united or in agreement with one another, even in their response to the same potential hazard. In fact, a risk-dominated outlook toward emerging hazards could actually be a catalyst to Western disunity and fragmentation. As the perception of risk is

¹Yee-Kuang Heng, “Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A Risk Management Exercise in War Clothing?”, *Security Dialogue* (33), no. 2, (June 2000):228.

constructed culturally, different societies often disagree as to the nature and magnitude of a particular hazard within the context of a given crisis. The greater the degree of uncertainty associated with a hazard, the more likely it is to generate conflicting conceptions of risk, and, therefore, dissimilar strategies for its management. Rather than the West becoming a unified Risk Society or a regional cosmopolis as some have argued, it is far more probable that it will be, at best, a sort of federation or community of risk societies that comes together when there is common agreement and common benefit, and separates when there is not. Without a unifying self-interest or shared assessment of the risk, societies will pursue their own courses of action according to their own constructions of the risks they face. Because of this, and contrary to Ulrich Beck's prediction of a risk-based cosmopolitan society, risk societies will probably be as fractious and divisive as ever. A hint of this fragmentation is already evident as European states seem increasingly divergent, both from one another and from their allies across the Atlantic, on issues as wide ranging as foreign and security policy,² the future of European governance, the control of asylum seekers, and the sale of beef.

Within these risk societies, Western populations are becoming more anxious and doubtful as new catastrophes confirm their suspicions and new dooms are prophesied by legions of experts. Greater anxiety and doubt increase the West's ambivalence toward endangered people in other parts of the world. As Western populations feel more personally vulnerable to unknown dangers, they grow more inwardly focused in an attempt to find ways that reduce their exposure to risks. Consequently, they are less committed to particular courses of action that require sacrifice in the face of uncertainty. This trend is reinforced by the fact that now, unlike in the early 1990s, members of risk societies have

² For an excellent discussion of European-US divergence, see Christopher Coker, *Empires in Conflict: The Growing Rift Between Europe and the United States*, Whitehall Paper 58, (London: the Royal United

the opportunity to consider the poor results of past protection attempts. With the humanitarian results of the interventions being as unimpressive as they are and the negative consequences as dangerous, Western publics may be less committed to population protection interventions than ever before.

At the same time, the Western public is growing increasingly aware that the unbounded nature of risk means that distant dangers have local consequences and, therefore, must be addressed. For example, though population abuse may occur miles away from Western states, Western publics are aware that such abuses often produce floods of refugees who harm the local economy, destabilise the region by upsetting the ethnic and religious balance, or disperse foreign criminals and potential terrorists worldwide. In response, the public is aware that something must be done both to contain the atrocities and soothe its troubled conscience. It expresses its verbal outrage over the humanitarian atrocities and demands international protection for the population, followed by an equally intense demand to stay out of any armed conflict that endangers friendly soldiers for causes that do not directly threaten Western interests. As long as risk societies exist, the public will demand that the West provide endangered populations with *protection*, when it is actually only prepared to accept the cost of providing them with *assistance*. The distinction between the two is critical. Faced with these ambivalent demands, Western decision-makers will most likely continue to manage the crises using minimalist *ad hoc* measures, which will challenge international norms and increase the uncertainty within international society.

8.1.3 Endangered Populations

The increasingly reinforced rhetorical linkage of state sovereignty with state responsibility, combined with the deepening entrenchment of the West's risk avoidance approach to intervention in practice has had a devastating effect on populations in need of protection. Encouraged by the international community's protection rhetoric, the endangered populations have been led to expect a greater amount of Western involvement in their situations than the West has been prepared to give. They hear of the international outrage, the condemnatory remarks, and the pledges for international action regarding their need for protection. They see and talk with high-level delegations sent to document humanitarian abuses and formulate plans for action. They witness the delivery of large quantities of food and medicines and come into contact with numerous NGO representatives with newly established bases in their areas. In desperation, the endangered populations look to the West as saviours and protectors. They believe the international community's assurances of lessons learned from past mistakes and consider themselves fortunate to be objects of international concern. In so doing, they make themselves more vulnerable by remaining within the borders of their own states and congregating in large masses near aid camps and "protection" zones.

Only then do they grasp the reality of the "protection" provided by risk societies. They find that military forces sent to assist them, if any are sent, are too few and too constrained by mandates and rules of engagement to provide real protection. For all their equipment and firepower, the intervening forces are far more concerned with staying alive than with jeopardising their own safety on behalf of an endangered foreign population. The interveners help deliver aid, negotiate cease-fires between rival combatants, and bring some general organisation to the lives of the displaced people. But

in the end, the endangered populations find that the interveners' presence is only marginally connected with their protection. The media cameras eventually disappear; the international forces return home to commendation; commanders write their after-action-reports; and they remain displaced, endangered, or dead.

If Western states continue to operate as risk societies, the implications for future endangered populations will continue to be grim. Regardless of the scale of the humanitarian atrocity and despite the verbal condemnations that emerge from Western leaders, the populations will only be protected by Western states as long as doing so manages more risks for the intervener than it generates.

8.1.4 Sovereignty

Although sovereignty has never really been a static concept,³ it underwent modifications in the 1990s that can be somewhat explained by the emergence of a risk outlook in the West. As Nicholas Wheeler thoroughly explained in his book *Saving Strangers*, the post-Cold War international community increasingly accepted the legitimacy of humanitarian justifications for intervening in certain humanitarian crises. However, rather than being evidence of a solidarist shift, it may simply be evidence of dominant Western risk societies intervening to manage the risks generated by population crises. In fact, the risk society explanation accounts for the "gap" between Western humanitarian rhetoric and practice much better than solidarism.

In the post-Cold War environment in which the West is relatively free from imminent survival threats, the risks posed by humanitarian tragedies are relatively greater than they

³ J. Samuel Barkin, "The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence of Human Rights Norms", *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2, 1998, 229-252.

once were and are, therefore, afforded greater weight in the West's response calculus. In the democratic West, the plight of endangered populations can generate risks in terms of credibility, legitimacy, unity, and stability. Nevertheless, these risks are still assessed among a host of others before Western leaders can determine an appropriate course of action. This array of constantly changing risks accounts for the West's mission selectivity. Moreover, population abuse is not often of sufficient priority by itself to generate an intervention, especially if the intervention has the potential of generating substantially greater risks to the intervener. Thus, Western humanitarian rhetoric can be sincere even though military intervention on the population's behalf does never follow.

At times, humanitarian tragedies generate sufficient risks to generate Western military action, but the degree of Western action is proportionate to the West's perception of the risk. Because risk assessments constantly change, the West's willingness to expend resources on humanitarian crises change as well, sometimes in the middle of an operation. At times, mandates are suddenly expanded, and at other times, they are terminated altogether.

The transition of the West into risk societies suggests that the concept of sovereignty will remain in flux for the near future. Western states will continue to rely on humanitarian arguments to justify interventions, but they are not likely to support efforts to legitimise an "obligation to intervene" precisely because such an obligation would decrease the risk manager's flexibility and could actually work against the pursuit of his or her self-interests.

Although humanitarian concern for an endangered population is, by itself, frequently insufficient to move Western states to action, Western decision-makers appeal to it quite often when justifying their decision to intervene. The humanitarian motive increases the legitimacy of military action. Even when a non-humanitarian reason for launching military action is fairly well accepted by the international community, Western interveners cannot afford to ignore the humanitarian effects of their actions. Indeed, the accomplishment of a humanitarian objective has become an expectation for virtually all Western military action. In a climate characterised by uncertain hazards of a non-survival nature, the use of such terms as "self-defence", "national security", and "national interest" are usually not enough in themselves to foster long-lasting international toleration of Western military actions. By way of example, the US, and arguably the entire NATO alliance, deemed post-September 11th terrorism, particularly from Al Qaeda, a threat to its national interests. Even the UN added its legitimacy to the American-led response following the attacks. The subsequent coalition attack on Afghanistan was agreed by most states to be a justifiable action of self-defence. Nevertheless, US and UK officials were quick to emphasise the humanitarian benefit the operation would have for the oppressed people of Afghanistan. When US President George W. Bush announced the beginning of the military campaign in Afghanistan, he stressed the dual military and humanitarian nature of the operation. He declared that "the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan".⁴ Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasised the West's

⁴ President George W. Bush's Address to the Nation, 7 Oct 2001, <http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911d.html>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

humanitarian motives when he characterised the battle in Afghanistan as a “battle to allow the Afghans themselves to retake control of their country”.⁵

The US and UK governments used similar rhetoric to justify their campaign against Iraq. Though the Security Council deemed Iraq’s non-compliance with a host of resolutions between 1991 and 2003 regarding weapons of mass destruction to be a threat to international peace and security, the US and UK governments emphasised the benefits to the population as the moral case for war. In a speech to the American Enterprise Institute on 26 February 2003, Bush devoted considerable time to outlining the benefits a military operation would have for the people of Iraq. “The first to benefit from a free Iraq,” he said,

would be the Iraqi people, themselves. Today they live in scarcity and fear, under a dictator who has brought them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their lives and their freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein -- but Iraqi lives and freedom matter greatly to us.⁶

Bush went on to discuss a US commitment to Iraqi self-determination, the provision of emergency food rations, the contribution of millions of dollars through humanitarian relief agencies, the provision of security, and the protection of natural resources. All of these commitments were in addition to the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, which was the real basis of Security Council Resolution 1441.

In a similar way, Tony Blair differentiated between the legal case for war and the moral case. The latter, he said, hinged on the condition of the Iraqi population under Saddam Hussein. After stating a number of facts about the atrocities that occurred regularly under

⁵ Tony Blair, “Extracts of Speech given by Tony Blair to the Welsh Assembly 30 Oct”, *Guardian*, 31 Oct 2001, cited in David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention*, (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 72.

the Iraqi regime, Blair declared that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was “inhumane”, and he pledged that if the UK went to war in Iraq, it would “be as committed to the humanitarian task of rebuilding Iraq for the Iraqi people as [it has] been to removing Saddam”.⁷

It seems that for the West, humanitarian justifications and demonstrable humanitarian results are no longer optional when it comes to legitimising intervention. Unlike the Cold War notion of sovereignty where self-defence was the only justification for intervention, it now appears that self-defence, devoid of humanitarian benefit, is no longer enough. Yet, as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the cases evaluated in this paper have shown, humanitarian efforts are usually the first to be emphasised verbally, and the first to be abandoned in practice. Instead, humanitarian aims are a legitimising addendum to more traditional notions of national interest

8.1.5 Future Interventions

If the risk perspective continues to gain ground in the West, it will have an impact on how the West conducts future protection interventions. It is now generally recognised that for speed and military efficiency, a “coalition of the willing” led by a capable state is vastly preferable at the commencement of an intervention to a UN “blue-beret” force, though the UN force will probably be necessary at some future stage of the operation. If a crisis fails to generate the requisite degree of risk to incite a sufficiently capable “lead state” to conduct the intervention, then it is likely that no intervention will take place. Because

⁶ U.S. President George W. Bush, Office of the Press Secretary, February 26, 2003, President’s Remarks, “President discusses the future of Iraq”, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington D.C., <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030226-11.html>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

⁷ British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech Delivered at Labour’s local government, women’s and youth conferences, SECC, Glasgow, 15 February 2003, <http://www.thespeechwriter.com/speeches/blairspeech.htm>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

past Western attempts to distribute the risks of intervention to UN peacekeepers often generated more risks in the long run that they alleviated, the West is unlikely to pursue that option in the future.

Secondly, in spite of the international community's humanitarian rhetoric, it is probable that fewer protection interventions will have formal Security Council authorisation. The optimism that characterised the early 1990s with regards to the efficacy of UN peacekeeping operations was crushed in the streets of Mogadishu, the killing fields of Kigali, and the safe area of Srebrenica. Moreover, beginning with the intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 and continuing throughout the decade, the Security Council was careful to highlight the extraordinary nature of the events that led to the decision to intervene. States that had troublesome minority populations of their own were strongly opposed to any precedent-setting categorisations which could detract from their future ability to govern their territory as they saw fit. States in the developing world were particularly sensitive to these changes, and had capable champions for their stance in the form of China and Russia. In the 1990s, the Security Council was able to label these interventions as "exceptional", but as one intervention followed another, this rationale became harder to defend.

Furthermore, as Western states were usually the ones calling for and leading the interventions, protection efforts came to be viewed by many as a form of neo-colonialism. In 1999 when NATO side-stepped Security Council authorisation and launched Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, many Member States were convinced that the days of "exceptional" intervention were coming to an end. The US and UK actions with regard to Iraq in 2003 added to their certainty.

In response to this "trend", the permanent five members of the Security Council are more likely to use their vetoes or threats of veto in order to avoid setting a UN precedent for the "right" to humanitarian intervention on behalf of endangered populations. If the West is determined to intervene, it will have to do so without the legitimacy or the scapegoat provided by the UN throughout the 1990s.

Disagreement within the Security Council is not limited to the "West versus the rest". As mentioned previously, the uncertain nature of risks means that different risk societies can come to vastly different conceptions of what constitutes a risk and how best to manage it. It is far more conceivable now than it was during the 1990s that Security Council authorisation for intervention could be withheld primarily as a result of disagreement among Western states.

Thirdly, future interventions will probably be characterised by greater asymmetry and violence between Western interveners and the opposition forces. The risk-conscious West will increasingly rely on its technological advantages as it seeks to minimise its exposure to casualties in its management operations. As in the past, the West will emphasise the use of airpower, though piloted missions will decrease as unmanned aerial vehicles are perfected and new aerial technologies become operational. Western ground forces, when they are deployed, will go equipped with overwhelming firepower designed primarily for force protection purposes. When it comes to self-defence, Western troops will operate with robust rules of engagement that enable them to seize and maintain the initiative.

In contrast to the casualty averse, technologically advanced West, the opposition forces are more likely to rely on low-technology, indiscriminate attacks, chosen for their ability to produce large numbers of casualties. The previous actions and responses of Western interveners have dispelled much of the deterrent value of Western threats and humanitarian rhetoric. Rather than being cowed by the West's tough talk and "demonstrations" of military force, opposition forces now expect the interveners to be casualty averse and uncommitted to the cause of population protection. Though the opposition forces are not likely to confront the interveners directly, they will employ brutal tactics designed to shake the western public's commitment to the humanitarian cause. To accomplish this goal, it will not be necessary for the opposition forces to defeat the Western protectors; it will only be necessary for them to generate anxiety within the Western public. A few carefully selected acts of barbarity in response to the interveners' sterile precision will accomplish a great deal in this regard.

8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Because it is likely that risk societies and endangered non-combatant populations will continue to exist in the near future, it is useful to consider ways in which interveners and vulnerable populations might optimise their actions in this new security environment. While this section is not intended to be a formal presentation of "lessons learned" or a blueprint for specific actions in the future, it, nevertheless, offers some suggestions for leaders of Western risk societies and vulnerable populations world-wide.

8.2.1 Western Decision-makers

Leaders of risk societies must recognise that in an environment free from survival threats, humanitarian atrocities against non-combatants will often generate risks in terms of international order, regional stability, international credibility, alliance unity, domestic support, and moral legitimacy that cannot be ignored. Whenever humanitarian atrocities are combined with extensive media coverage, empathetic Western publics, and a security environment devoid of survival threats, they are likely to generate sufficient risks to require some form of active management. Consequently, it is beneficial for decision-makers to plan for this eventuality and begin the management process as early as possible. Risk management techniques are designed to be proactive, and the earlier a manager formulates a strategy, the more time he or she has to adjust to the changing hazard. After the West's experiences in the 1990s, decision-makers should not be surprised when atrocities against populations generate risks of a sufficient magnitude to demand some sort of Western response. In some cases, advance planning and policy formulation may be all that is required to avoid the crisis-driven policies of the past. In other cases, Western states might be able to use early diplomatic and economic incentives to deter the combatants from targeting the population or to motivate and prepare regional security organisations to act more quickly.

In addition to diplomatic and economic pressures, Western states should conduct a realistic assessment of the possible scope of the likely population displacement, both inside the affected state as well as within neighbouring states. Based on these early assessments, humanitarian aid may be more appropriately prepared and strategies for dealing with the displaced people more realistically devised. Diplomatic and economic pressure and assistance should also be applied to the states surrounding the affected area

so that endangered populations are not refused entry if they flee. Should the predicted refugee flows be extensive enough to warrant a transfer of refugees to other states, Western states should make these arrangements in advance, thereby avoiding *ad hoc* measures that have a tendency to exacerbate troubling situations.

When determining what managerial strategy to employ, decision-makers should make a clear distinction between aid and protection. Western publics will generally support the provision of long-term humanitarian aid to endangered populations with very little government justification. In contrast, their support for humanitarian protection will be fickle due to the dangerous nature of the mission and the personal sacrifice that is required to provide it. As was evident throughout the 1990s, ambiguous mandates and unclear expectations often caused more problems over the course of the intervention than they alleviated. When the public is clear on the objective of the government's strategy, it is far more likely to withhold its criticism if it sees that the objective is being logically pursued, even if it disagrees with the strategy

Clearly stating the objective of the operation is also highly beneficial to the vulnerable population. Western decision-makers must consider that the use of phrases like "safe havens/areas", "protection zones", and "humanitarian corridors" convey intentions to endangered populations and the international community at large which the Western interveners of the past never intended to satisfy. By stating clearly-defined objectives from the outset, Western states will not only be better prepared to deflect international expectations to continually expand their mission, but they it will also give the endangered population a realistic idea of what level of external support to expect.

Next, when formulating their strategies, the decision-makers must recognise that taking on the mantle of protector, even rhetorically, should not be regarded as a trouble-free way-out of difficult political problems. Truly protecting an endangered population during an ongoing intrastate conflict is extremely difficult and its attempt can generate a host of new risks. Protection is a long, difficult task that requires a great deal of political leadership and continual salesmanship to the public. Leaders should constantly reiterate the reasons for intervention and avoid the temptation of overstating the mission's success. If the public is led to believe that an intervention is highly successful and then learns of a development which seems to disprove this assessment, it could result in the complete loss of public confidence either in the government's truthfulness or in its ability to properly assess the situation. Whichever conclusion the public draws, it will likely lead to calls for the termination of the intervention.

In addition to being time-consuming and difficult, population protection is a very dangerous task. As a result of previous interventions, decision-makers should consider that their verbal threats and "shows of force" may no longer have much deterrent effect on the belligerents. Furthermore, if troops are sent to protect a population, it is highly likely that a determined opposition will challenge them with the goal of killing or wounding as many interveners as possible. As a result, interveners should guard against over-reliance on the consent of belligerents. To the belligerents fighting for their survival, consent is a tool to be used for the manipulation of the intervener. As such, it can easily be withdrawn or modified, leaving the intervener exposed and vulnerable. Rather than be put in this situation, decision-makers should expect and plan for non-consensual operations. Non-consensual operations require greater numbers of highly-

trained troops and specialised equipment, and must be undertaken with a greater expectancy of casualties.

Finally, decision-makers must give ample consideration to the risks that accompany failed operations or early withdrawals. When interventions are conducted under the banner of the UN, Western states can lay the failure at the feet of a faceless entity and avoid most of the blame. As the likelihood of UN authorisation decreases, however, Western interveners will be forced to shoulder more responsibility for the results of their actions. First of all, failed interventions result in the deaths of innocent non-combatants. In the 1990s, thousands of civilians who placed their trust in interveners were killed and millions of others were either left in transit camps or displaced within their countries as their "protectors" boarded ships or aeroplanes bound for home. Many interveners also lost their lives in operations that were never intended to 'succeed' at population protection. These intervening troops were often poorly prepared and ill-equipped for the missions assigned to them. Consequently, they paid the ultimate price for the political expediency of the decision-makers. Western leaders do not usually escape the backlash from failed interventions, regardless of how well they distributed the risks ahead of time. As after-action reports and official inquiries into protection failures have repeatedly shown, their actions will be assessed and blame will be apportioned with little deference to their status or position.

Once again, the key to successful risk management strategies on behalf of endangered populations is advanced planning. The plans will most certainly change as the risks become more defined, but having considered the possible options in advance will reduce the need for *ad hoc* measures. As the interventions of the 1990s have shown, crisis

responses designed to deal with short-term discomfort often generate boomerang risks which can be very difficult to manage in the long term.

8.2.2 Endangered Populations

Since non-combatants are the ones who have suffered the most as a result of the West's metamorphosis into a community of risk societies, this thesis concludes with several recommendations for them. It is perhaps strange to offer recommendations to endangered populations on how they might increase their chances of convincing the West to intervene on their behalf. In many ways, doing so may seem to be a pointless exercise. After all, endangered non-combatants—the elderly and infirm, women and children, men who are either unable or unwilling to take up arms—are rarely in positions of choice regarding their situations. They are, by necessity, usually focused totally on their survival, clinging desperately to any source of hope, no matter how obscure or doubtful it may be. Nevertheless, among such desperate populations, leaders emerge who wield influence over the masses. Additionally, in the case of several recent interventions, representatives of endangered populations have waged aggressive media campaigns to increase the West's awareness of their plight. The following recommendations are addressed to these representatives and are purposely of a general nature.

First, endangered populations must be aware that, while they face a threat to their survival, the potential interveners do not. So-called protection interventions generally occur because humanitarian atrocities, when weighed against other hazards, generate risks to the intervener of a sufficient degree to warrant some form of action. Generally speaking, intervening states act because they choose to do so, not because it is required to preserve their way of life. This is particularly important for those seeking protection to

understand because the loud and persuasive humanitarian rhetoric coming from the West will often convey a degree of commitment beyond what they are willing to make. Though the language of humanitarianism is spoken fluently by the West, and though Western populations earnestly desire that non-combatants be afforded a degree of protection, their commitments do not yet coincide with their rhetoric.

This incongruity being the case, endangered populations must seek to understand their own situation in terms of the interveners' risk environment. Only by understanding the interveners' situation can they accurately assess their chances for external protection and convey their predicament in terms that will resonate with the Western states. In evaluating the West's risk environment, endangered populations should consider the competing hazards confronting Western states, particularly whether or not the West is facing a survival threat from any source. Factors such as the political climate, the result of its most recent intervention, the degree of popular support for the cause, and the likelihood of UN authorisation for an intervention should also be key considerations.

While not a comprehensive list, these considerations will assist the population in developing a clear picture of the situation, and could be quite helpful in determining the degree of protection the crisis is likely to generate. For example, if a potential intervener is facing a survival threat, it is highly unlikely that a distant humanitarian crisis is going to generate enough risk to warrant an intervention. In such a case, the endangered population would probably do better to ignore Western rhetoric and engage in self-help activities. Rather than staying in the country in hopes that the interveners will come to their rescue, it might be better to cross into a neighbouring state where laws and

organisations governing refugees are better established and the immediate danger of hostile combatants is reduced.

Secondly, the endangered population should seek ways of increasing the degree of insecurity that their crisis causes to the West. Though the non-combatants understand the source of their danger quite clearly, they should not assume that it is so easily understood by Western risk societies. To the West, the crisis may be no more than a distant and confusing conflict involving people of different histories, norms, and cultures. Therefore, in order to accomplish the twin goals of uncertainty diminution and insecurity expansion, endangered populations must utilise the media, NGOs, diaspora populations, public awareness campaigns, and lobbyists to communicate and publicise their plight to Western audiences.

Use of the media is particularly important as visual images arouse empathy with the endangered people and often incite the public to demand action from their governments. In dealing with the media, endangered people should remember that the media converges on those places that are likely to generate the most public interest. Therefore, leaders within the endangered population must be media savvy, even as they struggle to survive. This means that they must often resist the urge to retaliate against their oppressors as retaliation blurs the distinction between victim and violator.

The constant focus of those in need of Western protection must be to raise the awareness of the Western public. An empathetic public can generate high levels of insecurity among decision-makers even when more traditional threats to their self-interests are absent from the crisis. Western risk societies are much more likely to intervene in distant

conflicts when faced with a relatively straightforward humanitarian situation that is generating high levels of insecurity.

Western states experience the highest level of insecurity when their survival is in question. For this reason, endangered populations should strive to associate their need for protection with the interveners' survival to the greatest extent possible. As Western interventions are motivated primarily by self-interest, the more a humanitarian crisis is seen to directly threaten the future of a Western state's existence, the more likely that Western state will be to respond in a vigorous manner. Threats of refugee flows, regional instability, and moral credibility are useful and should certainly be emphasised, but they usually convey issues of choice for the intervener. Survival threats, on the other hand, demand a response. During the Cold War, needy states often used the threat of communist infiltration as a pretext for soliciting Western aid. In the zero-sum environment of bi-polar politics, this was generally an effective strategy. Now, endangered populations must use the threat of other relevant dangers to induce the West into action. One possibility would be the threat of terrorism. Endangered populations living in the midst of intrastate conflict could make the case that anti-western terrorists were taking advantage of the chaos caused by the conflict and were using the territory as a base of operations. Similarly, they could claim that the West's inaction in the conflict would be deeply resented by the population and would serve as a recruiting mechanism for terrorist organisations bent on the destruction of the West. Whatever the issue, the important point is that endangered people seeking protection should constantly seek to narrow the identity gap between Westerners and themselves, and between Western security and their own.

Finally, endangered populations should recognise that a Western intervention does not guarantee their protection. Western interveners have repeatedly shown that they act in proportion to the degree of risk they feel as a result of the humanitarian crisis. Decision-makers allocate resources according to their perception of the risks involved. Because risks are uncertain and, therefore, fluid, decision-makers constantly reassess their risk priorities. Such reassessments can be fatal for vulnerable populations. When the risks generated by intervention outweigh those resulting from inaction, the interveners will find a way to withdraw "with honour", even though they leave the population with totally inadequate protection. Knowing this, the endangered populations must not rest in past efforts once an intervention occurs, but must work to keep the humanitarian crisis a priority risk for the interveners until they are out of danger.

The difficulty with this recommendation is that the manner in which the intervener assesses his or her risk is largely out of the population's control. Therefore, in spite of the interveners' humanitarian rhetoric and promises of protection, threatened populations must resist the temptation to rely solely on the interveners for protection. Instead, they should remain sceptical of the interveners' commitment and avoid taking any action that would increase their vulnerability if the interveners suddenly withdrew. For this reason, vulnerable civilians should be particularly wary of strategies that designate areas of protection within their home state. Safe areas are notoriously difficult to protect. Against a determined opposition, protection of safe areas requires massive numbers of troops and equipment, aggressive rules of engagement, and a committed Western public. Because the attainment of any one of these ingredients is rare when there is no perceived threat to the intervener's survival, endangered people should realise that they may inadvertently be increasing their vulnerability by congregating in such an area. Endangered non-

combatants should retain as much independence and capability to protect themselves as possible.

FINAL THOUGHTS

This thesis has endeavoured to contribute to the understanding of Western interventions in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s by showing the applicability of using risk principles to explain the complex manner in which the West safeguards its self-interests in the post-Cold War security environment. The 21st Century has already proven to be a tumultuous time. In addition to Western military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, humanitarian tragedies continue to stimulate Western involvement. At the time of this writing, the European Union is engaged in population protection in a small area of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the United States is strongly considering sending a US peacekeeping force into Liberia. How these interventions play out will signify the extent to which the risk framework remains an applicable and helpful tool for understanding Western protection interventions.

APPENDIX 1 EAST TIMOR

INTRODUCTION

Critics of the risk society explanation given in this paper could argue that the successful post-referendum protection intervention in East Timor in 1999 weakens or even disproves the contention of this thesis. After all, the intervention in East Timor accomplished an impressive array of achievements. In a remarkably short period of time, the UN Security Council authorised a multinational “coalition of the willing” led by Australia to restore peace and security to East Timor. International Force East Timor, or INTERFET as the force was called, received a Chapter VII authorisation and was mandated to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate. Even more impressive was the fact that the Australian-led force began its deployment only five days after receiving its authorisation. Additionally, INTERFET deployed with overwhelming force, accomplished its mission without any friendly combat-related fatalities, and managed to avoid practically all confrontations with the Indonesian military forces (TNI) on the island. Within six months of the deployment, INTERFET was able to transfer the mission to the UN Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET), which maintained control of the island until East Timor received its independence two years later.¹ In spite of these realities and in response to the critics, this thesis maintains that the protection intervention in East Timor was clearly predicated on risk principles. It is, in a sense, the exception that proves the rule.

¹ East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002.

From the beginning of the 1998 tripartite negotiations between the UN, Portugal, and Indonesia regarding the future of East Timor, until the Australian-led coalition handed over control to the UN on 14 February 2000, Western states exhibited the characteristics of risk societies as they prioritised the protection of their self-interests over that of the endangered East Timorese. Even so, there were a number of unique factors associated with the East Timor case that make its broader applicability to protection interventions of limited utility. These factors significantly reduced the uncertainty faced by the interveners, which allowed them to pursue a more aggressive managerial strategy than many other interventions in the 1990s. While other interventions shared some of these characteristics, the combination of them into one case made the intervention in East Timor quite distinct. To elaborate further on these points, this section will be divided into two parts. The first part addresses the uniqueness of the East Timor case, and the second explains the risk application more fully.

A.1 UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES

The INTERFET coalition benefited from a number of unique circumstances which contributed to its ability to stabilise and protect the East Timorese population. These factors included overwhelming support for independence amongst the East Timorese population, high Indonesian vulnerability to international pressure, consent from Indonesia, and the disciplined inactivity of the East Timorese independence fighters. Each of these factors contributed to a decrease in the amount of uncertainty that characterised the operational environment, and hence, lowered the risks to the intervening forces.

A.1.1 Indigenous Support

Unlike most interventions of the 1990s, East Timor's indigenous population was largely united in its desire to be independent from Indonesia.² The history of East Timor was completely different from that of Indonesia's other territories. The distinction between the Indonesians and the East Timorese was further reinforced by the fact that the East Timorese were predominately Christians, whereas Indonesia was the world's largest Muslim nation. Simply put, Indonesia had practically no historical, ethnic, or religious tie to the territory. As such, the small number of pro-integration militia personnel on the island were practically bereft of a support base from which to sustain their military campaign. Instead, they were completely dependent on the Indonesian military. These factors, along with the Indonesian's twenty-three-year brutal campaign against the East Timorese, contributed to the strong sense of a distinctive East Timorese identity among a vast majority of the population.

A.1.2 Indonesian Vulnerability

The second factor that made the protection intervention in East Timor unique was the vulnerability of the Indonesian government to international pressure. From the outset, the international community frowned upon the manner in which the Indonesians took control of the island. Though Portugal never renounced its administrative control of the territory, it withdrew from East Timor in 1974 due to the civil unrest. In December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor, and in 1976, claimed it as its twenty-seventh province. The international community, with the exception of Australia, never acknowledged the

² Though various tribal groupings existed within East Timor, they were united by their common dislike for the Portuguese and Indonesian oppressors. See Tim Huxley, *Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper 349, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), 33.

validity of Indonesia's claim by granting it *de jure* recognition over the territory.³ On the contrary, the Security Council passed Resolutions 384 in December 1975 and 389 in April 1976 calling on Indonesia to withdraw from the territory and for all nations to respect East Timor's right to self-determination. Additionally, the General Assembly annually reaffirmed East Timor's right to self-determination until 1981, when it authorised the Secretary-General to use his good offices to bring about a settlement to the dispute.⁴

Indonesia was also vulnerable to international pressure as a result of its economic woes in the late 1990s. In 1998, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia's leader, President Suharto, had been toppled from power, and the country began a transition to democracy. An interim government, led by President B.J. Habibie, was formed to fill the vacancy until elections could be held in the last half of 1999. As a result of Suharto's mismanagement and corrupt economic practices, as well as the financial crisis throughout the region, Indonesia was in dire economic straits. For a government that presided over a multitude of disparate and geographically-separated ethnicities, many of which were showing signs of increased opposition to Indonesian rule, economic stability was crucial to the maintenance of the state. It was also critical for Habibie, in light of an approaching election, to demonstrate his commitment to democracy and his ability to foster an economic recovery.⁵ To accomplish the latter, he needed to secure loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which made him particularly

³ Australia granted Indonesia *de jure* recognition over the territory in 1979.

⁴ Ian Martin, *Self Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 17-18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 29.

susceptible to international pressure.⁶ Vulnerability of this sort would prove to be a critical factor in Indonesia's acceptance of a post-referendum UN force in East Timor.

International support of East Timor and pressure on Indonesia also increased as a result of the tripartite negotiations that ended in the signing of the May 5th Agreements and the ensuing referendum on the territory. In the May 5th Agreements, the UN agreed to conduct and monitor a "consultation" on East Timor regarding an offer of autonomy. If the East Timorese rejected the autonomy offer, they would be granted independence from Indonesia and the territory would be transferred to the UN until an appropriate transition to independence could occur. Indonesia's decision and the May 5th Agreements received widespread international support. In Security Council Resolution 1246 of 11 June 1999, the Security Council expressed its approval for the agreement and authorised the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to conduct the consultation. The consultation took place on 30 August 1999 with over 98 percent of registered voters taking part. The East Timorese rejected autonomy with Indonesia by a margin of 78.5 percent to 21.5 percent in a vote that was considered to be free and fair by the UN Electoral Commission. Such an overwhelming result in a process agreed upon by the Indonesian government significantly increased Indonesia's vulnerability to international pressure.

A.1.3 Indonesian Consent

The most significant factor differentiating the East Timor case from other third party interventions was the extent of Indonesian consent throughout the process. It was

⁶ James Cotton, " 'Peacekeeping' in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999, 239. See also Martin, *Self Determination*, 107-8, and Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, *Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor*, 7 December 2000, para 3.52 (hereafter referred to as *Australia Report*), http://www.apf.gov.au/senate/committee/fadt_ctte/east_timor/report/index.htm. Accessed 7 July 2003.

President Habibie who broke the deadlock in the tripartite talks between Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN by announcing that he was prepared to grant East Timor special autonomy. Soon after, it was Habibie who decided to give the East Timorese an immediate vote or "consultation" on the acceptance of special autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty or the rejection of autonomy in favour of full independence. This decision was in defiance of all external inputs, including those from Australian officials and East Timorese independence activists. Though Indonesians have since blamed the West for facilitating the loss of East Timor, the initiation of the process clearly came from the Indonesian government.

The Indonesian president not only initiated the consultation, but he also consented to the deployment of an international protection force prior to the Indonesian parliament's ratification of the election results. Moreover, the Indonesian government specifically urged Asian states to participate in the intervention force. While it is true that he consented largely as a result of diplomatic and economic pressures, the necessity of the international force was a direct result of Indonesia's inability to meet its pre-acknowledged commitment to provide security in the immediate aftermath of the consultation. Throughout the entire process, Indonesia's consent had the effect of greatly reducing the uncertainty surrounding a possible intervention, making international support for the intervention much easier to get and maintain.

A.1.4 Indigenous Inactivity

The final circumstance that made the East Timor intervention unique was the inaction of the East Timorese opposition force, FALINTIL. Though FALINTIL had waged an armed guerrilla struggle for independence from Indonesia since the invasion in 1975, its leaders,

encouraged by East Timorese activist leaders, chose to disengage from fighting once the plans for the consultation were announced. Even after the pro-Indonesian militias and TNI soldiers began ransacking the cities and driving the Timorese into hiding, FALINTIL forces did not respond militarily in hopes of further inciting international attention and eventual intervention. Once INTERFET intervened, FALINTIL refused to disarm, but it did agree to remain within specified camps and to cease all military operations except those done in self-defence. FALINTIL's inaction further reduced the uncertainty regarding the situation on the island. As there was no military response from the East Timorese, the pro-Indonesian supporters could not justify their destructive actions as self-defence.⁷ Instead, the inhumane actions of the pro-Indonesian militias stood in stark contrast to the actions of the East Timorese, making it much easier for the international community to differentiate between villain and victim.

A.2 RISK APPLICATION

Though the crisis in East Timor was unique in many respects, the handling of it by the West was consistent with a risk approach. Western states, through their influence in the UN Security Council as well as their direct actions, demonstrated that their primary concern was not the immediate suffering of the East Timorese non-combatants, but the future hazards that the East Timorese situation generated for themselves. While the humanitarian tragedy generated risks to Western states, they had to be weighed against a host of other competing risks before deciding on an appropriate response. Simply stated, the risk generated by the plight of the East Timorese population to Western states never surpassed the risk associated with overriding the sovereignty of such a valuable economic

⁷ Ibid., 72.

and geo-strategic partner as Indonesia, especially over its "internal affairs". This is evident in the fact that the atrocities in East Timor were predicted well in advance of their perpetration, yet no action was taken to ensure the protection of the population. Analysts, intelligence officials, and the militia leaders themselves had been predicting the humanitarian disaster before the consultation on East Timor ever took place.⁸ In spite of these indications, Western states chose to prioritise the protection of their own interests over the protection of the East Timorese population.

To address the risk management strategy of the West more fully, this analysis is divided into two parts. The first addresses the actions of the UN and the West in general. The second focuses specifically on the risk assessment and management strategies of Australia.

A.2.1 Western Risk Management

Pro-Indonesian violence against the East Timorese civilians was evident at each stage of the dispute, yet the West consistently prioritised its relations with Indonesia over the protection of the civilian population. When Habibie announced that he would grant East Timor autonomy, and then again when he proposed the consultation on autonomy, pro-Indonesian militias, aided by the TNI, committed widespread atrocities in the territory.⁹ UN officials and various Member States noted this trend and voiced their concerns to Indonesia numerous times. UN representatives tried to insert specific security provisions

⁸ According to Coral Bell, all of the intelligence bodies in Australia predicted widespread violence in East Timor as early as April 1999. Coral Bell, "East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A Case Study in Crisis Management", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, 171. Militia leaders vowed to fight a civil war if East Timor move towards independence as early as February 1999 according to Human Rights Watch. Cited in William Maley, "Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical Comments", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, (2000): 154. Also see *Australia Report*, Chapter 7, footnote 157, p. 183.

⁹ Martin, *Self Determination*, 24-5.

into the May 5th Agreements,¹⁰ but the Indonesian representatives refused to include them in the final agreement. Regardless of the woefully inadequate security measures allotted for the civilian population, the UN and Portuguese representatives signed the May 5th Agreements.

Western officials repeatedly stated their concern for the safety of the non-combatants of East Timor, yet they consistently agreed to Indonesia's demands and assurances without establishing any consequences should the requisite security be neglected. On 27 April 1999 at a meeting with Habibie in Bali, Australian Prime Minister Howard, pressured by the US, urged Indonesia to accept a peacekeeping force prior to the consultation.¹¹ Indonesia rejected this suggestion so vehemently that the Howard government refused to use any diplomatic or economic leverage to achieve this aim and chose, instead, to rely on the Indonesian security commitments. Similarly, the US was unwilling to use its economic or military leverage to ensure the civilian population was protected. Thus, when UNAMET, the election-monitoring mission, was deployed to East Timor, it was totally dependent on the Indonesian forces to safeguard its presence. Instead of peacekeepers or a neutral security force, UNAMET was comprised of 50 military officers whose function was to liaise with the TNI and 275 unarmed civilian police who acted solely in an advisory role.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., 31.

¹¹ On 25 February 1999, Stanley Roth, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, urged Dr. Ashton Calvert, Australian Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to push Indonesia to accept a neutral security force. Calvert said that Australia's position was "to avert the need for recourse to peacekeeping". See Australian Senate, *Final Report*, para 7.120.

¹² Martin, *Self-Determination*, 38-9.

Once UNAMET members were on the island, they witnessed first-hand the TNI involvement in the brutality against East Timorese civilians.¹³ As early as June, UNAMET confirmed the humanitarian NGOs' assessment that there were already 40,000 IDPs, many of whom told stories of rape, torture, and the destruction of entire villages by the militias and TNI soldiers.¹⁴ UNAMET workers reported the urgency of the security situation and warned of a catastrophe if the population voted for independence. The pre-consultation violence and intimidation were so severe that voter registration had to be delayed on two separate occasions, and the number of displaced East Timorese rose to 60,000. Nevertheless, Western states did nothing other than verbally pressure Indonesia to fulfil its security commitments.¹⁵

After the results of the consultation were announced on 4 September, the militias, aided and directed by the TNI, wreaked havoc all across East Timor.¹⁶ Even then, the UN Security Council responded by sending another observation team on a fact-finding mission to see the damage for themselves.¹⁷ Though the UN boasted of its quick response and Australia of its swift deployment, in the sixteen days between the results being announced and the deployment of INTERFET, 80 percent of the population was displaced. An estimated 500,000 people were forced to flee from their homes, and another 240,000 fled or were forcibly relocated to West Timor.¹⁸ Additionally over 70 percent of the physical infrastructure was destroyed in what Jarat Chopra, the initial head of the UNTAET Office of District Administration, compared to the "razing and salting of

¹³ Australian Senate, *Final Report*, para 7.107

¹⁴ Martin, *Self-Determination*, 45.

¹⁵ E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.3, 6 April 2000, "Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, to the Commission on Human rights in accordance with Commission Resolution 1999/S-4/1 of 27 September 1999. UN Commission on Human Rights. .

¹⁶ Terry McCarthy, "On the Razor's Edge: After East Timor is savaged by thugs, Indonesia agrees to let in U.N. peacekeepers", *Time*, September 20, 1999, 26.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁸ E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.3, paras 17 and 19.

ancient Carthage or the sacking of Troy".¹⁹ The country was in shambles and UNAMET had withdrawn.

Though the Secretary-General used tough rhetoric when Indonesia refused to give its consent for a security mission, there was no serious talk within the Security Council of overriding the consent of Indonesia on behalf of the population. Military pressure was never used, though economic pressure from the IMF and various forms of diplomatic pressure from the US were eventually applied.²⁰ Only when the atrocities in East Timor generated domestic pressure in the West did Western states find inaction on behalf of the East Timorese to be untenable—and, even then, the West insisted on Indonesian consent before it agreed to protect the endangered population.

A.2.2 Australia's Risk Perspective

Since Australia led the international intervention into East Timor, it is worthwhile to examine the process that led to the specifics of Australia's action in greater detail. When analysing the ongoing violence in East Timor, the Australian government faced six primary risks. The most dangerous of the risks was a possible military conflict with Indonesia. Though Indonesia was undergoing political and economic difficulties, it still possessed a large and capable military. When asked why the government did not insist that a peacekeeping operation be deployed prior to the consultation, John Dauth, Australia's Deputy Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, responded, "... we no more than any other country in the world were prepared to go to war with Indonesia to do that".²¹

¹⁹ Moreen Dee, "'Coalitions of the Willing' and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia's Involvement with INTERFET", *International Peacekeeping*, (Autumn 2001) no. 3, A Frank Cass Journal, 4.

²⁰ *Australia Report*, paras 3.49-3.55.

²¹ *Australia Report*, Chapter 7, para 7.118, page 188

Secondly, the crisis on East Timor posed a risk to regional stability.²² On the one hand, if the crisis was not addressed swiftly or was allowed to drag on indefinitely, it could have incited populations in other Indonesian holdings, eventually resulting in the “Balkanisation” of the state. Such an occurrence would have had serious economic and security implications for the region. The crisis in East Timor had the potential to encourage minorities in other Asian states to launch similar independence struggles. On the other hand, there was the possibility that international action, in defiance of Indonesia’s will, would embolden disaffected populations throughout the region even further.²³ Heightened political instability at a time of serious economic instability could have had major repercussions on all the states in the region. One of the consequences for Australia would have been a surge of refugees. As East Timor was located just across a narrow stretch of water from Australia, refugees were a very real probability. In fact, prior to the events of 1999, Australia was already accommodating approximately 20,000 East Timorese refugees.²⁴

The third risk faced by Australia was the issue of regional credibility. Australia was East Timor’s nearest neighbour with the capability to intervene. As Australia had been trying to secure its position as a key member of the region, its refusal to get involved could have reinforced the impression among its Asian neighbours that it was not an Asian nation at all, in spite of its geographical location. Furthermore, as Australia championed a European conception of human rights in an Asian environment, its refusal to act would have invited criticism that its ethical stance was nothing more than empty rhetoric. There

²² For a more comprehensive analysis of regional stability concerns, see Alan Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (54), no. 2, (2000): 163-5.

²³ Huxley, *Disintegrating Indonesia?*, 74-5.

²⁴ Cotton, “‘Peacekeeping’”, 244.

was also a reverse risk to Australia's regional credibility. Intervention by the white Australians could have been seen by the other Asian states as an attempt to become a new European hegemon in the region, with the goal of enforcing its foreign conceptions of morality on its Asian neighbours.²⁵

Fourthly, Australia jeopardised losing international credibility if it refused to act. As Australia was the obvious choice to lead an intervention force on the island, its refusal could have demonstrated that it was incapable of leading such an operation.²⁶ Though Australia had participated in numerous peacekeeping contingencies and interventions, it had always done so under the leadership of another country. East Timor presented a chance for Australia to demonstrate its right to be considered a regional power in Asia. On the other hand, an unsuccessful intervention in such a "minor" conflict posed the opposite risk of its being viewed as incapable of acting in a leadership role.

Fifthly, the Australian government faced the risk of losing the support of its domestic public if it chose not to intervene. Prime Minister Howard's change in policy regarding East Timor was probably the result of the opposition Australian Labor Party's (ALP) decision to support East Timor's self-determination in 1997. The ALP's stance proved to be so popular with Australians that when Suharto was forced out of power, Howard's government took advantage of the opportunity and altered its position on East Timor.²⁷

When militia violence on East Timor increased in 1999, the majority of the Australian public was highly supportive of Australian action to protect the East Timorese. This

²⁵ Dupont, 164-5.

²⁶ Admiral Chris Barrie, Media Conference, 16 September 1999, Internet <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/parchiv/2000/Q2000-May-11/easttimor.defence.gov.au/Galleries/templates/templates/315024-2.html>. Accessed 18 July 2003.

²⁷ Martin, *Self-Determination*, 20 and Cotton, 239.

support was grounded in feelings of shame over Australia's past betrayal of the East Timorese. In return for the suffering which the East Timorese had endured for supporting Australian Special Forces against the Japanese during World War II, Australia had supported Portugal in its resumption of control over East Timor after the war ended.²⁸

Additionally, many Australians felt a sense of shame over their government's foreign policy decision in 1979 in which it broke ranks with the international community and granted *de jure* recognition of Indonesia's seizure of East Timor in order to secure favourable oil and geo-strategic interests.²⁹ One Australian businessman said, "A lot of us have felt the guilt. I, for one, am glad we're finally evening accounts. I think most Australians feel that way, and that's one of the reasons the peacekeeping mission has been supported so enthusiastically".³⁰

As a sign of the popular support, pro-intervention demonstrations broke out across the country, and in a poll immediately prior to the intervention, 72% of the public supported intervention.³¹ While it is impossible to know how the public would have reacted if Australian forces had taken large casualties on behalf of the East Timorese people, there was a general feeling within Australia at the beginning of the conflict that the cause was worth supporting, even at the expense of casualties or worsening relations with Indonesia.³²

²⁸ Dec, 5.

²⁹ Ibid., 5. Also see *Australia Report*, Chapter 7.

³⁰ David Lamb, "Australia's Support for E. Timor Rooted in Guilt", *Los Angeles Times*, 22 September 1999, A4.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Colonel Stephen Dunn, Royal Australian Army Representative to the UK, Interview with the author, 1 August 2002.

Finally, the uncertainty about the public's commitment to the intervention in the event of friendly casualties posed a risk to the Australian government. Though the public seemed to be in favour of the operation at the outset, the government feared that the public's support could dwindle if casualties mounted. With a loss of domestic support, the mission could result in failure, bringing with it negative consequences to Australia's credibility and legitimacy.

A.2.3 Australian Risk Management

In an effort to reduce the likelihood of these risks, the Australian government pursued a managerial strategy designed to deal specifically with each of the risks it faced. Australia's efforts were characterised by preventive action, risk containment, and risk distribution.

To deal with the primary risk of a military confrontation with Indonesia, Australia required Indonesia's consent before it would intervene in the region. Even when the public was demanding action and the media was reporting the horrific atrocities occurring daily on East Timor, the Australian government refused to consider any operation unless Indonesia first gave its consent. Though Indonesia might resent the intervention and be embittered towards the state through which it came, it was extremely unlikely to renege on its international commitment once it had been made. The attainment of this consent was an extremely important managerial success for Australia, but it resulted in delayed action that cost the East Timorese severely.

Next, Australia proactively managed the risk of regional instability which could have resulted from a prolonged conflict by demanding that its intervention force be granted

Chapter VII authority and a mandate to use all necessary means. These two demands ensured that Australia would be able to confront the militias swiftly and robustly without having to wait for additional approval from the Security Council. These pre-approved demands were especially important since Security Council Member States were known for their quickly shifting opinions and tendency to bow to pressure from Indonesia. With the authority to use all necessary means, the Australians could intervene in a way that would end the conflict quickly, leave little time for it to spread to other parts of the region, and signal to other paramilitaries that interveners would have the authority to act decisively.

In order to manage the risk to its credibility in the region, Australia-distributed the risk among a coalition of willing states, particularly those of other Asian nations. In this way, Australia hoped to be seen as acting in the collective interest of Southeast Asia, rather than as a geographically separated piece of Europe or a pawn of the US. To emphasize this point, Australia chose Thailand's Major General Songkitti Jaggabattara as the Deputy Commander of the operation. The recruitment of coalition partners was made much easier by the fact that Indonesia consented to the intervention and appealed to other Asian nations to join in the intervention force. In the end, twenty-two states, including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Fiji, and China joined Australia in its efforts.

To manage the risk to its international credibility, Australia once again chose a strategy of distribution. Before it agreed to lead the intervention, it required Security Council authorisation. UN authorisation not only bolstered Australia's credibility, but it also minimised the accusations from other states in the region that Australia was seeking to

dominate the region or to become a neo-colonial power. Australia further bolstered its international credibility by convincing the US to send troops to support the operation. Though the Clinton administration was initially reluctant to do so, Prime Minister Howard shamed him into a commitment by reminding him of Australian support for past American operations. The US eventually obliged him by agreeing to deploy 385 non-combat troops in addition to providing the necessary airlift for the intervention.³³

The final two risks posed by the intervention were the only ones that Australia could not manage prior to the intervention. To reduce the risk of losing domestic support, the Australian government needed to accomplish the intervention quickly and successfully on behalf of the East Timorese population. To maintain domestic support, it had to intervene in such a way that would increase the potential for a quick victory and reduce the potential for large numbers of casualties. Thus, with intervention a necessity, Australia's biggest risk became the possibility of failure. Unlike many other interventions of the 1990s, failure in East Timor was tied to the protection of East Timorese non-combatants from pro-Indonesian militias. Australian decision-makers realised that a failed intervention had implications for the stability of the region, for Australia's credibility both in the region and in the wider international community, and for the Australian government's legitimacy at home.

Australia used a variety of methods to manage the risk of failure. First, it prioritised force protection over population protection. Regardless of the public support, casualty avoidance underpinned everything that INTERFET did. Australia's Chief of Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie, emphasised the priority of force protection and hinted at the

³³ Henry S. Albinski, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 1999", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 46, Issue 2, 2000, 206-7.

triage nature of risk management in his first press conference of the intervention. "While our aim is to relieve the suffering of the East Timorese people", he said, "this will need to be balanced with the making sure [sic] we can deploy a self contained force, able to provide its own security and that of the United Nations...".³⁴ Consistent with this reasoning, INTERFET first secured Dili and other major cities and towns to use as secure bases of operations before slowly spreading out into the countryside where the displaced population had fled.

Secondly, Australia sought to minimise the possibility of a confrontation with TNI forces in East Timor. Although Indonesia had pledged its consent to the intervention, INTERFET commanders were uncertain as to how the TNI forces on the island would react to the international force. Therefore, they instituted confidence-building measures and sought the co-operation of the TNI as long as they remained on East Timor.³⁵ INTERFET was careful not to provoke the TNI soldiers, knowing that the Indonesian military had lost many countrymen in their fight to extinguish the opposition forces in East Timor.³⁶ Instead, INTERFET strove to partner with them as much as possible, even though the TNI began its withdrawal as soon as INTERFET was deployed to the region. Throughout the operation, Major General Peter Cosgrove, INTERFET's commander, insisted that INTERFET be transparent in its actions in the hope of avoiding a confrontation between Indonesia and Australia that could quickly change the political climate of the intervention.

³⁴Barrie, Media Conference.

³⁵ Ibid. See also Major General Peter Cosgrove, Transcript from "INTERFET Commander Under Pressure", Maxine McKew interviews Major General Peter Cosgrove, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 8 October 1999, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/stories/s58082.htm>. Accessed 7 July 2003.

³⁶ According to James Cotton, since Indonesia's integration of East Timor in 1976, the Indonesian military had suffered "approximately 20,000 casualties, with between 5000 and 10,000 killed". See Cotton, 243.

Thirdly, INTERFET deployed with overwhelming force. Its force structure consisted of 9,400 troops from 19 different countries. As for combat forces, INTERFET consisted of over four infantry battalion groups, one mechanised battalion group, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, an armoured personnel squadron, and numerous Special Forces.³⁷ Interestingly, there were no attack aircraft used in the operation. The deployment of overwhelming force had two principle advantages. It allowed the coalition forces to secure the region quickly and thus reduce their vulnerability and the vulnerability of their mission. It also served as a deterrent to the militias who could have had little doubt as to INTERFET's technological superiority.

Next, to complement the sizeable force, INTERFET operated with aggressive rules of engagement which allowed its soldiers to seize and maintain the initiative. In fact, the joint conference assigned to review the implementation of the Brahimi Report commended INTERFET's simple, yet robust ROE. It found that "[s]implification of the Rules of Engagement (ROE)—i.e. 'shoot to kill' if there is a threat to the mission—has ... been a deterrent to the militia".³⁸ Unlike many other interventions, INTERFET's ROE included the "disarmament and pacification of hostile elements".³⁹ Speaking of the combined effect of force dominance and aggressive rules of engagement, Cosgrove made the following assessment of the strategy:

Our troops were able to starkly demonstrate to all interested parties the penalties and sanctions that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the wealth of violent rhetoric. Our high-end capabilities meant that with battlefield mobility and surveillance systems we were able to seem ubiquitous. I believe the very

³⁷ Alan Ryan, "Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor", Study Paper No. 304, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Nov 2000, <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/SP%20304.pdf>. Accessed 7 July 2003.

³⁸ "The Reform Process of United Nations Peace Operations: Debriefing and Lessons", UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)—The Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)—Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) Conference, 2-3 April 2001, Singapore, Report Dated 28 April 2001, 3. http://www.ips.org.sg/unitar/Rep_Rec.pdf, Accessed 18 July 2003.

³⁹ Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2002), 288.

capable structure and training inherent in the force actually was a major factor in restraining the number of casualties on both sides.⁴⁰

When the operation ended, the objective of casualty avoidance had clearly been accomplished as INTERFET did not suffer a single combat-related death.

Finally, Australia reduced its risk of failure by securing East Timor quickly and turning the mission over to UNTAET. By the middle of October 1999, just weeks after its arrival, INTERFET had secured the island to the point that UNTAET could begin its mission. By February 2000, INTERFET transferred the security of the island to UNTAET security forces. At that time, the intervention went from being a "coalition of the willing" under the leadership of Australia to a "blue beret" force under command of the UN. To most of the soldiers on the ground, the only obvious change between the two forces was the hat they wore from one day to the next. To the Australian government, the hand-over brought significant relief.

CONCLUSION

INTERFET's intervention was arguably more successful than other interventions in the 1990s, but this result should not be attributed to a major shift toward cosmopolitan thinking, as some have suggested, or as a refutation of the risk society explanation. On the contrary, Western states behaved in much the same self-serving manner as they had done in previous interventions. Western states on the Security Council refused to challenge the consent of Indonesia and continually deferred to Indonesia's will in the matter, though it did eventually pressure Indonesia to give way. Member States prioritised their self-interests over the protection of the East Timorese population, even

⁴⁰ Dec, 14.

when so doing resulted in the destruction of the territory's infrastructure, the displacement of the entire population, and the withdrawal of the UN Mission. When INTERFET was launched, the interveners distributed the risks as widely as possible and prioritised the safety of the intervening forces over the lives of the endangered population.

Australia's actions were very much in conformity with a risk management approach, though the risks Australia faced were somewhat unique as a result of the low degree of uncertainty they faced. It was because of this unique environment that the East Timorese population fared so much better than other populations in the 1990s, and it is this uniqueness that must prevent INTERFET from being regarded as an exceptional case of population protection or a refutation of the risk society explanation. Unfortunately for vulnerable populations, it is highly unlikely that such a combination of factors, and hence, such a result, will occur again soon

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